GHSA-FCRW-F7GG-6G9F
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-24 21:14 – Updated: 2026-08-12 18:57Summary
The /api/users/metadata and /api/users/metadata/:id endpoints in @budibase/server return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes oauth2.accessToken and oauth2.refreshToken fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.
Details
When a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173:
dbUser.oauth2 = {
...dbUser.oauth2,
...details,
}
await db.put(dbUser)
The user metadata endpoints are protected by PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ (packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11), which maps to the POWER permission set (packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99).
Path 1 — List all users (GET /api/users/metadata):
1. controller.fetchMetadata → sdk.users.fetchMetadata() (packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78)
2. → getGlobalUsers() → getRawGlobalUsers() (packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122) — strips only password and forceResetPassword
3. → processUser() (packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76) — strips only password and roles
4. The oauth2 field containing accessToken and refreshToken is never removed
Path 2 — Single user (GET /api/users/metadata/:id):
1. controller.findMetadata → getFullUser() (packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6)
2. → getGlobalUser() → getRawGlobalUser() (packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92) — raw CouchDB fetch, no field stripping at all
3. → processUser() — strips only password and roles
4. Same result: oauth2 tokens are returned
There is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.
PoC
Prerequisites: A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.
Step 1 — As the POWER user, list all users:
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata' \
-H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
-H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.[].oauth2'
Expected output: null for all users (tokens should not be exposed)
Actual output: For SSO users, the response includes:
{
"accessToken": "ya29.a0ARrdaM...",
"refreshToken": "1//0eXxXxXxXx..."
}
Step 2 — Fetch a specific SSO user's profile:
curl -s -X GET 'http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_<sso-user-id>' \
-H 'Cookie: budibase:auth=<power-user-jwt>' \
-H 'x-budibase-app-id: app_<appid>' | jq '.oauth2'
This also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.
Impact
- A user with POWER role in any app can read all SSO users' OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.
- Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.
- Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.
- Additionally,
admin,builder,tenantId,ssoId, anduserGroupsfields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.
Recommended Fix
Strip sensitive SSO fields in processUser() at packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15:
export async function processUser(
user: ContextUser,
opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}
) {
if (!user || (!user.roles && !user.userGroups)) {
return user
}
user = cloneDeep(user)
delete user.password
+ delete (user as any).oauth2
+ delete (user as any).provider
+ delete (user as any).providerType
+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile
+ delete (user as any).profile
+ delete (user as any).ssoId
+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword
// ... rest of function
Additionally, getRawGlobalUsers() at line 101 should also strip oauth2 alongside its existing password/forceResetPassword stripping for defense in depth.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "npm",
"name": "@budibase/server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "3.39.25"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-73304"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-24T21:14:31Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "## Summary\n\nThe `/api/users/metadata` and `/api/users/metadata/:id` endpoints in `@budibase/server` return full global user profiles to any user with POWER role or above. For SSO-authenticated users (OIDC, Google), the response includes `oauth2.accessToken` and `oauth2.refreshToken` fields, leaking identity provider credentials to other users who should not have access to them.\n\n## Details\n\nWhen a user authenticates via SSO (OIDC or Google), the OAuth2 tokens are stored in the global CouchDB user document at `packages/backend-core/src/auth/auth.ts:170-173`:\n\n```typescript\ndbUser.oauth2 = {\n ...dbUser.oauth2,\n ...details,\n}\nawait db.put(dbUser)\n```\n\nThe user metadata endpoints are protected by `PermissionType.USER, PermissionLevel.READ` (`packages/server/src/api/routes/user.ts:11`), which maps to the POWER permission set (`packages/backend-core/src/security/permissions.ts:99`).