GHSA-GG4R-JV3P-QX3C
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-10 19:56 – Updated: 2026-11-10 19:56Summary
sanitizeFilter exists to stop query selector injection: it wraps operator objects such as { $ne: null } in filter values in $eq, so they are matched literally. Set on a connection with mongoose.connect() or createConnection(uri, { sanitizeFilter: true }), the connection reports it as enabled but queries never apply it. An application that relies on the connection-level option and passes an attacker-controlled object into a filter therefore remains open to selector injection, and a password value of { $ne: null } returns the account record without the password.
Details
NativeConnection#createClient() at lib/drivers/node-mongodb-native/connection.js:270-272 moves options.sanitizeFilter into Connection.config and deletes the original option. Query#_castConditions() at lib/query.js:2413-2423 checks Connection.options, the global options, and the per-query options, but never Connection.config. The defense therefore does not run even though Connection#get('sanitizeFilter') returns true. This storage was introduced in Mongoose 6.0.0 and the same mismatch is present in 9.11.2.
Proof of concept
import mongoose from 'mongoose'
const conn = await mongoose.createConnection('<MONGODB_URI>', { sanitizeFilter: true }).asPromise()
const User = conn.model('User', new mongoose.Schema({
username: String,
password: String,
marker: String
}))
await User.create({
username: 'victim',
password: 'correct-password',
marker: 'PROTECTED_RECORD'
})
const filter = { username: 'victim', password: { $ne: null } }
console.log(conn.get('sanitizeFilter'))
console.log((await User.findOne(filter).lean()).marker)
A control query with a literal wrong password returned no document in the same run, confirming the filter is otherwise enforced.
Impact
Connection-level sanitizeFilter option is not respected. Any user that relies on connection-level config and sanitizeFilter to defend against query selector injection is affected. Users that set sanitizeFilter globally using mongoose.set('sanitizeFilter') or on specific queries using Model.find().sanitizeFilter() are not affected.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mongoose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "6.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "6.13.12"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mongoose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "7.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "7.8.13"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mongoose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "8.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "8.24.7"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "mongoose"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "9.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "9.11.4"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-125119"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-943"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-11-10T19:56:12Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-11-09T23:17:22Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\n\nsanitizeFilter exists to stop query selector injection: it wraps operator objects such as `{ $ne: null }` in filter values in `$eq`, so they are matched literally. Set on a connection with `mongoose.connect()` or `createConnection(uri, { sanitizeFilter: true })`, the connection reports it as enabled but queries never apply it. An application that relies on the connection-level option and passes an attacker-controlled object into a filter therefore remains open to selector injection, and a password value of `{ $ne: null }` returns the account record without the password.\n\n### Details\n\n`NativeConnection#createClient()` at `lib/drivers/node-mongodb-native/connection.js:270-272` moves `options.sanitizeFilter` into `Connection.config` and deletes the original option. `Query#_castConditions()` at `lib/query.js:2413-2423` checks `Connection.options`, the global `options`, and the per-query options, but never `Connection.config`. The defense therefore does not run even though `Connection#get(\u0027sanitizeFilter\u0027)` returns true. This storage was introduced in Mongoose 6.0.0 and the same mismatch is present in 9.11.2.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\n```javascript\nimport mongoose from \u0027mongoose\u0027\n\nconst conn = await mongoose.createConnection(\u0027\u003cMONGODB_URI\u003e\u0027, { sanitizeFilter: true }).asPromise()\nconst User = conn.model(\u0027User\u0027, new mongoose.Schema({\n username: String,\n password: String,\n marker: String\n}))\n\nawait User.create({\n username: \u0027victim\u0027,\n password: \u0027correct-password\u0027,\n marker: \u0027PROTECTED_RECORD\u0027\n})\n\nconst filter = { username: \u0027victim\u0027, password: { $ne: null } }\nconsole.log(conn.get(\u0027sanitizeFilter\u0027))\nconsole.log((await User.findOne(filter).lean()).marker)\n```\n\nA control query with a literal wrong password returned no document in the same run, confirming the filter is otherwise enforced.\n\n### Impact\n\nConnection-level `sanitizeFilter` option is not respected. Any user that relies on connection-level config and `sanitizeFilter` to defend against query selector injection is affected. Users that set `sanitizeFilter` globally using `mongoose.set(\u0027sanitizeFilter\u0027)` or on specific queries using `Model.find().sanitizeFilter()` are not affected.",
"id": "GHSA-gg4r-jv3p-qx3c",
"modified": "2026-11-10T19:56:12Z",
"published": "2026-11-10T19:56:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/security/advisories/GHSA-gg4r-jv3p-qx3c"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-125119"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/4bb659478be2f30655a7bdd78bc251bdf111cd29"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/4f4f9a79f860786a54133bee2c9af967ec691491"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/83eda6af1489e9ef60bb8eee8cf9ee005771b9d5"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/commit/b8970c25998c23fbccd17f76c0398b902ff4911d"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/releases/tag/6.13.12"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/releases/tag/7.8.13"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/releases/tag/8.24.7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Automattic/mongoose/releases/tag/9.11.4"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Mongoose: Connection-level sanitizeFilter not applied"
}
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