GHSA-FXQM-P968-C5X9
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-25 18:30 – Updated: 2025-11-19 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mt76: mt7925: prevent NULL pointer dereference in mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload()
Add a NULL check for msta->vif before accessing its members to prevent a kernel panic in AP mode deployment. This also fix the issue reported in [1].
The crash occurs when this function is triggered before the station is fully initialized. The call trace shows a page fault at mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload() due to accessing resources when msta->vif is NULL.
Fix this by adding an early return if msta->vif is NULL and also check wcid.sta is ready. This ensures we only proceed with decap offload configuration when the station's state is properly initialized.
[14739.655703] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffffffffffa0 [14739.811820] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 895854 Comm: hostapd Tainted: G [14739.821394] Tainted: [C]=CRAP, [O]=OOT_MODULE [14739.825746] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.1 (DT) [14739.831577] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--) [14739.838538] pc : mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0xc0/0x1b8 [mt7925_common] [14739.845271] lr : mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0x58/0x1b8 [mt7925_common] [14739.851985] sp : ffffffc085efb500 [14739.855295] x29: ffffffc085efb500 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff807803a158 [14739.862436] x26: ffffff8041ececb8 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000001 [14739.869577] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000008 x21: ffffff8041ecea88 [14739.876715] x20: ffffff8041c19ca0 x19: ffffff8078031fe0 x18: 0000000000000000 [14739.883853] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffe2aeac1110 x15: 000000559da48080 [14739.890991] x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000 [14739.898130] x11: 0a10020001008e88 x10: 0000000000001a50 x9 : ffffffe26457bfa0 [14739.905269] x8 : ffffff8042013bb0 x7 : ffffff807fb6cbf8 x6 : dead000000000100 [14739.912407] x5 : dead000000000122 x4 : ffffff80780326c8 x3 : 0000000000000000 [14739.919546] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8041ececb8 [14739.926686] Call trace: [14739.929130] mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0xc0/0x1b8 [mt7925_common] [14739.935505] ieee80211_check_fast_rx+0x19c/0x510 [mac80211] [14739.941344] _sta_info_move_state+0xe4/0x510 [mac80211] [14739.946860] sta_info_move_state+0x1c/0x30 [mac80211] [14739.952116] sta_apply_auth_flags.constprop.0+0x90/0x1b0 [mac80211] [14739.958708] sta_apply_parameters+0x234/0x5e0 [mac80211] [14739.964332] ieee80211_add_station+0xdc/0x190 [mac80211] [14739.969950] nl80211_new_station+0x46c/0x670 [cfg80211] [14739.975516] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdc/0x150 [14739.980158] genl_rcv_msg+0x218/0x298 [14739.983830] netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x138 [14739.987670] genl_rcv+0x40/0x60 [14739.990816] netlink_unicast+0x314/0x380 [14739.994742] netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3f0 [14739.998664] __sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xc0 [14740.002324] ____sys_sendmsg+0x260/0x298 [14740.006242] ___sys_sendmsg+0xb4/0x110
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-38450"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-07-25T16:15:30Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nwifi: mt76: mt7925: prevent NULL pointer dereference in mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload()\n\nAdd a NULL check for msta-\u003evif before accessing its members to prevent\na kernel panic in AP mode deployment. This also fix the issue reported\nin [1].\n\nThe crash occurs when this function is triggered before the station is\nfully initialized. The call trace shows a page fault at\nmt7925_sta_set_decap_offload() due to accessing resources when msta-\u003evif\nis NULL.\n\nFix this by adding an early return if msta-\u003evif is NULL and also check\nwcid.sta is ready. This ensures we only proceed with decap offload\nconfiguration when the station\u0027s state is properly initialized.\n\n[14739.655703] Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address ffffffffffffffa0\n[14739.811820] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 895854 Comm: hostapd Tainted: G\n[14739.821394] Tainted: [C]=CRAP, [O]=OOT_MODULE\n[14739.825746] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 4 Model B Rev 1.1 (DT)\n[14739.831577] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)\n[14739.838538] pc : mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0xc0/0x1b8 [mt7925_common]\n[14739.845271] lr : mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0x58/0x1b8 [mt7925_common]\n[14739.851985] sp : ffffffc085efb500\n[14739.855295] x29: ffffffc085efb500 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffffff807803a158\n[14739.862436] x26: ffffff8041ececb8 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: 0000000000000001\n[14739.869577] x23: 0000000000000001 x22: 0000000000000008 x21: ffffff8041ecea88\n[14739.876715] x20: ffffff8041c19ca0 x19: ffffff8078031fe0 x18: 0000000000000000\n[14739.883853] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffffe2aeac1110 x15: 000000559da48080\n[14739.890991] x14: 0000000000000001 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000\n[14739.898130] x11: 0a10020001008e88 x10: 0000000000001a50 x9 : ffffffe26457bfa0\n[14739.905269] x8 : ffffff8042013bb0 x7 : ffffff807fb6cbf8 x6 : dead000000000100\n[14739.912407] x5 : dead000000000122 x4 : ffffff80780326c8 x3 : 0000000000000000\n[14739.919546] x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffffff8041ececb8\n[14739.926686] Call trace:\n[14739.929130] mt7925_sta_set_decap_offload+0xc0/0x1b8 [mt7925_common]\n[14739.935505] ieee80211_check_fast_rx+0x19c/0x510 [mac80211]\n[14739.941344] _sta_info_move_state+0xe4/0x510 [mac80211]\n[14739.946860] sta_info_move_state+0x1c/0x30 [mac80211]\n[14739.952116] sta_apply_auth_flags.constprop.0+0x90/0x1b0 [mac80211]\n[14739.958708] sta_apply_parameters+0x234/0x5e0 [mac80211]\n[14739.964332] ieee80211_add_station+0xdc/0x190 [mac80211]\n[14739.969950] nl80211_new_station+0x46c/0x670 [cfg80211]\n[14739.975516] genl_family_rcv_msg_doit+0xdc/0x150\n[14739.980158] genl_rcv_msg+0x218/0x298\n[14739.983830] netlink_rcv_skb+0x64/0x138\n[14739.987670] genl_rcv+0x40/0x60\n[14739.990816] netlink_unicast+0x314/0x380\n[14739.994742] netlink_sendmsg+0x198/0x3f0\n[14739.998664] __sock_sendmsg+0x64/0xc0\n[14740.002324] ____sys_sendmsg+0x260/0x298\n[14740.006242] ___sys_sendmsg+0xb4/0x110",
"id": "GHSA-fxqm-p968-c5x9",
"modified": "2025-11-19T18:31:16Z",
"published": "2025-07-25T18:30:39Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38450"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35ad47c0b3da04b00b19a8b9ed5632e2f2520472"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/91c3dec2453b3742e8f666957b99945edc30577f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9b50874f297fcc62adc7396f35209878e51010b0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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