GHSA-FJ4J-9CQW-5CXW
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-23 15:31 – Updated: 2026-10-23 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment
Rebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race monitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears hci_pi(sk)->hdev and drops the device reference under only the socket lock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for reading.
Replay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the last reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev->id. This can cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a use-after-free if the old pointer is retained.
The kernel reported:
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f] RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800 Call Trace: hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190 __sys_bind+0x166/0x200 __x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0 do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
The same missing serialization lets hci_send_to_sock() select a socket for the old device and queue its frame after bind has detached the socket or installed a new binding.
Take hci_sk_list.lock for writing when clearing the device pointer and resetting the socket state. This waits for existing replay and delivery readers to finish before detachment and prevents later readers from using the old binding. Keep hci_dev_put() outside the critical section because the final device release can sleep.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-99015"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-10-23T13:17:24Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nBluetooth: hci_sock: Serialize dead-device detachment\n\nRebinding an HCI socket after its controller is unregistered can race\nmonitor control replay and crash the kernel. hci_sock_bind() clears\nhci_pi(sk)-\u003ehdev and drops the device reference under only the socket\nlock, whereas send_monitor_control_replay() holds hci_sk_list.lock for\nreading.\n\nReplay can observe a non-NULL hdev, then bind can clear it and drop the\nlast reference before create_monitor_ctrl_open() reads hdev-\u003eid. This\ncan cause a NULL pointer dereference if the pointer is reloaded, or a\nuse-after-free if the old pointer is retained.\n\nThe kernel reported:\n\n KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000068-0x000000000000006f]\n RIP: 0010:create_monitor_ctrl_open+0x579/0x800\n Call Trace:\n hci_sock_bind+0xd96/0x1190\n __sys_bind+0x166/0x200\n __x64_sys_bind+0x6d/0xb0\n do_syscall_64+0xdd/0x4a0\n entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f\n\nThe same missing serialization lets hci_send_to_sock() select a socket\nfor the old device and queue its frame after bind has detached the socket\nor installed a new binding.\n\nTake hci_sk_list.lock for writing when clearing the device pointer and\nresetting the socket state. This waits for existing replay and delivery\nreaders to finish before detachment and prevents later readers from\nusing the old binding. Keep hci_dev_put() outside the critical section\nbecause the final device release can sleep.",
"id": "GHSA-fj4j-9cqw-5cxw",
"modified": "2026-10-23T15:31:35Z",
"published": "2026-10-23T15:31:34Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99015"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37cef0c8fb537f40600910d2c2e5f2d5509305f3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/381a0925c556a8d91a80a9b9e3e86651d60ffee3"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/76f2e2665697340ac719e7ff1bf148dd014e55c1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c3d2799877906d0c8392d96e14216cd82b020330"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e660a22402944f2615a16fde7129a3c497537329"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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