GHSA-FR6M-54GX-W628
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-15 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/huge_memory: preserve pmd_swp_uffd_wp on device-private PMD downgrade
change_non_present_huge_pmd() rewrites a writable device-private PMD swap entry into a readable one without carrying pmd_swp_uffd_wp() across. The PTE-level change_softleaf_pte() does this correctly; mirror that here, matching what copy_huge_pmd() does for the fork path. Without the carry, a plain mprotect() over a UFFD_WP-marked device-private THP strips the bit and the trap is bypassed on swap-in.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72180"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:36Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nmm/huge_memory: preserve pmd_swp_uffd_wp on device-private PMD downgrade\n\nchange_non_present_huge_pmd() rewrites a writable device-private PMD swap\nentry into a readable one without carrying pmd_swp_uffd_wp() across. The\nPTE-level change_softleaf_pte() does this correctly; mirror that here,\nmatching what copy_huge_pmd() does for the fork path. Without the carry,\na plain mprotect() over a UFFD_WP-marked device-private THP strips the bit\nand the trap is bypassed on swap-in.",
"id": "GHSA-fr6m-54gx-w628",
"modified": "2026-08-15T06:32:15Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:15Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72180"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2611f7521c6c124b1bef1be4fc319e0ca144502f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f7e2c21bd1f57cd5350eecdfdb5d6025ca6afbab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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