GHSA-FX59-JR66-R73H

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-20 06:32 – Updated: 2026-11-20 06:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: nVMX: Process each host MSR entry at most once when unwinding failed VM-Entry

Add a missing "break" in the inner for-loop of the open coded mess that unwinds MSRs back to the pre-VM-Enter state when VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME VM-Fails due to a consistency check that is caught by hardware but missed by KVM. I.e. move on to the next MSR in the VM-Entry load list after performing a write using a value found in the VM-Exit load list. Processing every matching entry in the VM-Exit load list makes the processing quadratic, which is problematic if the load lists are full of MSRs that are expensive to emulate. E.g. writing APIC_BASE triggers kvm_recalculate_apic_map() and a whole pile of unnecessary work.

Functionally, arbitrarily restoring the value of the first matching entry is "fine", because none of this is architecturally correct: the load lists are never supposed to have been used in the first place. In practice, it's likely a moot point as no well-behaved VMM will have multiple, diverging entries in the load lists.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99711"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-20T06:18:07Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: nVMX: Process each host MSR entry at most once when unwinding failed VM-Entry\n\nAdd a missing \"break\" in the inner for-loop of the open coded mess that\nunwinds MSRs back to the pre-VM-Enter state when VMLAUNCH/VMRESUME VM-Fails\ndue to a consistency check that is caught by hardware but missed by KVM.\nI.e. move on to the next MSR in the VM-Entry load list after performing a\nwrite using a value found in the VM-Exit load list.  Processing *every*\nmatching entry in the VM-Exit load list makes the processing quadratic,\nwhich is problematic if the load lists are full of MSRs that are expensive\nto emulate.  E.g. writing APIC_BASE triggers kvm_recalculate_apic_map() and\na whole pile of unnecessary work.\n\nFunctionally, arbitrarily restoring the value of the first matching entry\nis \"fine\", because none of this is architecturally correct: the load lists\nare never supposed to have been used in the first place.  In practice, it\u0027s\nlikely a moot point as no well-behaved VMM will have multiple, diverging\nentries in the load lists.",
  "id": "GHSA-fx59-jr66-r73h",
  "modified": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "published": "2026-11-20T06:32:08Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99711"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/05fae367c6878d08f54a7c5bb6986a5e57e9bd1c"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/42b98982aedf40f5076bf045bf359df4dea09468"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6a4697ec81693f8db41a1c3ba81f3b9b2510879f"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c33ef9d334059f7cb167569ed7b4779752fe4425"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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