GHSA-G9X6-C54R-8JG6

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-12-09 18:30 – Updated: 2025-12-09 18:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

drm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb

The Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock:

[ 1231.611031] Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:

[ 1231.611033] CPU0 CPU1 [ 1231.611034] ---- ---- [ 1231.611035] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611038] local_irq_disable(); [ 1231.611039] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611041] lock(&xa->xa_lock#17); [ 1231.611044] [ 1231.611045] lock(&fence->lock); [ 1231.611047] *** DEADLOCK ***

In this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job->dependencies through the xa_* functions that don't disable interrupts (eg: drm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()).

CPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling callback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to grab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0.

Replacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix this issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal takes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback.

dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock -> drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() -> foreach dependencies -> dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock

This will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock.

To fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them is moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work().

[phasta: commit message nits]

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40329"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-12-09T16:17:43Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/sched: Fix deadlock in drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb\n\nThe Mesa issue referenced below pointed out a possible deadlock:\n\n[ 1231.611031]  Possible interrupt unsafe locking scenario:\n\n[ 1231.611033]        CPU0                    CPU1\n[ 1231.611034]        ----                    ----\n[ 1231.611035]   lock(\u0026xa-\u003exa_lock#17);\n[ 1231.611038]                                local_irq_disable();\n[ 1231.611039]                                lock(\u0026fence-\u003elock);\n[ 1231.611041]                                lock(\u0026xa-\u003exa_lock#17);\n[ 1231.611044]   \u003cInterrupt\u003e\n[ 1231.611045]     lock(\u0026fence-\u003elock);\n[ 1231.611047]\n                *** DEADLOCK ***\n\nIn this example, CPU0 would be any function accessing job-\u003edependencies\nthrough the xa_* functions that don\u0027t disable interrupts (eg:\ndrm_sched_job_add_dependency(), drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()).\n\nCPU1 is executing drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb() as a fence signalling\ncallback so in an interrupt context. It will deadlock when trying to\ngrab the xa_lock which is already held by CPU0.\n\nReplacing all xa_* usage by their xa_*_irq counterparts would fix\nthis issue, but Christian pointed out another issue: dma_fence_signal\ntakes fence.lock and so does dma_fence_add_callback.\n\n  dma_fence_signal() // locks f1.lock\n  -\u003e drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_cb()\n  -\u003e foreach dependencies\n     -\u003e dma_fence_add_callback() // locks f2.lock\n\nThis will deadlock if f1 and f2 share the same spinlock.\n\nTo fix both issues, the code iterating on dependencies and re-arming them\nis moved out to drm_sched_entity_kill_jobs_work().\n\n[phasta: commit message nits]",
  "id": "GHSA-g9x6-c54r-8jg6",
  "modified": "2025-12-09T18:30:35Z",
  "published": "2025-12-09T18:30:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40329"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0d63031ee4a57be0252cb9a4e09ae921c75cece9"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e8ada4fd838e3fd2cca94000dac054f3a347c01"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/487df8b698345dd5a91346335f05170ed5f29d4e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/70150b9443dddf02157d821c68abf438f55a2e8e"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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