GHSA-GFVX-2C2G-38WQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-28 19:56 – Updated: 2026-10-28 19:56Impact
When series columns are built from point objects, the point option keys are used directly as data column ids, so the write that populates a column reaches Object.prototype and the Object constructor. Keys named __proto__ and constructor survive JSON.parse as own enumerable properties, so an attacker who controls the point objects can set integer-keyed properties on Object.prototype, one per point index, to values of their choosing. Named properties cannot be reached this way. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the attacker's value, and for...in over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. The properties remain in place once the chart has been built, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.
Consequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.
Workarounds
Drop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2). Add the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.
;!function(t){if(t&&t.Point&&!t.Point.prototype.protoPollutionPatched){var o=t.Point.prototype,r=o.optionsToObject,e=o.setNestedProperty,n=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;o.optionsToObject=function(t){if(t&&"object"==typeof t&&!Array.isArray(t)&&(n.call(t,"__proto__")||n.call(t,"constructor"))){var o={};for(var e in t)n.call(t,e)&&!c(e)&&(o[e]=t[e]);t=o}return r.call(this,t)},o.setNestedProperty=function(t,o,r){return String(r).split(".").some(c)?t:e.call(this,t,o,r)},o.protoPollutionPatched=!0}function c(t){return"__proto__"===t||"constructor"===t}}(Highcharts);
Obtaining the patched version
The patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example npm install highcharts@13.1.0. If you load Highcharts from the CDN, use the versioned URLs on code.highcharts.com, for example https://code.highcharts.com/13.1.0/highcharts.js. For more on each installation method, see the installation guide.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 13.0.2"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "highcharts"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "13.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "13.1.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-118249"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-1321"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-28T19:56:13Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-28T18:17:16Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Impact\nWhen series columns are built from point objects, the point option keys are used directly as data column ids, so the write that populates a column reaches `Object.prototype` and the `Object` constructor. Keys named `__proto__` and `constructor` survive `JSON.parse` as own enumerable properties, so an attacker who controls the point objects can set integer-keyed properties on `Object.prototype`, one per point index, to values of their choosing. Named properties cannot be reached this way. The integer keys still affect every object in the page: reading an out-of-range index on any array or plain object returns the attacker\u0027s value, and `for...in` over any object yields the injected keys, so unrelated code can take branches it should not using attacker-supplied data, and rendering can fail as a side effect. The properties remain in place once the chart has been built, and no user interaction is required beyond rendering the chart.\n\nConsequences beyond disruption depend on the consuming application.\n\n### Workarounds\nDrop-in fix - for any versions affected (6.1.0-13.0.2).\nAdd the below IIFE to run after Highcharts is loaded.\n\n```javascript\n;!function(t){if(t\u0026\u0026t.Point\u0026\u0026!t.Point.prototype.protoPollutionPatched){var o=t.Point.prototype,r=o.optionsToObject,e=o.setNestedProperty,n=Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;o.optionsToObject=function(t){if(t\u0026\u0026\"object\"==typeof t\u0026\u0026!Array.isArray(t)\u0026\u0026(n.call(t,\"__proto__\")||n.call(t,\"constructor\"))){var o={};for(var e in t)n.call(t,e)\u0026\u0026!c(e)\u0026\u0026(o[e]=t[e]);t=o}return r.call(this,t)},o.setNestedProperty=function(t,o,r){return String(r).split(\".\").some(c)?t:e.call(this,t,o,r)},o.protoPollutionPatched=!0}function c(t){return\"__proto__\"===t||\"constructor\"===t}}(Highcharts);\n```\n\n[Live demo \u0026 testing](https://jsfiddle.net/BlackLabel/nopc6vhj/)\n\n### Obtaining the patched version\nThe patched releases are available from all the usual distribution channels. With npm, upgrade the affected package to the patched version listed above, for example `npm install highcharts@13.1.0`. If you load Highcharts from the CDN, use the versioned URLs on code.highcharts.com, for example `https://code.highcharts.com/13.1.0/highcharts.js`. For more on each installation method, see the [installation guide](https://www.highcharts.com/docs/getting-started/installation).",
"id": "GHSA-gfvx-2c2g-38wq",
"modified": "2026-10-28T19:56:13Z",
"published": "2026-10-28T19:56:13Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/highcharts/highcharts/security/advisories/GHSA-gfvx-2c2g-38wq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-118249"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/highcharts/highcharts/pull/25321"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/highcharts/highcharts/commit/d3357705c8f348904441327e32f50ab528c3a205"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/highcharts/highcharts"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/highcharts/highcharts/releases/tag/v13.1.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:H/SC:L/SI:L/SA:L",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Highcharts: series column construction writes to Object.prototype"
}
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