GHSA-G33P-J5VG-7CWX

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-21 15:41
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: Remove conflicting altnames for dying netns in __dev_change_net_namespace().

syzbot reported the warning in cfg80211_pernet_exit(). 0

The repro does the following:

  1. create two device in root netns and non-root netns
  2. assign the same altname for the two devices
  3. remove the non-root netns

Since commit 7663d522099e ("net: check for altname conflicts when changing netdev's netns"), cfg80211_switch_netns() and cfg802154_switch_netns() fail if init_net has a device with the conflicting altname.

default_device_exit_net() had the same issue and commit d09486a04f5d ("net: fix removing a namespace with conflicting altnames") fixed it.

cfg80211_pernet_exit() and cfg802154_pernet_exit() need the same fix.

Let's generalise the fix by removing conflicting altnames for dying netns in __dev_change_net_namespace().

WARNING: net/wireless/core.c:1871 at cfg80211_pernet_exit+0xd5/0x120 net/wireless/core.c:1871, CPU#1: kworker/u8:9/1160 Modules linked in: CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1160 Comm: kworker/u8:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026 Workqueue: netns cleanup_net RIP: 0010:cfg80211_pernet_exit+0xd5/0x120 net/wireless/core.c:1871 Code: e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 b4 ef 0e f7 4d 8b 36 49 81 fe 20 10 4a 90 74 12 e8 03 3d 9f f6 eb 85 e8 fc 3c 9f f6 90 <0f> 0b 90 eb cc e8 f1 3c 9f f6 eb 05 e8 ea 3c 9f f6 5b 41 5c 41 5e RSP: 0018:ffffc900057a78f0 EFLAGS: 00010293 RAX: ffffffff8b287154 RBX: ffff88807ba72780 RCX: ffff8880213e8000 RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000 RBP: 00000000ffffffef R08: ffffffff9024cc67 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: fffff52000af4eb0 R11: fffffbfff204998d R12: dffffc0000000000 R13: ffffffff904a1080 R14: ffff888144ed0008 R15: ffff888144ed0e20 FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888124de6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00005642de0a8a70 CR3: 000000007a40c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0 Call Trace: ops_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:200 [inline] ops_undo_list+0x43d/0x8d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:253 cleanup_net+0x572/0x810 net/core/net_namespace.c:706 process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3387 [inline] process_scheduled_works+0xc3d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3470 worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3551 kthread+0x38b/0x480 kernel/kthread.c:436 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245

Severity
7.8 (High)
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Show details on source website
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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-98073"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:36Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnet: Remove conflicting altnames for dying netns in __dev_change_net_namespace().\n\nsyzbot reported the warning in cfg80211_pernet_exit(). [0]\n\nThe repro does the following:\n\n  1. create two device in root netns and non-root netns\n  2. assign the same altname for the two devices\n  3. remove the non-root netns\n\nSince commit 7663d522099e (\"net: check for altname conflicts\nwhen changing netdev\u0027s netns\"), cfg80211_switch_netns() and\ncfg802154_switch_netns() fail if init_net has a device with the\nconflicting altname.\n\ndefault_device_exit_net() had the same issue and commit d09486a04f5d\n(\"net: fix removing a namespace with conflicting altnames\") fixed it.\n\ncfg80211_pernet_exit() and cfg802154_pernet_exit() need the same fix.\n\nLet\u0027s generalise the fix by removing conflicting altnames for dying\nnetns in __dev_change_net_namespace().\n\n[0]:\ncfg80211_switch_netns(rdev, \u0026init_net)\nWARNING: net/wireless/core.c:1871 at cfg80211_pernet_exit+0xd5/0x120 net/wireless/core.c:1871, CPU#1: kworker/u8:9/1160\nModules linked in:\nCPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 1160 Comm: kworker/u8:9 Not tainted syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)\nHardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 07/24/2026\nWorkqueue: netns cleanup_net\nRIP: 0010:cfg80211_pernet_exit+0xd5/0x120 net/wireless/core.c:1871\nCode: e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 b4 ef 0e f7 4d 8b 36 49 81 fe 20 10 4a 90 74 12 e8 03 3d 9f f6 eb 85 e8 fc 3c 9f f6 90 \u003c0f\u003e 0b 90 eb cc e8 f1 3c 9f f6 eb 05 e8 ea 3c 9f f6 5b 41 5c 41 5e\nRSP: 0018:ffffc900057a78f0 EFLAGS: 00010293\nRAX: ffffffff8b287154 RBX: ffff88807ba72780 RCX: ffff8880213e8000\nRDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000ffffffef RDI: 0000000000000000\nRBP: 00000000ffffffef R08: ffffffff9024cc67 R09: 0000000000000000\nR10: fffff52000af4eb0 R11: fffffbfff204998d R12: dffffc0000000000\nR13: ffffffff904a1080 R14: ffff888144ed0008 R15: ffff888144ed0e20\nFS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888124de6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000\nCS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033\nCR2: 00005642de0a8a70 CR3: 000000007a40c000 CR4: 00000000003526f0\nCall Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n ops_exit_list net/core/net_namespace.c:200 [inline]\n ops_undo_list+0x43d/0x8d0 net/core/net_namespace.c:253\n cleanup_net+0x572/0x810 net/core/net_namespace.c:706\n process_one_work kernel/workqueue.c:3387 [inline]\n process_scheduled_works+0xc3d/0x1630 kernel/workqueue.c:3470\n worker_thread+0xa47/0xfb0 kernel/workqueue.c:3551\n kthread+0x38b/0x480 kernel/kthread.c:436\n ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158\n ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245\n \u003c/TASK\u003e",
  "id": "GHSA-g33p-j5vg-7cwx",
  "modified": "2026-10-21T15:41:40Z",
  "published": "2026-09-25T12:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-98073"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/119ac1716705af17fb74b3e33058a938a87eecd4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54772bf503dd0e81e8b8db537fee6946de81e717"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a29ea5b5034654aaaa4aadd771f48c01abfd2dfa"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac6631843269e6a9b2164e393b7f729328711d78"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/debac3a20dec524a59625cf10fa2f18571127824"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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