GHSA-FPH8-8R8J-JWFP

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-10 15:33 – Updated: 2026-08-10 15:33
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types

The pf->txtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest TxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number and is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI queues.

However, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before consulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0, bit 0 is set in pf->txtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset rebuild, the CTRL VSI's Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and ice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks pf->txtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it finds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI's ETF queue, not the CTRL VSI's. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously allocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring.

Since CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring() takes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching ice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset leaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring.

Fix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for PF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-68292"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-08-10T13:20:18Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nice: prevent tstamp ring allocation for non-PF VSI types\n\nThe pf-\u003etxtime_txqs bitmap tracks which Tx queues have ETF (Earliest\nTxTime First) offload enabled. This bitmap is indexed by queue number\nand is set by ice_offload_txtime(), which only operates on PF VSI\nqueues.\n\nHowever, ice_is_txtime_ena() does not check the VSI type before\nconsulting the bitmap. When ETF offload is enabled on PF Tx queue 0,\nbit 0 is set in pf-\u003etxtime_txqs. During a subsequent PCI reset\nrebuild, the CTRL VSI\u0027s Tx queue 0 is reconfigured and\nice_is_txtime_ena() is called for that ring. Since it only checks\npf-\u003etxtime_txqs by queue index without distinguishing VSI type, it\nfinds bit 0 set and returns true, matching the PF VSI\u0027s ETF queue,\nnot the CTRL VSI\u0027s. This causes ice_vsi_cfg_txq() to spuriously\nallocate a tstamp_ring for the CTRL VSI ring.\n\nSince CTRL VSI rings have no associated netdev, ice_clean_tx_ring()\ntakes an early return at the !netdev check before reaching\nice_free_tx_tstamp_ring(), leaking the allocation. Each PCI reset\nleaks one 64-byte tstamp_ring.\n\nFix this by restricting ice_is_txtime_ena() to return true only for\nPF VSI rings, since txtime_txqs is only meaningful for PF VSI queues.",
  "id": "GHSA-fph8-8r8j-jwfp",
  "modified": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
  "published": "2026-08-10T15:33:45Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-68292"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/144539bbfd3cea1ab0fb6f5216d6004c1f4f029b"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/684d4d0bda95a3fb21b3e29ff0f668f657707b54"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0a21604c6abfa4956f3a511a1de174cec77a812"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



Log in or create an account to share your comment.




Tags
Taxonomy of the tags.


Loading…

Loading…

Loading…

Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.

Forecast uses a logistic model when the trend is rising, or an exponential decay model when the trend is falling. Fitted via linearized least squares.

Sightings

Author Source Type Date Other

Nomenclature

  • Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
  • Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
  • Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
  • Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
  • Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
  • Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

JSON
How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Events included in the timeline

Loading timeline…


    Loading…

    Loading…

    Loading…

    Related by attack behaviour

    Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.