GHSA-F99H-FJ7P-24MH

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-16 12:31 – Updated: 2026-11-16 12:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fbdev: udlfb: don't rebuild the mode list while the framebuffer is in use

dlfb_setup_modes() frees info->modelist with fb_destroy_modelist() and rebuilds it, but fbcon holds raw pointers into that list in fb_display[i].mode and nothing un-publishes them the way do_unregister_framebuffer() and store_modes() do with fbcon_delete_modelist(). The function does refuse to install a new mode while the framebuffer has users (dlfb->fb_count != 0), but only after the list is already destroyed. Reached from the 0666 "edid" sysfs attribute, an unprivileged write to /sys/class/graphics/fb0/edid therefore fails with -EINVAL and still leaves every fb_display[i].mode dangling; the next console switch reads the freed fb_videomode in fb_videomode_to_var().

Test fb_count before touching the list. fbcon takes a reference through fbcon_open(), so that condition covers exactly the states in which fb_display[] points into the list, and the errno returned to userspace is unchanged.

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905) Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880107b449c by task kworker/1:1/47 Workqueue: events console_callback Call Trace: fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905) display_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:998) fbcon_switch (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2182) redraw_screen (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:994) complete_change_console (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:1141) console_callback (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3358) process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396) worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560) kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436) ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158) ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245) ... The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of freed 96-byte region [ffff8880107b4480, ffff8880107b44e0)

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99305"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-16T10:17:05Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfbdev: udlfb: don\u0027t rebuild the mode list while the framebuffer is in use\n\ndlfb_setup_modes() frees info-\u003emodelist with fb_destroy_modelist() and\nrebuilds it, but fbcon holds raw pointers into that list in\nfb_display[i].mode and nothing un-publishes them the way\ndo_unregister_framebuffer() and store_modes() do with\nfbcon_delete_modelist(). The function does refuse to install a new mode\nwhile the framebuffer has users (dlfb-\u003efb_count != 0), but only after the\nlist is already destroyed. Reached from the 0666 \"edid\" sysfs attribute,\nan unprivileged write to /sys/class/graphics/fb0/edid therefore fails with\n-EINVAL and still leaves every fb_display[i].mode dangling; the next\nconsole switch reads the freed fb_videomode in fb_videomode_to_var().\n\nTest fb_count before touching the list. fbcon takes a reference through\nfbcon_open(), so that condition covers exactly the states in which\nfb_display[] points into the list, and the errno returned to userspace is\nunchanged.\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905)\n  Read of size 4 at addr ffff8880107b449c by task kworker/1:1/47\n  Workqueue: events console_callback\n  Call Trace:\n   fb_videomode_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/modedb.c:905)\n   display_to_var (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:998)\n   fbcon_switch (drivers/video/fbdev/core/fbcon.c:2182)\n   redraw_screen (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:994)\n   complete_change_console (drivers/tty/vt/vt_ioctl.c:1141)\n   console_callback (drivers/tty/vt/vt.c:3358)\n   process_one_work (kernel/workqueue.c:3396)\n   worker_thread (kernel/workqueue.c:3479 kernel/workqueue.c:3560)\n   kthread (kernel/kthread.c:436)\n   ret_from_fork (arch/x86/kernel/process.c:158)\n   ret_from_fork_asm (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:245)\n  ...\n  The buggy address is located 28 bytes inside of\n   freed 96-byte region [ffff8880107b4480, ffff8880107b44e0)",
  "id": "GHSA-f99h-fj7p-24mh",
  "modified": "2026-11-16T12:31:41Z",
  "published": "2026-11-16T12:31:40Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99305"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1e13b8957510cfbc7367b3be1f08adc1757bb6d4"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/291010d5de1c9efc38e98c416b6230500bfae438"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4bc608af98a3da0fa0b17af67a64d0d11d625a1d"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ac9cfa552102b8e80e88c2872e80dc9cb5f07dda"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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