GHSA-F8H3-QJ6H-J2CJ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-01-14 15:33 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
MIPS: ftrace: Fix memory corruption when kernel is located beyond 32 bits
Since commit e424054000878 ("MIPS: Tracing: Reduce the overhead of dynamic Function Tracer"), the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly has been used, and this macro can generate more than 2 instructions. At the same time, the code in ftrace assumes that no more than 2 instructions can be generated, which is why it stores them in an int[2] array. However, as previously noted, the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly (and now UASM_i_LA) causes a buffer overflow when _mcount is beyond 32 bits. This leads to corruption of the variables located in the __read_mostly section.
This corruption was observed because the variable __cpu_primary_thread_mask was corrupted, causing a hang very early during boot.
This fix prevents the corruption by avoiding the generation of instructions if they could exceed 2 instructions in length. Fortunately, insn_la_mcount is only used if the instrumented code is located outside the kernel code section, so dynamic ftrace can still be used, albeit in a more limited scope. This is still preferable to corrupting memory and/or crashing the kernel.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-71109"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-787"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-01-14T15:15:59Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nMIPS: ftrace: Fix memory corruption when kernel is located beyond 32 bits\n\nSince commit e424054000878 (\"MIPS: Tracing: Reduce the overhead of\ndynamic Function Tracer\"), the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly has been used,\nand this macro can generate more than 2 instructions. At the same\ntime, the code in ftrace assumes that no more than 2 instructions can\nbe generated, which is why it stores them in an int[2] array. However,\nas previously noted, the macro UASM_i_LA_mostly (and now UASM_i_LA)\ncauses a buffer overflow when _mcount is beyond 32 bits. This leads to\ncorruption of the variables located in the __read_mostly section.\n\nThis corruption was observed because the variable\n__cpu_primary_thread_mask was corrupted, causing a hang very early\nduring boot.\n\nThis fix prevents the corruption by avoiding the generation of\ninstructions if they could exceed 2 instructions in\nlength. Fortunately, insn_la_mcount is only used if the instrumented\ncode is located outside the kernel code section, so dynamic ftrace can\nstill be used, albeit in a more limited scope. This is still\npreferable to corrupting memory and/or crashing the kernel.",
"id": "GHSA-f8h3-qj6h-j2cj",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:32:23Z",
"published": "2026-01-14T15:33:00Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-71109"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/36dac9a3dda1f2bae343191bc16b910c603cac25"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3f7a003fe2646337fbc5dd41051ad6754ac34064"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7f39b9d0e86ed6236b9a5fb67616ab1f76c4f150"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9cfda98cf02eacfa6b09076e98bd479fd73407c2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e3e33ac2eb69d595079a1a1e444c2fb98efdd42d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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