GHSA-GCV4-6HMH-XHWC
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2024-10-21 18:30 – Updated: 2024-10-24 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
btrfs: send: fix buffer overflow detection when copying path to cache entry
Starting with commit c0247d289e73 ("btrfs: send: annotate struct name_cache_entry with __counted_by()") we annotated the variable length array "name" from the name_cache_entry structure with __counted_by() to improve overflow detection. However that alone was not correct, because the length of that array does not match the "name_len" field - it matches that plus 1 to include the NUL string terminator, so that makes a fortified kernel think there's an overflow and report a splat like this:
strcpy: detected buffer overflow: 20 byte write of buffer size 19 WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3310 at __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.11.0-prnet #1 Hardware name: CompuLab Ltd. sbc-ihsw/Intense-PC2 (IPC2), BIOS IPC2_3.330.7 X64 03/15/2018 RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x45/0x50 Code: 48 8b 34 (...) RSP: 0018:ffff97ebc0d6f650 EFLAGS: 00010246 RAX: 7749924ef60fa600 RBX: ffff8bf5446a521a RCX: 0000000000000027 RDX: 00000000ffffdfff RSI: ffff97ebc0d6f548 RDI: ffff8bf84e7a1cc8 RBP: ffff8bf548574080 R08: ffffffffa8c40e10 R09: 0000000000005ffd R10: 0000000000000004 R11: ffffffffa8c70e10 R12: ffff8bf551eef400 R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: 00000000000003a8 FS: 00007fae144de8c0(0000) GS:ffff8bf84e780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007fae14691690 CR3: 00000001027a2003 CR4: 00000000001706f0 Call Trace: ? __warn+0x12a/0x1d0 ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 ? report_bug+0x154/0x1c0 ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70 ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50 ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20 ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50 __fortify_panic+0x9/0x10 __get_cur_name_and_parent+0x3bc/0x3c0 get_cur_path+0x207/0x3b0 send_extent_data+0x709/0x10d0 ? find_parent_nodes+0x22df/0x25d0 ? mas_nomem+0x13/0x90 ? mtree_insert_range+0xa5/0x110 ? btrfs_lru_cache_store+0x5f/0x1e0 ? iterate_extent_inodes+0x52d/0x5a0 process_extent+0xa96/0x11a0 ? __pfx_lookup_backref_cache+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_store_backref_cache+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_iterate_backrefs+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_check_extent_item+0x10/0x10 changed_cb+0x6fa/0x930 ? tree_advance+0x362/0x390 ? memcmp_extent_buffer+0xd7/0x160 send_subvol+0xf0a/0x1520 btrfs_ioctl_send+0x106b/0x11d0 ? __pfx___clone_root_cmp_sort+0x10/0x10 _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1ac/0x240 btrfs_ioctl+0x75b/0x850 __se_sys_ioctl+0xca/0x150 do_syscall_64+0x85/0x160 ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100 ? handle_mm_fault+0x1327/0x15c0 ? __se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0xf1/0x180 ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0xa0 ? do_syscall_64+0x91/0x160 ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21d/0x630 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e RIP: 0033:0x7fae145eeb4f Code: 00 48 89 (...) RSP: 002b:00007ffdf1cb09b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fae145eeb4f RDX: 00007ffdf1cb0ad0 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00000000000078fe R08: 00007fae144006c0 R09: 00007ffdf1cb0927 R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdf1cb1ce8 R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055c499fab2e0 R15: 0000000000000004
Fix this by not storing the NUL string terminator since we don't actually need it for name cache entries, this way "name_len" corresponds to the actual size of the "name" array. This requires marking the "name" array field with __nonstring and using memcpy() instead of strcpy() as recommended by the guidelines at:
