GHSA-FFQF-M6VH-866W
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-03 15:32 – Updated: 2026-09-03 15:32Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener's signature check (_validateIPN()) accepted UNVERIFIED and any non-INVALID response as valid, made its verification request with CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked — so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when mc_gross was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (floatval(null) == 0) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured receiver_email and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the custom field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to CONFIRMED with no payment, or force another customer's pending order to FAILED. paypalv2.php performed no amount check under any circumstances.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-77999"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-472"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-03T13:06:08Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "Joomla Extension - j2commerce.com - Unauthenticated PayPal callback forgery leading to order confirmation fraud in J2Store 1.0.0-3.3.21, 4.0.0-4.0.21, 4.1.0-4.1.6 - The PayPal IPN listener\u0027s signature check (`_validateIPN()`) accepted `UNVERIFIED` and any non-`INVALID` response as valid, made its verification request with `CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER` disabled, and stored its verdict in a field nothing downstream ever checked \u2014 so processing continued regardless of the outcome. Separately, the paid-amount comparison only ran when `mc_gross` was a positive number; omitting the field from the POST body (`floatval(null) == 0`) skipped the check entirely. Combined with a merchant-configured `receiver_email` and a sequential, enumerable order id read from the `custom` field, an anonymous POST was enough to move a pending order straight to `CONFIRMED` with no payment, or force another customer\u0027s pending order to `FAILED`. `paypalv2.php` performed no amount check under any circumstances.",
"id": "GHSA-ffqf-m6vh-866w",
"modified": "2026-09-03T15:32:12Z",
"published": "2026-09-03T15:32:12Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-77999"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.j2commerce.com"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
]
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.