GHSA-FHRG-H295-8P3M
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-11 21:31 – Updated: 2026-09-14 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
SUNRPC: wait for in-flight client TLS handshake callback
xs_tls_handshake_sync() gives xs_tls_handshake_done() a reference to the lower transport before submitting the handshake request. On timeout or signal, the synchronous waiter drops that reference after calling tls_handshake_cancel().
handshake_req_cancel() returns false when handshake_complete() has already marked the request complete. In that case the completion callback can still be running, so dropping the callback-owned reference in the waiter can free the lower transport before xs_tls_handshake_done() stores xprt_err or drops its own reference.
If cancellation loses to completion, wait until xs_tls_handshake_done() signals handshake_done and let the callback release its reference. This mirrors the server-side handshake lifetime handling and keeps the timeout or signal return value unchanged.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89536"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-11T20:19:36Z",
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nSUNRPC: wait for in-flight client TLS handshake callback\n\nxs_tls_handshake_sync() gives xs_tls_handshake_done() a reference to the\nlower transport before submitting the handshake request. On timeout or\nsignal, the synchronous waiter drops that reference after calling\ntls_handshake_cancel().\n\nhandshake_req_cancel() returns false when handshake_complete() has\nalready marked the request complete. In that case the completion callback\ncan still be running, so dropping the callback-owned reference in the\nwaiter can free the lower transport before xs_tls_handshake_done() stores\nxprt_err or drops its own reference.\n\nIf cancellation loses to completion, wait until xs_tls_handshake_done()\nsignals handshake_done and let the callback release its reference. This\nmirrors the server-side handshake lifetime handling and keeps the timeout\nor signal return value unchanged.",
"id": "GHSA-fhrg-h295-8p3m",
"modified": "2026-09-14T15:32:28Z",
"published": "2026-09-11T21:31:30Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89536"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/15431820f448e09f8029b670d5c82aa5917d4625"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1de391e8b94e31b45c19c16dbf315e294810c7de"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7fbb6d2ab0391eb8d1f1a68e6bc263ef02cea61b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a89dd597458848b463d284b15e42a8078beeb046"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb43997407bc17ee39bac81ab708101312e255f5"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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Vulnerability timeline
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