GHSA-F946-9QP6-VGCH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-05-18 16:34 – Updated: 2026-06-08 20:07Impact
Multiple Livewire components in the admin panel allowed an authenticated low-privilege user to mutate data without the required permission:
- Order detail Filament actions (cancel, mark paid, mark complete, capture payment, archive, start processing) were callable with
read_ordersonly and did not requireedit_orders.capturePaymentcould trigger an actual PSP capture. - Order shipments table actions (mark delivered, edit tracking) were callable with
browse_ordersonly. - Sub-form Livewire components for products (Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files) had no authorization on
store(), so any authenticated panel user could mutate product data withoutedit_products. Settings/Team/Indexhad nomount()authorization at all — any authenticated user could create roles and delete other users.Settings/Team/RolePermissiongated its write actions on the read-onlyview_userspermission, allowing privilege escalation via the RBAC system itself.PaymentMethods,Currencies,Carrierstable toggles and per-record actions had no per-action permission check.Customers/Create::store()re-passed a Hidden_passwordform field into the create payload.
Several public Eloquent model properties on Livewire components were not #[Locked], allowing client-side ID tampering.
A stored XSS surface existed on the product barcode field, which is rendered through DNS1DFacade::getBarcodeHTML() with {!! !!}.
Patches
Fixed in v2.8.0. Upgrade via:
composer require shopper/admin:^2.8 shopper/cart:^2.8 shopper/core:^2.8
php artisan migrate
Workarounds
None. Upgrade to v2.8.0.
Resources
- Pull request: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/pull/511
- CWE-862 Missing Authorization
- CWE-285 Improper Authorization
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "shopper/framework"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.8.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-47740"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-285",
"CWE-862"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-18T16:34:23Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-05-29T19:16:25Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "## Impact\n\nMultiple Livewire components in the admin panel allowed an authenticated low-privilege user to mutate data without the required permission:\n\n- Order detail Filament actions (cancel, mark paid, mark complete, capture payment, archive, start processing) were callable with `read_orders` only and did not require `edit_orders`. `capturePayment` could trigger an actual PSP capture.\n- Order shipments table actions (mark delivered, edit tracking) were callable with `browse_orders` only.\n- Sub-form Livewire components for products (Edit, Inventory, Seo, Shipping, Files) had no authorization on `store()`, so any authenticated panel user could mutate product data without `edit_products`.\n- `Settings/Team/Index` had no `mount()` authorization at all \u2014 any authenticated user could create roles and delete other users.\n- `Settings/Team/RolePermission` gated its write actions on the read-only `view_users` permission, allowing privilege escalation via the RBAC system itself.\n- `PaymentMethods`, `Currencies`, `Carriers` table toggles and per-record actions had no per-action permission check.\n- `Customers/Create::store()` re-passed a Hidden `_password` form field into the create payload.\n\nSeveral public Eloquent model properties on Livewire components were not `#[Locked]`, allowing client-side ID tampering.\n\nA stored XSS surface existed on the product barcode field, which is rendered through `DNS1DFacade::getBarcodeHTML()` with `{!! !!}`.\n\n## Patches\n\nFixed in `v2.8.0`. Upgrade via:\n\n```bash\ncomposer require shopper/admin:^2.8 shopper/cart:^2.8 shopper/core:^2.8\n```\n\n```shell\nphp artisan migrate\n```\n\n## Workarounds\n\nNone. Upgrade to `v2.8.0`.\n\n## Resources\n\n- Pull request: https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/pull/511\n- CWE-862 Missing Authorization\n- CWE-285 Improper Authorization",
"id": "GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch",
"modified": "2026-06-08T20:07:22Z",
"published": "2026-05-18T16:34:23Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/security/advisories/GHSA-f946-9qp6-vgch"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-47740"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/issues/510"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/pull/511"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/commit/fcd0c5920588702df5b874f432b1042abd77a50b"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/shopperlabs/shopper/releases/tag/v2.8.0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "shopper/framework: Authorization bypass in multiple Livewire admin components"
}
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