https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2024-49869"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-120"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2024-10-21T18:15:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nbtrfs: send: fix buffer overflow detection when copying path to cache entry\n\nStarting with commit c0247d289e73 (\"btrfs: send: annotate struct\nname_cache_entry with __counted_by()\") we annotated the variable length\narray \"name\" from the name_cache_entry structure with __counted_by() to\nimprove overflow detection. However that alone was not correct, because\nthe length of that array does not match the \"name_len\" field - it matches\nthat plus 1 to include the NUL string terminator, so that makes a\nfortified kernel think there\u0027s an overflow and report a splat like this:\n\n strcpy: detected buffer overflow: 20 byte write of buffer size 19\n WARNING: CPU: 3 PID: 3310 at __fortify_report+0x45/0x50\n CPU: 3 UID: 0 PID: 3310 Comm: btrfs Not tainted 6.11.0-prnet #1\n Hardware name: CompuLab Ltd. sbc-ihsw/Intense-PC2 (IPC2), BIOS IPC2_3.330.7 X64 03/15/2018\n RIP: 0010:__fortify_report+0x45/0x50\n Code: 48 8b 34 (...)\n RSP: 0018:ffff97ebc0d6f650 EFLAGS: 00010246\n RAX: 7749924ef60fa600 RBX: ffff8bf5446a521a RCX: 0000000000000027\n RDX: 00000000ffffdfff RSI: ffff97ebc0d6f548 RDI: ffff8bf84e7a1cc8\n RBP: ffff8bf548574080 R08: ffffffffa8c40e10 R09: 0000000000005ffd\n R10: 0000000000000004 R11: ffffffffa8c70e10 R12: ffff8bf551eef400\n R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000013 R15: 00000000000003a8\n FS: 00007fae144de8c0(0000) GS:ffff8bf84e780000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\n CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\n CR2: 00007fae14691690 CR3: 00000001027a2003 CR4: 00000000001706f0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ? __warn+0x12a/0x1d0\n ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50\n ? report_bug+0x154/0x1c0\n ? handle_bug+0x42/0x70\n ? exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x50\n ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1a/0x20\n ? __fortify_report+0x45/0x50\n __fortify_panic+0x9/0x10\n __get_cur_name_and_parent+0x3bc/0x3c0\n get_cur_path+0x207/0x3b0\n send_extent_data+0x709/0x10d0\n ? find_parent_nodes+0x22df/0x25d0\n ? mas_nomem+0x13/0x90\n ? mtree_insert_range+0xa5/0x110\n ? btrfs_lru_cache_store+0x5f/0x1e0\n ? iterate_extent_inodes+0x52d/0x5a0\n process_extent+0xa96/0x11a0\n ? __pfx_lookup_backref_cache+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_store_backref_cache+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_iterate_backrefs+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_check_extent_item+0x10/0x10\n changed_cb+0x6fa/0x930\n ? tree_advance+0x362/0x390\n ? memcmp_extent_buffer+0xd7/0x160\n send_subvol+0xf0a/0x1520\n btrfs_ioctl_send+0x106b/0x11d0\n ? __pfx___clone_root_cmp_sort+0x10/0x10\n _btrfs_ioctl_send+0x1ac/0x240\n btrfs_ioctl+0x75b/0x850\n __se_sys_ioctl+0xca/0x150\n do_syscall_64+0x85/0x160\n ? __count_memcg_events+0x69/0x100\n ? handle_mm_fault+0x1327/0x15c0\n ? __se_sys_rt_sigprocmask+0xf1/0x180\n ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x75/0xa0\n ? do_syscall_64+0x91/0x160\n ? do_user_addr_fault+0x21d/0x630\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e\n RIP: 0033:0x7fae145eeb4f\n Code: 00 48 89 (...)\n RSP: 002b:00007ffdf1cb09b0 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010\n RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00007fae145eeb4f\n RDX: 00007ffdf1cb0ad0 RSI: 0000000040489426 RDI: 0000000000000004\n RBP: 00000000000078fe R08: 00007fae144006c0 R09: 00007ffdf1cb0927\n R10: 0000000000000008 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007ffdf1cb1ce8\n R13: 0000000000000003 R14: 000055c499fab2e0 R15: 0000000000000004\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\nFix this by not storing the NUL string terminator since we don\u0027t actually\nneed it for name cache entries, this way \"name_len\" corresponds to the\nactual size of the \"name\" array. This requires marking the \"name\" array\nfield with __nonstring and using memcpy() instead of strcpy() as\nrecommended by the guidelines at:\n\n https://github.com/KSPP/linux/issues/90",
"id": "GHSA-gcv4-6hmh-xhwc",
"modified": "2024-10-24T21:31:01Z",
"published": "2024-10-21T18:30:56Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2024-49869"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/843738ede6cb8b959fb22591fcbabe8b456d7216"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/96c6ca71572a3556ed0c37237305657ff47174b7"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.