GHSA-F7CG-QGJP-PHQF
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-08-15 06:32 – Updated: 2026-08-15 06:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ieee802154: ca8210: fix cas_ctl leak on spi_async failure
ca8210_spi_transfer() allocates cas_ctl with kzalloc_obj(GFP_ATOMIC) and relies entirely on the SPI completion callback ca8210_spi_transfer_complete() to free it.
The spi_async() API only invokes the completion callback on successful submission. On failure it returns a negative error code without ever queuing the callback, which leaves cas_ctl and its embedded spi_message and spi_transfer orphaned. Every kfree(cas_ctl) in the driver is inside the completion callback, so there is no other reclamation path.
ca8210_spi_transfer() is called from ca8210_spi_exchange(), the interrupt handler ca8210_interrupt_handler(), and from the retry path inside the completion callback itself. The exchange and interrupt handler paths loop on -EBUSY, so under sustained SPI bus contention every retry iteration leaks a fresh cas_ctl (~600 bytes per occurrence).
Fix it by freeing cas_ctl on the spi_async() error path. While here, correct the misleading error string: the function calls spi_async(), not spi_sync().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-72048"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-08-15T06:21:14Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nieee802154: ca8210: fix cas_ctl leak on spi_async failure\n\nca8210_spi_transfer() allocates cas_ctl with kzalloc_obj(GFP_ATOMIC)\nand relies entirely on the SPI completion callback\nca8210_spi_transfer_complete() to free it.\n\nThe spi_async() API only invokes the completion callback on successful\nsubmission. On failure it returns a negative error code without ever\nqueuing the callback, which leaves cas_ctl and its embedded spi_message\nand spi_transfer orphaned. Every kfree(cas_ctl) in the driver is\ninside the completion callback, so there is no other reclamation path.\n\nca8210_spi_transfer() is called from ca8210_spi_exchange(), the\ninterrupt handler ca8210_interrupt_handler(), and from the retry path\ninside the completion callback itself. The exchange and interrupt\nhandler paths loop on -EBUSY, so under sustained SPI bus contention\nevery retry iteration leaks a fresh cas_ctl (~600 bytes per\noccurrence).\n\nFix it by freeing cas_ctl on the spi_async() error path. While here,\ncorrect the misleading error string: the function calls spi_async(),\nnot spi_sync().",
"id": "GHSA-f7cg-qgjp-phqf",
"modified": "2026-08-15T06:32:10Z",
"published": "2026-08-15T06:32:10Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-72048"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/460c5cd51e4d7d15b317f178f42cfcb666c0fe91"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7e3630fbb6aabb844bbf35746dee0bf3894100c7"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b07aea90dbc6e188c74c100af64b77b9482ffc65"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b9071dc7889bef42590e04fbf3e56cc65e1e5e6e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cb5cca1d2a908ddd5e357971de0f2009617b8d6a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d4a397fe803c2d157f6ebb068b802ef75fbf109e"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e09390e439bd7cca30dd10893b1f64802961667a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fe90605b651573d30be8293ff5be40e3d7023117"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
Sightings
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