\n\n**Path 1 \u2014 List all users** (`GET /api/users/metadata`):\n1. `controller.fetchMetadata` \u2192 `sdk.users.fetchMetadata()` (`packages/server/src/sdk/users/utils.ts:78`)\n2. \u2192 `getGlobalUsers()` \u2192 `getRawGlobalUsers()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:101-122`) \u2014 strips only `password` and `forceResetPassword`\n3. \u2192 `processUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15-76`) \u2014 strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. The `oauth2` field containing `accessToken` and `refreshToken` is **never removed**\n\n**Path 2 \u2014 Single user** (`GET /api/users/metadata/:id`):\n1. `controller.findMetadata` \u2192 `getFullUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/users.ts:6`)\n2. \u2192 `getGlobalUser()` \u2192 `getRawGlobalUser()` (`packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:90-92`) \u2014 raw CouchDB fetch, **no field stripping at all**\n3. \u2192 `processUser()` \u2014 strips only `password` and `roles`\n4. Same result: `oauth2` tokens are returned\n\nThere is no output sanitization middleware on these routes that would strip sensitive fields before the response reaches the client.\n\n## PoC\n\n**Prerequisites:** A Budibase instance with at least one SSO-authenticated user (OIDC or Google) and a separate user with POWER role in an app.\n\n**Step 1 \u2014 As the POWER user, list all users:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET \u0027http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e\u0027 | jq \u0027.[].oauth2\u0027\n```\n\n**Expected output:** `null` for all users (tokens should not be exposed)\n\n**Actual output:** For SSO users, the response includes:\n```json\n{\n \"accessToken\": \"ya29.a0ARrdaM...\",\n \"refreshToken\": \"1//0eXxXxXxXx...\"\n}\n```\n\n**Step 2 \u2014 Fetch a specific SSO user\u0027s profile:**\n```bash\ncurl -s -X GET \u0027http://localhost:10000/api/users/metadata/ro_ta_users_us_\u003csso-user-id\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027Cookie: budibase:auth=\u003cpower-user-jwt\u003e\u0027 \\\n -H \u0027x-budibase-app-id: app_\u003cappid\u003e\u0027 | jq \u0027.oauth2\u0027\n```\n\nThis also returns the full OAuth2 tokens.\n\n## Impact\n\n- A user with POWER role in any app can read **all SSO users\u0027 OAuth2 access tokens and refresh tokens** via the list endpoint, without needing to know individual user IDs.\n- Stolen access tokens can be used to access external identity provider resources (Google Workspace, Azure AD, Okta-protected services) as the victim user.\n- Refresh tokens allow indefinite token renewal, persisting access even after the original access token expires.\n- Additionally, `admin`, `builder`, `tenantId`, `ssoId`, and `userGroups` fields are leaked, revealing the full authorization topology of the instance.\n\n## Recommended Fix\n\nStrip sensitive SSO fields in `processUser()` at `packages/server/src/utilities/global.ts:15`:\n\n```typescript\nexport async function processUser(\n user: ContextUser,\n opts: { appId?: string; groups?: UserGroup[] } = {}\n) {\n if (!user || (!user.roles \u0026\u0026 !user.userGroups)) {\n return user\n }\n user = cloneDeep(user)\n delete user.password\n+ delete (user as any).oauth2\n+ delete (user as any).provider\n+ delete (user as any).providerType\n+ delete (user as any).thirdPartyProfile\n+ delete (user as any).profile\n+ delete (user as any).ssoId\n+ delete (user as any).forceResetPassword\n // ... rest of function\n```\n\nAdditionally, `getRawGlobalUsers()` at line 101 should also strip `oauth2` alongside its existing `password`/`forceResetPassword` stripping for defense in depth.",
"id": "GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f",
"modified": "2026-08-12T18:57:12Z",
"published": "2026-07-24T21:14:31Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/security/advisories/GHSA-fcrw-f7gg-6g9f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/pull/19110"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/7b8ba11a2c8b233c35e7728dd752dba25ef919a4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/commit/80a31f6c3354620aa90e50af8a2c614333084621"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/Budibase/budibase/releases/tag/3.39.25"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:H/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": " Budibase: SSO OAuth2 Token Leakage via User Metadata Endpoints to Power-Role Users"
}
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