GHSA-GCMV-PX7F-RQ8M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ipv6: reject wrapped temporary address preferred lifetimes

ipv6_create_tempaddr() raises a temporary address's preferred lifetime to regen_advance + age + 1 when the configured lifetime is too short. The result is stored in a u32, while regen_advance and age are unsigned long. If the sum wraps or is truncated, the stored lifetime can still be less than or equal to regen_advance + age.

addrconf_verify_rtnl() then sees the new address as due for regeneration and creates another one. Temporary addresses are not limited by max_addresses since commit 4b08a8f1bd8c ("ipv6: remove max_addresses check from ipv6_create_tempaddr"), so this can cause unbounded address growth. With dad_transmits set to -1, a baseline kernel reached 2859 loopback addresses in two seconds.

After storing the adjusted lifetime, verify that it is still greater than regen_advance + age. Reject the new address if the check fails.

On an x86-64 KASAN kernel, the normal configuration created three IPv6 addresses. The negative dad_transmits, positive multiplication overflow, and large retransmission-time cases each left only the loopback and public addresses. An i386 defconfig and an x86-64 allmodconfig both built addrconf.o with W=1.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99708"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:06Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nipv6: reject wrapped temporary address preferred lifetimes\n\nipv6_create_tempaddr() raises a temporary address\u0027s preferred lifetime to\nregen_advance + age + 1 when the configured lifetime is too short. The\nresult is stored in a u32, while regen_advance and age are unsigned long.\nIf the sum wraps or is truncated, the stored lifetime can still be less\nthan or equal to regen_advance + age.\n\naddrconf_verify_rtnl() then sees the new address as due for regeneration\nand creates another one. Temporary addresses are not limited by\nmax_addresses since commit 4b08a8f1bd8c (\"ipv6: remove max_addresses\ncheck from ipv6_create_tempaddr\"), so this can cause unbounded address\ngrowth. With dad_transmits set to -1, a baseline kernel reached 2859\nloopback addresses in two seconds.\n\nAfter storing the adjusted lifetime, verify that it is still greater than\nregen_advance + age. Reject the new address if the check fails.\n\nOn an x86-64 KASAN kernel, the normal configuration created three IPv6\naddresses. The negative dad_transmits, positive multiplication overflow,\nand large retransmission-time cases each left only the loopback and public\naddresses. An i386 defconfig and an x86-64 allmodconfig both built\naddrconf.o with W=1.",
  "id": "GHSA-gcmv-px7f-rq8m",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99708"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/11c7029932fb578b12b379a5559702b0cec8feda"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56758052466e6617fa4ac8e68d3c109cca56efb3"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6bbce146f893ab8b335e9eb82f4293bc94f3a4bf"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3e67bd82b9b9b1a5118f09a429ccefe2aab0741"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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