GHSA-FX27-PFFF-J2G5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/drm_exec: fix up contended obj when num_objects is 0
drm_exec_prepare_array() silently returns success without calling drm_exec_lock_contended() when num_objects is zero. This breaks the invariant upheld by drm_exec_lock_obj(), where every entry point into the locking sequence must first attempt to lock any previously contended object before proceeding.
Drivers that chain multiple drm_exec_prepare_array() calls per drm_exec_until_all_locked() iteration (e.g. amdgpu's userq signal/wait ioctls, which prepare separate read and write BO arrays) can pass an empty array for one of the two calls. If contention is hit while preparing the non-empty array, exec->contended is set and the loop retries; on retry, the empty-array call preceding it is a no-op that never clears exec->contended, so drm_exec_retry_on_contention() immediately jumps back to the top of the loop without ever reaching the call that would resolve the contention. This spins forever.
Fix it by having drm_exec_prepare_array() call drm_exec_lock_contended() directly when num_objects is zero, so a pending contended object dont loop infinitely.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97900"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:16Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndrm/drm_exec: fix up contended obj when num_objects is 0\n\ndrm_exec_prepare_array() silently returns success without calling\ndrm_exec_lock_contended() when num_objects is zero. This breaks the\ninvariant upheld by drm_exec_lock_obj(), where every entry point into\nthe locking sequence must first attempt to lock any previously\ncontended object before proceeding.\n\nDrivers that chain multiple drm_exec_prepare_array() calls per\ndrm_exec_until_all_locked() iteration (e.g. amdgpu\u0027s userq signal/wait\nioctls, which prepare separate read and write BO arrays) can pass an\nempty array for one of the two calls. If contention is hit while\npreparing the non-empty array, exec-\u003econtended is set and the loop\nretries; on retry, the empty-array call preceding it is a no-op that\nnever clears exec-\u003econtended, so drm_exec_retry_on_contention()\nimmediately jumps back to the top of the loop without ever reaching\nthe call that would resolve the contention. This spins forever.\n\nFix it by having drm_exec_prepare_array() call drm_exec_lock_contended()\ndirectly when num_objects is zero, so a pending contended object dont\nloop infinitely.",
"id": "GHSA-fx27-pfff-j2g5",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:27Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:27Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97900"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/159720704d9d652b64390c11fb971e15b0a78d23"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/831cd124ce99c3e61266bed30519d52f7c26abed"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a565022c02f218ec9789c2baf4690792e7a48cbb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f3e74866018dab793ebee1fdf0ef34f7271d1f8c"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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