GHSA-G8M3-5G58-FQ7M

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-06-19 14:34 – Updated: 2026-06-19 14:34
VLAI
Summary
undici vulnerable to Set-Cookie SameSite attribute downgrade via permissive substring matching
Details

Impact

When undici parses a Set-Cookie header, it accepts any SameSite attribute value that contains Strict, Lax, or None as a substring, rather than the case-insensitive exact match specified by RFC 6265. Non-spec values are silently mapped to one of the three standard tokens:

  • SameSite=NoneOfYourBusiness is parsed as None, the most permissive setting.
  • SameSite=StrictLax is parsed as Lax, a downgrade from Strict.

Affected applications are those that consume Set-Cookie headers from server responses (for example via undici's fetch or proxy code paths) and then forward or rely on the parsed sameSite attribute. A malicious or non-compliant server can coerce the consumer's view of a cookie's SameSite policy to a weaker value, silently degrading the SameSite enforcement the cookie is supposed to provide.

This was introduced in undici 5.15.0 when the cookies feature was added.

Patches

Upgrade to undici v6.27.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0.

Workarounds

After parsing a Set-Cookie header, validate that the resulting sameSite attribute is one of 'Strict', 'Lax', or 'None' (exact, case-insensitive) before forwarding or relying on it.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "6.27.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "7.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "7.28.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "undici"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "8.0.0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "8.5.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-11525"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-183"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-06-19T14:34:46Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-17T18:17:35Z",
    "severity": "LOW"
  },
  "details": "## Impact\n\nWhen undici parses a `Set-Cookie` header, it accepts any `SameSite` attribute value that contains `Strict`, `Lax`, or `None` as a substring, rather than the case-insensitive exact match specified by RFC 6265. Non-spec values are silently mapped to one of the three standard tokens:\n\n- `SameSite=NoneOfYourBusiness` is parsed as `None`, the most permissive setting.\n- `SameSite=StrictLax` is parsed as `Lax`, a downgrade from `Strict`.\n\nAffected applications are those that consume `Set-Cookie` headers from server responses (for example via undici\u0027s `fetch` or proxy code paths) and then forward or rely on the parsed `sameSite` attribute. A malicious or non-compliant server can coerce the consumer\u0027s view of a cookie\u0027s SameSite policy to a weaker value, silently degrading the SameSite enforcement the cookie is supposed to provide.\n\nThis was introduced in undici 5.15.0 when the cookies feature was added.\n\n## Patches\n\nUpgrade to undici v6.27.0, v7.28.0 or v8.5.0.\n\n## Workarounds\n\nAfter parsing a `Set-Cookie` header, validate that the resulting `sameSite` attribute is one of `\u0027Strict\u0027`, `\u0027Lax\u0027`, or `\u0027None\u0027` (exact, case-insensitive) before forwarding or relying on it.",
  "id": "GHSA-g8m3-5g58-fq7m",
  "modified": "2026-06-19T14:34:46Z",
  "published": "2026-06-19T14:34:46Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici/security/advisories/GHSA-g8m3-5g58-fq7m"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-11525"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://cna.openjsf.org/security-advisories.html"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nodejs/undici"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "undici vulnerable to Set-Cookie SameSite attribute downgrade via permissive substring matching"
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.