GHSA-GQXP-FJ3H-CR3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-10-15 12:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ice: fix race condition in TX timestamp ring cleanup
Fix a race condition between ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() and ice_tx_map() that can cause a NULL pointer dereference.
ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring currently clears the ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME flag after NULLing the tstamp_ring. This could allow a concurrent ice_tx_map call on another CPU to dereference the tstamp_ring, which could lead to a NULL pointer dereference.
| CPU A:ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() | CPU B:ice_tx_map() |
|---|---|
| tx_ring->tstamp_ring = NULL | |
| ice_is_txtime_cfg() -> true | |
| tstamp_ring = tx_ring->tstamp_ring | |
| tstamp_ring->count // NULL deref! | |
| flags &= ~ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME |
Fix by: 1. Reordering ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() to clear the flag before NULLing the pointer, with smp_wmb() to ensure proper ordering. 2. Adding smp_rmb() in ice_tx_map() after the flag check to order the flag read before the pointer read, using READ_ONCE() for the pointer, and adding a NULL check as a safety net. 3. Converting tx_ring->flags from u8 to DECLARE_BITMAP() and using atomic bitops (set_bit(), clear_bit(), test_bit()) for all flag operations throughout the driver: - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_XDP - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG1 - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG2 - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_TXTIME
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-53008"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-362"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:12Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix race condition in TX timestamp ring cleanup\n\nFix a race condition between ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() and ice_tx_map()\nthat can cause a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nice_free_tx_tstamp_ring currently clears the ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME flag\nafter NULLing the tstamp_ring. This could allow a concurrent ice_tx_map\ncall on another CPU to dereference the tstamp_ring, which could lead to\na NULL pointer dereference.\n\n CPU A:ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() | CPU B:ice_tx_map()\n --------------------------------|---------------------------------\n tx_ring-\u003etstamp_ring = NULL |\n | ice_is_txtime_cfg() -\u003e true\n | tstamp_ring = tx_ring-\u003etstamp_ring\n | tstamp_ring-\u003ecount // NULL deref!\n flags \u0026= ~ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME |\n\nFix by:\n1. Reordering ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() to clear the flag before\n NULLing the pointer, with smp_wmb() to ensure proper ordering.\n2. Adding smp_rmb() in ice_tx_map() after the flag check to order the\n flag read before the pointer read, using READ_ONCE() for the\n pointer, and adding a NULL check as a safety net.\n3. Converting tx_ring-\u003eflags from u8 to DECLARE_BITMAP() and using\n atomic bitops (set_bit(), clear_bit(), test_bit()) for all flag\n operations throughout the driver:\n - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_XDP\n - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG1\n - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG2\n - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_TXTIME",
"id": "GHSA-gqxp-fj3h-cr3v",
"modified": "2026-10-15T12:30:36Z",
"published": "2026-06-24T18:32:43Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53008"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/097409d20465723283632515df73038a4a853eda"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c72ec18c2a4111204c2e915f8e4f6d849ce9398"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e98cea6d5562f546482fab8ad571e95e3fff1800"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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