GHSA-F86V-42XW-Q4VJ

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-07-27 06:30
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

crypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc

krb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and rfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL completion callback and treat any negative return from crypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to kfree_sensitive(buffer). When the encrypt_name resolves to an async AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer is freed while the backend's worker still holds a pointer, and the worker dereferences the freed slab on completion.

KASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend bound to krb5->encrypt_name:

BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7

The helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async instances out at allocation time instead of plumbing crypto_wait_req() through every call site.

Reachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and net/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to the krb5 enctype name.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-64439"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-416"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-07-25T10:17:28Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncrypto: krb5 - filter out async aead implementations at alloc\n\nkrb5_aead_encrypt(), krb5_aead_decrypt() in rfc3961_simplified.c and\nrfc8009_encrypt(), rfc8009_decrypt() in rfc8009_aes2.c set a NULL\ncompletion callback and treat any negative return from\ncrypto_aead_{encrypt,decrypt}() as terminal, falling through to\nkfree_sensitive(buffer).  When the encrypt_name resolves to an\nasync AEAD instance the request returns -EINPROGRESS, the buffer\nis freed while the backend\u0027s worker still holds a pointer, and the\nworker dereferences the freed slab on completion.\n\nKASAN report under UML+SLUB with a synthetic async aead backend\nbound to krb5-\u003eencrypt_name:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in t5_stub_complete+0x7d/0xc7\n\nThe helpers were written synchronously, so filter the async\ninstances out at allocation time instead of plumbing\ncrypto_wait_req() through every call site.\n\nReachable via net/rxrpc/rxgk.c, fs/afs/cm_security.c and\nnet/ceph/crypto.c on systems with an async AEAD provider bound to\nthe krb5 enctype name.",
  "id": "GHSA-f86v-42xw-q4vj",
  "modified": "2026-07-27T06:30:37Z",
  "published": "2026-07-25T12:31:35Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-64439"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/2b7bd6dccff14b8b632c5244f1fd506918077221"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6c9dddeb582fde005360f4fe02c760d45ca05fb5"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef6feb77e2d91761427c5b773edc9c97e1b706ad"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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