GHSA-G9J9-8GXH-GH9R

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-12 12:30 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

f2fs: fix to truncate first page in error path of f2fs_truncate()

syzbot reports a bug as below:

loop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 40427 F2FS-fs (loop0): Wrong SSA boundary, start(3584) end(4096) blocks(3072) F2FS-fs (loop0): Can't find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock F2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value F2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_convert_inline_folio: corrupted inline inode ino=3, i_addr[0]:0x1601, run fsck to fix. ------------[ cut here ]------------ kernel BUG at fs/inode.c:753! RIP: 0010:clear_inode+0x169/0x190 fs/inode.c:753 Call Trace: evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810 f2fs_fill_super+0x5612/0x6fa0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5047 get_tree_bdev_flags+0x40e/0x4d0 fs/super.c:1692 vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1815 do_new_mount+0x2a2/0x9e0 fs/namespace.c:3808 do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline] __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline] __se_sys_mount+0x317/0x410 fs/namespace.c:4324 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline] do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f

During f2fs_evict_inode(), clear_inode() detects that we missed to truncate all page cache before destorying inode, that is because in below path, we will create page #0 in cache, but missed to drop it in error path, let's fix it.

  • evict
  • f2fs_evict_inode
  • f2fs_truncate
  • f2fs_convert_inline_inode
    • f2fs_grab_cache_folio : create page #0 in cache
    • f2fs_convert_inline_folio : sanity check failed, return -EFSCORRUPTED
  • clear_inode detects that inode->i_data.nrpages is not zero
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-40137"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-12T11:15:43Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nf2fs: fix to truncate first page in error path of f2fs_truncate()\n\nsyzbot reports a bug as below:\n\nloop0: detected capacity change from 0 to 40427\nF2FS-fs (loop0): Wrong SSA boundary, start(3584) end(4096) blocks(3072)\nF2FS-fs (loop0): Can\u0027t find valid F2FS filesystem in 1th superblock\nF2FS-fs (loop0): invalid crc value\nF2FS-fs (loop0): f2fs_convert_inline_folio: corrupted inline inode ino=3, i_addr[0]:0x1601, run fsck to fix.\n------------[ cut here ]------------\nkernel BUG at fs/inode.c:753!\nRIP: 0010:clear_inode+0x169/0x190 fs/inode.c:753\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n evict+0x504/0x9c0 fs/inode.c:810\n f2fs_fill_super+0x5612/0x6fa0 fs/f2fs/super.c:5047\n get_tree_bdev_flags+0x40e/0x4d0 fs/super.c:1692\n vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x2b0 fs/super.c:1815\n do_new_mount+0x2a2/0x9e0 fs/namespace.c:3808\n do_mount fs/namespace.c:4136 [inline]\n __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:4347 [inline]\n __se_sys_mount+0x317/0x410 fs/namespace.c:4324\n do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]\n do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nDuring f2fs_evict_inode(), clear_inode() detects that we missed to truncate\nall page cache before destorying inode, that is because in below path, we\nwill create page #0 in cache, but missed to drop it in error path, let\u0027s fix\nit.\n\n- evict\n - f2fs_evict_inode\n  - f2fs_truncate\n   - f2fs_convert_inline_inode\n    - f2fs_grab_cache_folio\n    : create page #0 in cache\n    - f2fs_convert_inline_folio\n    : sanity check failed, return -EFSCORRUPTED\n  - clear_inode detects that inode-\u003ei_data.nrpages is not zero",
  "id": "GHSA-g9j9-8gxh-gh9r",
  "modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:18Z",
  "published": "2025-11-12T12:30:27Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-40137"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3500d7e1ba53f39bdb8a5aa9c2066b2f08e8c92e"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3b0c8908faa18cded84d64822882a830ab1f4d26"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/83a8e4efea022506a0e049e7206bdf8be9f78148"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9251a9e6e871cb03c4714a18efa8f5d4a8818450"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a7b7ebdd7045a36454b3e388a2ecf50344fad9e6"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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