GHSA-GPPM-HQ3P-H4RP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-11-08 19:03 – Updated: 2026-06-26 19:29Summary
Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server.
Atlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens ghs_...) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub.
When Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization.
This was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in Atlantis v0.30.0.
Details
Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer.
While auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered:
- Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications.
- Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application.
- Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using Terraform's GitHub integration.
Atlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as:
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58","msg":"Refreshing git tokens for Github App","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64","msg":"token ghs_[REDACTED]","json":{}}
{"level":"debug","ts":"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z","caller":"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36","msg":"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying","json":{}}
This enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters.
While the set-up "most employees have read-only access to Argo CD" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis.
This issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?&vendor=runatlantis&product=atlantis only lists CVE-2022-24912, which is unrelated).
Could you please publish a security advisory?
PoC
Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability.
cf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details.
Impact
What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?
- This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File).
- This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis.
- This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.30.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-52009"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-532"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2024-11-08T19:03:35Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2024-11-08T23:15:05Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n_Short summary of the problem. Make the impact and severity as clear as possible. For example: An unsafe deserialization vulnerability allows any unauthenticated user to execute arbitrary code on the server._\n\nAtlantis logs contains GitHub credentials (tokens `ghs_...`) when they are rotated. This enables an attacker able to read these logs to impersonate Atlantis application and to perform actions on GitHub.\n\nWhen Atlantis is used to administer a GitHub organization, this enables getting administration privileges on the organization.\n\nThis was reported in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 and fixed in https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667 . The fix was included in [Atlantis v0.30.0](https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0).\n\n### Details\n_Give all details on the vulnerability. Pointing to the incriminated source code is very helpful for the maintainer._\n\nWhile auditing the Kubernetes/Argo CD/Atlantis deployment of some company, the following set-up was encountered:\n\n- Most employees have read-only access to Argo CD, enabling them to see the health of deployed applications.\n- Atlantis was deployed as an Argo CD application.\n- Atlantis was used to manage the configuration of a GitHub organization (such as team members), using [Terraform\u0027s GitHub integration](https://registry.terraform.io/providers/integrations/github/latest).\n\nAtlantis logs on Argo CD contained lines such as:\n\n```json\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":\"2024-11-07T17:58:30.636Z\",\"caller\":\"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:58\",\"msg\":\"Refreshing git tokens for Github App\",\"json\":{}}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":\"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z\",\"caller\":\"vcs/gh_app_creds_rotator.go:64\",\"msg\":\"token ghs_[REDACTED]\",\"json\":{}}\n{\"level\":\"debug\",\"ts\":\"2024-11-07T17:58:30.637Z\",\"caller\":\"vcs/git_cred_writer.go:36\",\"msg\":\"git credentials file has expected contents, not modifying\",\"json\":{}}\n```\n\nThis enabled employees with read-only access to Argo CD to get administration privileges on the GitHub organization, compromising all repositories. As some repositories were used for Infrastructure-as-Code deployment (with Atlantis), this enabled the security auditors to get cluster admin privileges on most Kubernetes clusters.\n\nWhile the set-up \"most employees have read-only access to Argo CD\" can be seen as dangerous, this should not incur such security risk (cf. https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security/). The main issue here was that the logs contained privileged GitHub tokens as they were obtained by Atlantis.\n\nThis issue was already reported (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060) and fixed (https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667) but no security advisory was published on https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security and no CVE was assigned (https://app.opencve.io/cve/?\u0026vendor=runatlantis\u0026product=atlantis only lists [CVE-2022-24912](https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-24912), which is unrelated).\n\nCould you please publish a security advisory?\n\n### PoC\n_Complete instructions, including specific configuration details, to reproduce the vulnerability._\n\ncf. https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060 for more details.\n\n### Impact\n_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_\n\n- This leaks sensitive GitHub tokens in the log files (CWE-532: Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File).\n- This could enable anyone with log read access to compromiseGitHub organizations managed by Atlantis.\n- This impact at least users using Atlantis with Github application and integration.",
"id": "GHSA-gppm-hq3p-h4rp",
"modified": "2026-06-26T19:29:46Z",
"published": "2024-11-08T19:03:35Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/security/advisories/GHSA-gppm-hq3p-h4rp"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-52009"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/issues/4060"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/pull/4667"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/commit/0def7d3fb74aabb75570554692b053950cde02e1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://argo-cd.readthedocs.io/en/stable/operator-manual/security"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/runatlantis/atlantis/releases/tag/v0.30.0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://pkg.go.dev/vuln/GO-2024-3265"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:H/VI:N/VA:N/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Git credentials are exposed in Atlantis logs"
}
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| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
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