GHSA-GH4C-W75C-262G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: guest_memfd: take the invalidate lock when unbinding a dying file
kvm_gmem_unbind() takes mapping->invalidate_lock only if the get_file_active() succeeds. When the guest_memfd file is dying, its reference count is already zero so get_file_active fails and the binding is removed without holding the invalidate lock.
kvm_gmem_invalidate_{start,end}() checks f->bindings independently to decide whether to begin or end KVM MMU invalidation. So, the bindings must therefore remain stable between the two calls. Otherwise, unbind can remove a binding after start increments mmu_invalidate_in_progress, but before end finds the binding and decrements it. Example, unbind race with memory failure:
CPU 0: memory failure CPU 1: memslot delete
(guest_memfd file is dying)
kvm_gmem_error_folio() kvm_gmem_invalidate_start() finds binding mmu_invalidate_in_progress++ kvm_gmem_unbind() get_file_active() fails removes binding kvm_gmem_invalidate_end() no binding found counter stays elevated
mmu_invalidate_retry() then returns 1 forever, so guest page faults retry without ever installing a mapping and the guest hangs.
Remove the distinction between live and dying files in the unbind path. Always use slot->gmem.file and take the invalidate lock when it's non-NULL. Normal unbind callers hold slots_lock, which prevents release from clearing the pointer or freeing the file state until unbind completes. Final VM teardown can only see a NULL pointer because guest_memfd pins the KVM until release has cleared all bindings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99336"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:44Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: guest_memfd: take the invalidate lock when unbinding a dying file\n\nkvm_gmem_unbind() takes mapping-\u003einvalidate_lock only if the\nget_file_active() succeeds. When the guest_memfd file is dying, its\nreference count is already zero so get_file_active fails and the binding\nis removed without holding the invalidate lock.\n\nkvm_gmem_invalidate_{start,end}() checks f-\u003ebindings independently to\ndecide whether to begin or end KVM MMU invalidation. So, the bindings\nmust therefore remain stable between the two calls. Otherwise, unbind\ncan remove a binding after start increments mmu_invalidate_in_progress,\nbut before end finds the binding and decrements it.\nExample, unbind race with memory failure:\n\n CPU 0: memory failure CPU 1: memslot delete\n ---------------------------------- ---------------------------\n (guest_memfd file is dying)\n kvm_gmem_error_folio()\n kvm_gmem_invalidate_start()\n finds binding\n mmu_invalidate_in_progress++\n kvm_gmem_unbind()\n get_file_active() fails\n removes binding\n kvm_gmem_invalidate_end()\n no binding found\n counter stays elevated\n\nmmu_invalidate_retry() then returns 1 forever, so guest page faults\nretry without ever installing a mapping and the guest hangs.\n\nRemove the distinction between live and dying files in the unbind path.\nAlways use slot-\u003egmem.file and take the invalidate lock when it\u0027s non-NULL.\nNormal unbind callers hold slots_lock, which prevents release from clearing\nthe pointer or freeing the file state until unbind completes. Final VM\nteardown can only see a NULL pointer because guest_memfd pins the KVM until\nrelease has cleared all bindings.",
"id": "GHSA-gh4c-w75c-262g",
"modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:21Z",
"published": "2026-11-19T15:31:21Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99336"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/024be82ac4c4df650cc6daca6d7db79daee95470"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0ee2c883b62deb74d8c43007e8049dc006d3a2fb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3af94f4e3526efdf52d84d7ba8d9fb8e8facb93a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4ae4316682cdc78d8f5a856ab0712a8281f211ca"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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