GHSA-F7HC-2WXR-4JFG
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-16 12:30 – Updated: 2026-09-16 15:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: x86/mmu: Consume the locked rmap value in the lockless rmap walk
__kvm_rmap_lock() deliberately elides the rmap lock when it observes an empty rmap. In that case kvm_rmap_lock_readonly() also re-enables preemption and returns zero, so the caller holds neither the rmap lock nor a preemption reference. The elision documents the invariant it relies on:
* Elide the lock if the rmap is empty, as lockless walkers (read-only
* mode) don't need to (and can't) walk an empty rmap, nor can they add
* entries to the rmap. I.e. the only paths that process empty rmaps
* do so while holding mmu_lock for write, and are mutually exclusive.
kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() ignores the returned value and unconditionally enters for_each_rmap_spte_lockless(). The iterator started with rmap_get_first(), which re-reads rmap_head->val rather than using the value returned by the lock. If a writer populates the rmap between the lock's read and the iterator's re-read, the aging path walks the newly installed rmap without holding its lock.
For a KVM_RMAP_MANY rmap this leaves the walker following a pte_list_desc chain that it never locked. A writer holding mmu_lock for write may free that chain (e.g. kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes() on the recycle path, or any rmap zap) via kmem_cache_free() while the walk is in progress, giving a slab use-after-free. Nothing serialises the two: the aging path runs without mmu_lock when CONFIG_KVM_MMU_LOCKLESS_AGING=y, and the rmap lock that would otherwise exclude the writer was elided. Because the empty path re-enables preemption, the interval between the two reads can span an arbitrary scheduling delay.
Fix the class of bug by having the lockless walk consume the value returned by the lock instead of re-reading the rmap. Split rmap_get_first() into __rmap_get_first(), which starts an iterator from an already-read rmap value, and make for_each_rmap_spte_lockless() take that value and call __rmap_get_first() directly. kvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() passes the value returned by kvm_rmap_lock_readonly(): when the lock was elided the value is zero, __rmap_get_first() returns NULL, and the walk is skipped. No lockless walker re-reads the rmap, so the lock-elision invariant cannot be violated, and no lock()-without-paired-unlock() path is added to the aging code.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-89928"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-16T11:17:02Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nKVM: x86/mmu: Consume the locked rmap value in the lockless rmap walk\n\n__kvm_rmap_lock() deliberately elides the rmap lock when it observes an\nempty rmap. In that case kvm_rmap_lock_readonly() also re-enables\npreemption and returns zero, so the caller holds neither the rmap lock\nnor a preemption reference. The elision documents the invariant it\nrelies on:\n\n\t * Elide the lock if the rmap is empty, as lockless walkers (read-only\n\t * mode) don\u0027t need to (and can\u0027t) walk an empty rmap, nor can they add\n\t * entries to the rmap. I.e. the only paths that process empty rmaps\n\t * do so while holding mmu_lock for write, and are mutually exclusive.\n\nkvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() ignores the returned value and unconditionally\nenters for_each_rmap_spte_lockless(). The iterator started with\nrmap_get_first(), which re-reads rmap_head-\u003eval rather than using the\nvalue returned by the lock. If a writer populates the rmap between the\nlock\u0027s read and the iterator\u0027s re-read, the aging path walks the newly\ninstalled rmap without holding its lock.\n\nFor a KVM_RMAP_MANY rmap this leaves the walker following a\npte_list_desc chain that it never locked. A writer holding mmu_lock for\nwrite may free that chain (e.g. kvm_zap_all_rmap_sptes() on the recycle\npath, or any rmap zap) via kmem_cache_free() while the walk is in\nprogress, giving a slab use-after-free. Nothing serialises the two: the\naging path runs without mmu_lock when CONFIG_KVM_MMU_LOCKLESS_AGING=y,\nand the rmap lock that would otherwise exclude the writer was elided.\nBecause the empty path re-enables preemption, the interval between the\ntwo reads can span an arbitrary scheduling delay.\n\nFix the class of bug by having the lockless walk consume the value\nreturned by the lock instead of re-reading the rmap. Split\nrmap_get_first() into __rmap_get_first(), which starts an iterator from\nan already-read rmap value, and make for_each_rmap_spte_lockless() take\nthat value and call __rmap_get_first() directly.\nkvm_rmap_age_gfn_range() passes the value returned by\nkvm_rmap_lock_readonly(): when the lock was elided the value is zero,\n__rmap_get_first() returns NULL, and the walk is skipped. No lockless\nwalker re-reads the rmap, so the lock-elision invariant cannot be\nviolated, and no lock()-without-paired-unlock() path is added to the\naging code.",
"id": "GHSA-f7hc-2wxr-4jfg",
"modified": "2026-09-16T15:31:02Z",
"published": "2026-09-16T12:30:41Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-89928"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/41debfc98526c0a95c41a62435aca0a70340a26d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8edb3c09e43f7cd8a5dfd291c6e0fc9c74d4621d"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e428f9779a43737d830111238816f1928b07aefb"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.