GHSA-GQMR-M2RF-7C75
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-16 06:30 – Updated: 2026-10-16 06:30The User Profile Builder – Beautiful User Registration Forms, User Profiles & User Role Editor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.3 via the role parameter handled by the wppb_add_meta_to_user_on_activation() function. The vulnerability exists because the activation handler passes the attacker-supplied role value directly to WP_User::set_role() with no allow-list validation, and the 4.0.3 reserved-name check exempts pre-existing form fields from the block, allowing a legacy field with meta-name role to persist and bridge attacker-controlled request input into the serialized signup record stored in wp_signups. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain a fully activated WordPress administrator account by submitting role=administrator through the public [wppb-register] shortcode form and subsequently clicking the confirmation activation link. Exploitation requires the site to have a legacy form field with meta-name role carried over from before the 4.0.3 upgrade, email confirmation enabled, and open user registration — all stable site-state conditions once established.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-109447"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-269"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-16T06:17:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "The User Profile Builder \u2013 Beautiful User Registration Forms, User Profiles \u0026 User Role Editor plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 4.0.3 via the `role` parameter handled by the `wppb_add_meta_to_user_on_activation()` function. The vulnerability exists because the activation handler passes the attacker-supplied role value directly to `WP_User::set_role()` with no allow-list validation, and the 4.0.3 reserved-name check exempts pre-existing form fields from the block, allowing a legacy field with meta-name `role` to persist and bridge attacker-controlled request input into the serialized signup record stored in `wp_signups`. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain a fully activated WordPress administrator account by submitting `role=administrator` through the public `[wppb-register]` shortcode form and subsequently clicking the confirmation activation link. Exploitation requires the site to have a legacy form field with meta-name `role` carried over from before the 4.0.3 upgrade, email confirmation enabled, and open user registration \u2014 all stable site-state conditions once established.",
"id": "GHSA-gqmr-m2rf-7c75",
"modified": "2026-10-16T06:30:28Z",
"published": "2026-10-16T06:30:28Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-109447"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profile-builder/tags/4.0.3/admin/admin-functions.php#L400"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profile-builder/tags/4.0.3/features/email-confirmation/email-confirmation.php#L262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profile-builder/tags/4.0.3/front-end/class-formbuilder.php#L736"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profile-builder/tags/4.0.3/front-end/class-formbuilder.php#L793"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/browser/profile-builder/tags/4.0.3/front-end/register.php#L91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3741133/profile-builder"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://plugins.trac.wordpress.org/changeset/3741133/profile-builder/trunk/features/email-confirmation/email-confirmation.php"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.wordfence.com/threat-intel/vulnerabilities/id/88bfd754-e2ee-47c7-9af5-f31cbe993102?source=cve"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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