GHSA-FQG8-P65W-8FH2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-09-25 12:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hwmon: (corsair-cpro) Create debugfs entries after hwmon registration
ccp_debugfs_init() registers debugfs files whose private data is the devm allocated ccp. It runs before hwmon_device_register_with_info(), so when that registration fails, ccp_probe() returns with the files still in place. The HID core then frees ccp, and ccp_remove() is not called for a failed probe, so nothing removes them later either. Reading one of the files dereferences the freed pointer.
Create the debugfs entries only after the hwmon device has been registered, so no failing path can leave them behind.
The two version queries stay where they are. They send USB commands without holding ccp->mutex, which is only safe as long as nothing else can call send_usb_cmd(); once the hwmon device is registered its callbacks can do so concurrently. Only the debugfs creation moves, and it is told which queries succeeded.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97968"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:24Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nhwmon: (corsair-cpro) Create debugfs entries after hwmon registration\n\nccp_debugfs_init() registers debugfs files whose private data is the devm\nallocated ccp. It runs before hwmon_device_register_with_info(), so when\nthat registration fails, ccp_probe() returns with the files still in\nplace. The HID core then frees ccp, and ccp_remove() is not called for a\nfailed probe, so nothing removes them later either. Reading one of the\nfiles dereferences the freed pointer.\n\nCreate the debugfs entries only after the hwmon device has been\nregistered, so no failing path can leave them behind.\n\nThe two version queries stay where they are. They send USB commands\nwithout holding ccp-\u003emutex, which is only safe as long as nothing else\ncan call send_usb_cmd(); once the hwmon device is registered its\ncallbacks can do so concurrently. Only the debugfs creation moves, and\nit is told which queries succeeded.",
"id": "GHSA-fqg8-p65w-8fh2",
"modified": "2026-09-25T12:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97968"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/508baf1713f32f287bfb4f85d759403ec8ba35a3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c5d333216a937044acd3336e9ec7e30ff2eaee4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a58a966a440071bb877ef62535d1016952f83101"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fdfe17cb865715aad30328678344eb79889207ab"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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