GHSA-FVMW-CJ7J-J39Q

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-11-19 20:09 – Updated: 2025-11-27 08:15
VLAI
Summary
Astro Cloudflare adapter has Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in /_image endpoint
Details

Summary
A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the @astrojs/cloudflare adapter with output: 'server'. The built-in image optimization endpoint (/_image) uses isRemoteAllowed() from Astro’s internal helpers, which unconditionally allows data: URLs. When the endpoint receives a valid data: URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a 302 redirect back to the original data: URL, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (image.domains / image.remotePatterns) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.

Affected Versions
- @astrojs/cloudflare ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions)
- Astro ≥ 4.x when used with output: 'server' and the Cloudflare adapter

Root Cause – Vulnerable Code
File: node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts

export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean {
  if (!URL.canParse(src)) {
    return false;
  }
  const url = new URL(src);

  // Data URLs are always allowed 
  if (url.protocol === 'data:') {
    return true;
  }

  // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed
  if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) {
    return false;
  }
  // ... further http/https allow-list checks
}

In the Cloudflare adapter, the /_image endpoint contains logic similar to:

    const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href');
    if (!href) {
        // return error 
    }

    if (isRemotePath(href)) {
        if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) {
            // return error
        } else {
            //redirect to return the image 
            return Response.redirect(href, 302);
        }
    }

Because data: URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as:
https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)

triggers a 302 redirect directly to the data: URL, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.

Proof of Concept (PoC)

  1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (output: 'server').
  2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers.
  3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload:
https://yoursite.com/_image?href=

(Base64 decodes to: <svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>)

  1. The endpoint returns a 302 redirect to the data: URL → browser executes the <script> → alert() fires.

Impact
- Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage)
- Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.)
- Account takeover when combined with CSRF
- Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers
- Bypasses image.domains / image.remotePatterns configuration entirely

Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior
Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically proxy and rasterize SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The Cloudflare adapter currently redirects to remote resources (including data: URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.

References
- Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts
- Similar data: URL bypass in WordPress: CVE-2025-2575

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "astro"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "5.15.9"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-65019"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-79"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2025-11-19T20:09:12Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-11-19T17:15:53Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "**Summary**  \nA Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the **@astrojs/cloudflare** adapter with `output: \u0027server\u0027`. The built-in image optimization endpoint (`/_image`) uses `isRemoteAllowed()` from Astro\u2019s internal helpers, which **unconditionally allows `data:` URLs**. When the endpoint receives a valid `data:` URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a **302 redirect back to the original `data:` URL**, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (`image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns`) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations.\n\n**Affected Versions**  \n- `@astrojs/cloudflare` \u2264 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions)  \n- Astro \u2265 4.x when used with `output: \u0027server\u0027` and the Cloudflare adapter\n\n**Root Cause \u2013 Vulnerable Code**  \nFile: `node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts`\n\n```ts\nexport function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean {\n  if (!URL.canParse(src)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  const url = new URL(src);\n\n  // Data URLs are always allowed \n  if (url.protocol === \u0027data:\u0027) {\n    return true;\n  }\n\n  // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed\n  if (![\u0027http:\u0027, \u0027https:\u0027].includes(url.protocol)) {\n    return false;\n  }\n  // ... further http/https allow-list checks\n}\n```\n\nIn the **Cloudflare adapter**, the `/_image` endpoint contains logic similar to:\n\n```ts\n\tconst href = ctx.url.searchParams.get(\u0027href\u0027);\n\tif (!href) {\n\t\t// return error \n\t}\n\n\tif (isRemotePath(href)) {\n\t\tif (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) {\n\t\t\t// return error\n\t\t} else {\n            //redirect to return the image \n\t\t\treturn Response.redirect(href, 302);\n\t\t}\n\t}\n```\n\nBecause `data:` URLs are considered \u201callowed\u201d, a request such as:  \n`https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)`  \n\ntriggers a **302 redirect directly to the `data:` URL**, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG.\n\n**Proof of Concept (PoC)**  \n\n1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (`output: \u0027server\u0027`).\n2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers.\n3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload:\n\n```\nhttps://yoursite.com/_image?href=\n```\n\n   (Base64 decodes to: `\u003csvg xmlns=\"http://www.w3.org/2000/svg\"\u003e\u003cscript\u003ealert(\u0027zomasec\u0027)\u003c/script\u003e\u003c/svg\u003e`)\n\n4. The endpoint returns a **302 redirect** to the `data:` URL \u2192 browser executes the `\u003cscript\u003e` \u2192 `alert()` fires.\n\n**Impact**  \n- Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage)  \n- Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.)  \n- Account takeover when combined with CSRF  \n- Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers  \n- Bypasses `image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns` configuration entirely  \n\n**Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior**  \nOther Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically **proxy and rasterize** SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The **Cloudflare adapter** currently **redirects** to remote resources (including `data:` URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable.\n\n**References**  \n- Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts  \n- Similar `data:` URL bypass in WordPress: [CVE-2025-2575 ](https://feedly.com/cve/CVE-2025-2575)",
  "id": "GHSA-fvmw-cj7j-j39q",
  "modified": "2025-11-27T08:15:37Z",
  "published": "2025-11-19T20:09:12Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/security/advisories/GHSA-fvmw-cj7j-j39q"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-65019"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro/commit/9e9c528191b6f5e06db9daf6ad26b8f68016e533"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/withastro/astro"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:L/I:L/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "Astro Cloudflare adapter has Stored Cross-site Scripting vulnerability in /_image endpoint"
}



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