GHSA-GC7P-J5XM-XXH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2023-11-03 19:01 – Updated: 2023-11-06 21:58System Details
| Name | Value |
|---|---|
| OS | Windows 11 |
| Version | 4.11.1 (node v16.14.2) |
| Database | mysql |
Description
I marked some fields as private fields in user content-type, and tried to register as a new user via api, at the same time I added content to fill the private fields and sent a post request, and as you can see from the images below, I can write to the private fields.




To prevent this, I went to the extension area and tried to extend the register method, for this I wanted to do it using the sanitizeInput function that I know in the source codes of the strap. But the sanitizeInput function did not filter out private fields.
const { auth } = ctx.state;
const data = ctx.request.body;
const userSchema = strapi.getModel("plugin::users-permissions.user");
sanitize.contentAPI.input(data, userSchema, { auth });
here's the solution I've temporarily kept to myself, code snippet
const body = ctx.request.body;
const { attributes } = strapi.getModel("plugin::users-permissions.user");
const sanitizedData = _.omitBy(body, (data, key) => {
const attribute = attributes[key];
if (_.isNil(attribute)) {
return false;
}
//? If you want, you can throw an error for fields that we did not expect.
// if (_.isNil(attribute))
// throw new ApplicationError(`Unexpected value ${key}`);
// if private value is true, we do not want to send it to the database.
return attribute.private;
});
return sanitizedData;
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/plugin-users-permissions"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@strapi/strapi"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "4.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "4.13.1"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-39345"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-287"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2023-11-03T19:01:11Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2023-11-06T19:15:09Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### System Details\n| Name | Value |\n|----------|------------------------|\n| OS | Windows 11 |\n| Version | 4.11.1 (node v16.14.2) |\n| Database | mysql |\n\n\n### Description\nI marked some fields as private fields in user content-type, and tried to register as a new user via api, at the same time I added content to fill the private fields and sent a post request, and as you can see from the images below, I can write to the private fields.\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\n\nTo prevent this, I went to the extension area and tried to extend the register method, for this I wanted to do it using the sanitizeInput function that I know in the source codes of the strap. But the sanitizeInput function did not filter out private fields.\n\n```js\n const { auth } = ctx.state;\n const data = ctx.request.body;\n const userSchema = strapi.getModel(\"plugin::users-permissions.user\");\n\n sanitize.contentAPI.input(data, userSchema, { auth });\n```\n\nhere\u0027s the solution I\u0027ve temporarily kept to myself, code snippet\n\n```js\n const body = ctx.request.body;\n\n const { attributes } = strapi.getModel(\"plugin::users-permissions.user\");\n\n const sanitizedData = _.omitBy(body, (data, key) =\u003e {\n const attribute = attributes[key];\n\n if (_.isNil(attribute)) {\n return false;\n }\n\n //? If you want, you can throw an error for fields that we did not expect.\n\n // if (_.isNil(attribute))\n // throw new ApplicationError(`Unexpected value ${key}`);\n\n // if private value is true, we do not want to send it to the database.\n return attribute.private;\n });\n\n return sanitizedData;\n```\n\n",
"id": "GHSA-gc7p-j5xm-xxh2",
"modified": "2023-11-06T21:58:57Z",
"published": "2023-11-03T19:01:11Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi/security/advisories/GHSA-gc7p-j5xm-xxh2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-39345"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/strapi/strapi"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://strapi.io/blog/security-disclosure-of-vulnerabilities-sept-2023"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:L",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Unauthorized Access to Private Fields in User Registration API"
}
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