GHSA-GMPF-GMWM-HXHP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-19 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bonding: fix devconf_all NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled
When booting with the 'ipv6.disable=1' parameter, the devconf_all is never initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is called which initializes it. bond_send_validate(), however, will still call bond_ns_send_all() even ipv6 is indeed disabled. It will lead to NULL derefence of net->ipv6.devconf_all in ip6_pol_route().
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c [...] Workqueue: bond0 bond_arp_monitor [bonding] RIP: 0010:ip6_pol_route+0x69/0x480 [...] Call Trace: ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_ip6_pol_route_output+0x10/0x10 fib6_rule_lookup+0xfe/0x260 ? wakeup_preempt+0x8a/0x90 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? sched_balance_rq+0x369/0x810 ip6_route_output_flags+0xd7/0x170 bond_ns_send_all+0xde/0x280 [bonding] bond_ab_arp_probe+0x296/0x320 [bonding] ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f bond_activebackup_arp_mon+0xb4/0x2c0 [bonding] process_one_work+0x196/0x370 worker_thread+0x1af/0x320 ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0xe3/0x120 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x199/0x260 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
Fix this by adding ipv6_mod_enabled() condition check in the caller.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-68336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:23Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbonding: fix devconf_all NULL dereference when IPv6 is disabled\n\nWhen booting with the \u0027ipv6.disable=1\u0027 parameter, the devconf_all is\nnever initialized because inet6_init() exits before addrconf_init() is\ncalled which initializes it. bond_send_validate(), however, will still\ncall bond_ns_send_all() even ipv6 is indeed disabled. It will lead to\nNULL derefence of net-\u003eipv6.devconf_all in ip6_pol_route().\n\n BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000000c\n [...]\n Workqueue: bond0 bond_arp_monitor [bonding]\n RIP: 0010:ip6_pol_route+0x69/0x480\n [...]\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n ? __pfx_ip6_pol_route_output+0x10/0x10\n fib6_rule_lookup+0xfe/0x260\n ? wakeup_preempt+0x8a/0x90\n ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n ? sched_balance_rq+0x369/0x810\n ip6_route_output_flags+0xd7/0x170\n bond_ns_send_all+0xde/0x280 [bonding]\n bond_ab_arp_probe+0x296/0x320 [bonding]\n ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n bond_activebackup_arp_mon+0xb4/0x2c0 [bonding]\n process_one_work+0x196/0x370\n worker_thread+0x1af/0x320\n ? srso_return_thunk+0x5/0x5f\n ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0xe3/0x120\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x199/0x260\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nFix this by adding ipv6_mod_enabled() condition check in the caller.",
"id": "GHSA-gmpf-gmwm-hxhp",
"modified": "2026-08-19T18:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-10T15:33:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1c975de3343cdef506f2eecc833cc1f14b0401c4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2a4bad24ac5296b262ad821aa5e08bb265e6b154"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/451c2d5422a309393aa8ae161fc1a527c2f19ab2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/690ce66782778e8c4b1fdd79c0b0890a100e9522"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/738039ad21e20ca2c5bbde2f5a4f5ad5fb718038"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/992dce02bdabbd9883255ea9b36494e34a7821d7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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