GHSA-GG5J-6742-V827
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-12 22:55 – Updated: 2026-11-12 22:55Summary
XdsServer in @grpc/grpc-js-xds does not apply RBACPerRoute overrides from matching Route or VirtualHost resources. When a trusted xDS control plane supplies a broad top-level ALLOW policy and a stricter override, XdsServer ACKs the resources but evaluates the RPC under the top-level policy.
Details
Override parser lookup uses the override message type
parseOverrideFilterConfig() in packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter.ts:225-257 looks up FILTER_REGISTRY using the override message type:
type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBACPerRoute
Source: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter.ts#L225-L257
setup() in packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter/rbac-filter.ts:167-173 registers the filter only under the top-level RBAC type:
type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBAC
Source: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter/rbac-filter.ts#L167-L173
The lookup returns null even though the registered entry contains parseOverrideRbacConfig(), and server.ts silently skips the override.
Override maps are keyed by type URL instead of filter name
overrideConfigMaps in server.ts:99-102 is documented as keyed by HTTP filter name, but server.ts:169-174 stores each map under filterConfig.typeUrl.
Source: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L99-L102
Source: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L169-L174
Route overrides are later looked up by their typed_per_filter_config key, which is the HttpFilter.name. An ordinary key such as rbac therefore misses the stored map.
VirtualHost overrides are not read
handleRouteConfigurationResource() in server.ts:225-249 reads route.typed_per_filter_config but never reads virtualHost.typed_per_filter_config.
Source: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L225-L249
When no override reaches the RBAC interceptor, rbac-filter.ts:125-155 evaluates the broader top-level policy.
Proof of concept
Set:
GRPC_XDS_EXPERIMENTAL_RBAC=true
Run XdsServer with a protected unary handler.
Have the ADS control plane deliver a Listener containing an RBAC HTTP filter named rbac with a top-level ALLOW-any policy:
name: rbac
typed_config:
"@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBAC
rules:
action: ALLOW
policies:
allow-any:
principals: [{ any: true }]
permissions: [{ any: true }]
Deliver a matching non-forwarding route with this override:
typed_per_filter_config:
rbac:
"@type": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBACPerRoute
rbac:
rules:
action: DENY
policies:
deny-any:
principals: [{ any: true }]
permissions: [{ any: true }]
Invoke the protected unary method without credentials.
Expected: The route-specific DENY policy rejects the RPC before the protected handler runs.
Observed: XdsServer ACKs the resources, retains the top-level ALLOW policy, and runs the protected handler.
Listener and RouteConfiguration: ACKED
gRPC status: OK
handler invocations: 1
response: PROTECTED_SECRET_RECORD_RBAC_OVERRIDE
Impact
Users of @grpc/grpc-js-xds who are using RBAC-based authentication with override configurations may unintentionally accept some requests that should be rejected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@grpc/grpc-js-xds"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "1.14.0"
},
{
"fixed": "1.14.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-128065"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-863"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-12T22:55:47Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\n`XdsServer` in `@grpc/grpc-js-xds` does not apply `RBACPerRoute` overrides from matching Route or VirtualHost resources. When a trusted xDS control plane supplies a broad top-level ALLOW policy and a stricter override, `XdsServer` ACKs the resources but evaluates the RPC under the top-level policy.\n\n### Details\n\n### Override parser lookup uses the override message type\n\n`parseOverrideFilterConfig()` in packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter.ts:225-257 looks up FILTER_REGISTRY using the override message type:\n\n`type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBACPerRoute`\nSource: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter.ts#L225-L257\n\n`setup()` in packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter/rbac-filter.ts:167-173 registers the filter only under the top-level RBAC type:\n\n`type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBAC`\nSource: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/http-filter/rbac-filter.ts#L167-L173\n\nThe lookup returns null even though the registered entry contains `parseOverrideRbacConfig()`, and server.ts silently skips the override.\n\n### Override maps are keyed by type URL instead of filter name\n\n`overrideConfigMaps` in server.ts:99-102 is documented as keyed by HTTP filter name, but server.ts:169-174 stores each map under `filterConfig.typeUrl`.\n\nSource: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L99-L102\n\nSource: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L169-L174\n\nRoute overrides are later looked up by their `typed_per_filter_config` key, which is the `HttpFilter.name`. An ordinary key such as rbac therefore misses the stored map.\n\n### VirtualHost overrides are not read\n\n`handleRouteConfigurationResource()` in server.ts:225-249 reads `route.typed_per_filter_config` but never reads `virtualHost.typed_per_filter_config`.\n\nSource: https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/blob/56567d9604b4e45cdca0d2e3c2a60ac227ee659d/packages/grpc-js-xds/src/server.ts#L225-L249\n\nWhen no override reaches the RBAC interceptor, rbac-filter.ts:125-155 evaluates the broader top-level policy.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nSet:\n```\nGRPC_XDS_EXPERIMENTAL_RBAC=true\n```\n\nRun `XdsServer` with a protected unary handler.\n\nHave the ADS control plane deliver a Listener containing an RBAC HTTP filter named rbac with a top-level ALLOW-any policy:\n\n```\nname: rbac\ntyped_config:\n \"@type\": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBAC\n rules:\n action: ALLOW\n policies:\n allow-any:\n principals: [{ any: true }]\n permissions: [{ any: true }]\n```\n\nDeliver a matching non-forwarding route with this override:\n\n```\ntyped_per_filter_config:\n rbac:\n \"@type\": type.googleapis.com/envoy.extensions.filters.http.rbac.v3.RBACPerRoute\n rbac:\n rules:\n action: DENY\n policies:\n deny-any:\n principals: [{ any: true }]\n permissions: [{ any: true }]\n```\n\nInvoke the protected unary method without credentials.\n\nExpected: The route-specific DENY policy rejects the RPC before the protected handler runs.\n\nObserved: `XdsServer` ACKs the resources, retains the top-level ALLOW policy, and runs the protected handler.\n\n```\nListener and RouteConfiguration: ACKED\ngRPC status: OK\nhandler invocations: 1\nresponse: PROTECTED_SECRET_RECORD_RBAC_OVERRIDE\n```\n\n### Impact\n\nUsers of `@grpc/grpc-js-xds` who are using RBAC-based authentication with override configurations may unintentionally accept some requests that should be rejected.",
"id": "GHSA-gg5j-6742-v827",
"modified": "2026-11-12T22:55:47Z",
"published": "2026-11-12T22:55:47Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/security/advisories/GHSA-gg5j-6742-v827"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/commit/b8f3ced4d4699338dd33dc0f7b1d68d689a31d0e"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/grpc/grpc-node/releases/tag/@grpc/grpc-js-xds@1.14.2"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "@grpc/grpc-js: RBAC override configs in VirtualHost and Route resources are not applied"
}
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