GHSA-GQXP-FJ3H-CR3V

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-24 18:32 – Updated: 2026-06-24 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: fix race condition in TX timestamp ring cleanup

Fix a race condition between ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() and ice_tx_map() that can cause a NULL pointer dereference.

ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring currently clears the ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME flag after NULLing the tstamp_ring. This could allow a concurrent ice_tx_map call on another CPU to dereference the tstamp_ring, which could lead to a NULL pointer dereference.

CPU A:ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() CPU B:ice_tx_map()
tx_ring->tstamp_ring = NULL
ice_is_txtime_cfg() -> true
tstamp_ring = tx_ring->tstamp_ring
tstamp_ring->count // NULL deref!
flags &= ~ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME

Fix by: 1. Reordering ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() to clear the flag before NULLing the pointer, with smp_wmb() to ensure proper ordering. 2. Adding smp_rmb() in ice_tx_map() after the flag check to order the flag read before the pointer read, using READ_ONCE() for the pointer, and adding a NULL check as a safety net. 3. Converting tx_ring->flags from u8 to DECLARE_BITMAP() and using atomic bitops (set_bit(), clear_bit(), test_bit()) for all flag operations throughout the driver: - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_XDP - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG1 - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG2 - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_TXTIME

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-53008"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-24T17:17:12Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: fix race condition in TX timestamp ring cleanup\n\nFix a race condition between ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() and ice_tx_map()\nthat can cause a NULL pointer dereference.\n\nice_free_tx_tstamp_ring currently clears the ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME flag\nafter NULLing the tstamp_ring. This could allow a concurrent ice_tx_map\ncall on another CPU to dereference the tstamp_ring, which could lead to\na NULL pointer dereference.\n\n  CPU A:ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() | CPU B:ice_tx_map()\n  --------------------------------|---------------------------------\n  tx_ring-\u003etstamp_ring = NULL     |\n                                  | ice_is_txtime_cfg() -\u003e true\n                                  | tstamp_ring = tx_ring-\u003etstamp_ring\n                                  | tstamp_ring-\u003ecount  // NULL deref!\n  flags \u0026= ~ICE_TX_FLAGS_TXTIME   |\n\nFix by:\n1. Reordering ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring() to clear the flag before\n   NULLing the pointer, with smp_wmb() to ensure proper ordering.\n2. Adding smp_rmb() in ice_tx_map() after the flag check to order the\n   flag read before the pointer read, using READ_ONCE() for the\n   pointer, and adding a NULL check as a safety net.\n3. Converting tx_ring-\u003eflags from u8 to DECLARE_BITMAP() and using\n   atomic bitops (set_bit(), clear_bit(), test_bit()) for all flag\n   operations throughout the driver:\n   - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_XDP\n   - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG1\n   - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_VLAN_L2TAG2\n   - ICE_TX_RING_FLAGS_TXTIME",
  "id": "GHSA-gqxp-fj3h-cr3v",
  "modified": "2026-06-24T18:32:43Z",
  "published": "2026-06-24T18:32:43Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-53008"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/097409d20465723283632515df73038a4a853eda"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7c72ec18c2a4111204c2e915f8e4f6d849ce9398"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}


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