GHSA-F7GQ-H8JV-H3CQ
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-06-17 14:20 – Updated: 2026-04-06 23:14Impact
Session tokens remain valid on the server after user logout, creating a security gap where:
- Compromised tokens (via XSS, network interception, or device theft) continue to work even after the user logs out
- The sessions stored in the database still expire, limiting the duration during which this could be exploited
- Users cannot fully invalidate their sessions when logging out from shared or potentially compromised devices
- by default, changing one's password does invalidate all other sessions, so changing your password as a security measure would have been effective
- May cause compliance issues with security frameworks requiring complete session
Patches
Upgrade to version 2.10.0. After upgrading, users must update their AuthController implementation to use the new clear_session/2 function with their OTP app name. You will be prompted to do so with a compile-time error.
If you do not have the setting require_token_presence_for_authentication? set to true in the tokens section, you will see a separate error:
** (Spark.Error.DslError) authentication -> session_identifier:
Must set `authentication.session_identifier` to either `:jti` or `:unsafe`.
...
In order to revoke sessions on log out when not storing tokens directly in the session, we must have some unique identifier with which to do so. You should prefer to enable require_token_presence_for_authentication? if possible, instead of setting this to :jti. Note that whatever you do here, if you did not previously have require_token_presence_for_authentication? set to true, setting it to true or setting authentication.session_identifier to :jti will log out all of your currently authenticated users.
Workarounds
You can manually revoke tokens in your logout/2 handler in your auth controller.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 2.9.0"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Hex",
"name": "ash_authentication_phoenix"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "2.10.0"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2025-4754"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-613"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2025-06-17T14:20:46Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2025-06-17T15:15:53Z",
"severity": "LOW"
},
"details": "### Impact\n\nSession tokens remain valid on the server after user logout, creating a security gap where:\n\n- Compromised tokens (via XSS, network interception, or device theft) continue to work even after the user logs out\n - The sessions stored in the database still expire, limiting the duration during which this could be exploited\n- Users cannot fully invalidate their sessions when logging out from shared or potentially compromised devices \n - by default, changing one\u0027s password *does* invalidate all other sessions, so changing your password as a security measure would have been effective\n- May cause compliance issues with security frameworks requiring complete session \n### Patches\nUpgrade to version 2.10.0. After upgrading, users must update their AuthController implementation to use the new `clear_session/2` function with their OTP app name. You will be prompted to do so with a compile-time error.\n\nIf you do not have the setting `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` set to `true` in the `tokens` section, you will see a separate error:\n\n```\n** (Spark.Error.DslError) authentication -\u003e session_identifier:\nMust set `authentication.session_identifier` to either `:jti` or `:unsafe`.\n\n...\n```\n\nIn order to revoke sessions on log out when not storing tokens directly in the session, we must have some unique identifier with which to do so. You should prefer to enable `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` if possible, instead of setting this to `:jti`. Note that whatever you do here, if you did not previously have `require_token_presence_for_authentication?` set to `true`, setting it to `true` *or* setting `authentication.session_identifier` to `:jti` will log out all of your currently authenticated users.\n\n### Workarounds\nYou can manually revoke tokens in your `logout/2` handler in your auth controller.",
"id": "GHSA-f7gq-h8jv-h3cq",
"modified": "2026-04-06T23:14:59Z",
"published": "2025-06-17T14:20:46Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/security/advisories/GHSA-f7gq-h8jv-h3cq"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-4754"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/pull/634"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix/commit/a3253fb4fc7145aeb403537af1c24d3a8d51ffb1"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://cna.erlef.org/cves/CVE-2025-4754.html"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/team-alembic/ash_authentication_phoenix"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://osv.dev/vulnerability/EEF-CVE-2025-4754"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:L/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "ash_authentication_phoenix has Insufficient Session Expiration"
}
Drag nodes to arrange them. Double-click a related vulnerability to open it, or a source to visit its link. The Physics button on the left tunes the layout and the simulation; the legend at the bottom left hides or shows nodes by kind and by sighting type.
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
- Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
- Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
- Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
- Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Vulnerability timeline
Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC
How durations are calculated
Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.
Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.
Loading timeline…
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.
Related by attack behaviour
Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.