GHSA-G5M7-8JMR-XX94
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-08 15:31 – Updated: 2026-05-11 09:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()
This patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply() that can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In ceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a message is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than INT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative value. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and subsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that the memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.
This patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to u32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32, as it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.
Also, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that directly after reading it from the message, payload_len and result_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262
CPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary) Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014 Workqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph] Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0 print_report+0xd1/0x620 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210 kasan_report+0xe7/0x130 ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20 ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph] mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph] ? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0 ? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0 ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph] process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph] ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph] ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph] ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230 ? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0 ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760 ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0 ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10 ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph] process_one_work+0x629/0xf80 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10 ? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280 ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10 kthread+0x396/0x830 ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30 ? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610 ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10 ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0 ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for payload_len and result_msg_len ]
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-43407"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-125"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-08T15:16:52Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nlibceph: Fix potential out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()\n\nThis patch fixes an out-of-bounds access in ceph_handle_auth_reply()\nthat can be triggered by a message of type CEPH_MSG_AUTH_REPLY. In\nceph_handle_auth_reply(), the value of the payload_len field of such a\nmessage is stored in a variable of type int. A value greater than\nINT_MAX leads to an integer overflow and is interpreted as a negative\nvalue. This leads to decrementing the pointer address by this value and\nsubsequently accessing it because ceph_decode_need() only checks that\nthe memory access does not exceed the end address of the allocation.\n\nThis patch fixes the issue by changing the data type of payload_len to\nu32. Additionally, the data type of result_msg_len is changed to u32,\nas it is also a variable holding a non-negative length.\n\nAlso, an additional layer of sanity checks is introduced, ensuring that\ndirectly after reading it from the message, payload_len and\nresult_msg_len are not greater than the overall segment length.\n\nBUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]\nRead of size 4 at addr ffff88811404df14 by task kworker/20:1/262\n\nCPU: 20 UID: 0 PID: 262 Comm: kworker/20:1 Not tainted 6.19.2 #5 PREEMPT(voluntary)\nHardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014\nWorkqueue: ceph-msgr ceph_con_workfn [libceph]\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x76/0xa0\n print_report+0xd1/0x620\n ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10\n ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x72/0x210\n kasan_report+0xe7/0x130\n ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]\n ? ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]\n __asan_report_load_n_noabort+0xf/0x20\n ceph_handle_auth_reply+0x642/0x7a0 [libceph]\n mon_dispatch+0x973/0x23d0 [libceph]\n ? apparmor_socket_recvmsg+0x6b/0xa0\n ? __pfx_mon_dispatch+0x10/0x10 [libceph]\n ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30i\n ? mutex_unlock+0x7f/0xd0\n ? __pfx_mutex_unlock+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_do_recvmsg+0x10/0x10 [libceph]\n ceph_con_process_message+0x1f1/0x650 [libceph]\n process_message+0x1e/0x450 [libceph]\n ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x2e48/0x6c80 [libceph]\n ? __pfx_ceph_con_v2_try_read+0x10/0x10 [libceph]\n ? save_fpregs_to_fpstate+0xb0/0x230\n ? raw_spin_rq_unlock+0x17/0xa0\n ? finish_task_switch.isra.0+0x13b/0x760\n ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0\n ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30\n ? mutex_lock+0x8d/0xe0\n ? __pfx_mutex_lock+0x10/0x10\n ceph_con_workfn+0x248/0x10c0 [libceph]\n process_one_work+0x629/0xf80\n ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30\n worker_thread+0x87f/0x1570\n ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_try_to_wake_up+0x10/0x10\n ? kasan_print_address_stack_frame+0x1f7/0x280\n ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10\n kthread+0x396/0x830\n ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irq+0x10/0x10\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ? __kasan_check_write+0x14/0x30\n ? recalc_sigpending+0x180/0x210\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork+0x3f7/0x610\n ? __pfx_ret_from_fork+0x10/0x10\n ? __switch_to+0x385/0xda0\n ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30\n \u003c/TASK\u003e\n\n[ idryomov: replace if statements with ceph_decode_need() for\n payload_len and result_msg_len ]",
"id": "GHSA-g5m7-8jmr-xx94",
"modified": "2026-05-11T09:30:31Z",
"published": "2026-05-08T15:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43407"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6cee34d6669fe176b4259131adb1a145c939b472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8bb87547e92dcf0928ed763c60e0ac8d733c3656"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9f9e2297f45fc2d2524eb104c289d69ddef95665"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b282c43ed156ae15ea76748fc15cd5c39dc9ab72"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea080b21092590122c3f971cf588932cdbf47847"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed024d2f4c79c0eb2464df0fb640610ac301f9a0"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/edc678e5cd11730a2834b43071d8923f05bc334d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f9da5c1bbac5c8e33259fe00ed7347438fffa969"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Sightings
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