GHSA-F6C3-623P-967P
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:31 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring
The existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid disabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing was a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the connection/channel didn't get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT reply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in fuse_uring_ready() doesn't work and IO could already be going on and cause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch->bg_lock and queue->lock).
The change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change, FUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers to accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only non-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it. Qemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.
Moved up is the smp_load_acquire(&fch->initialized) check, as a fuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT is processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.
Also fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the FUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.
If there should be a report from any library or application we probably need to revert this commit.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90095"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:01Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nfuse: Fix the condition to enable over-io-uring\n\nThe existing condition in fuse_uring_cmd() is there only to avoid\ndisabling io-uring for connections that already run with it, missing\nwas a condition to refuse any IORING_OP_URING_CMD if the\nconnection/channel didn\u0027t get enabled because of missing FUSE_INIT\nreply flag FUSE_OVER_IO_URING. Without the reply flag the barrier in\nfuse_uring_ready() doesn\u0027t work and IO could already be going on and\ncause deadlock states (at a minimum one between fch-\u003ebg_lock and\nqueue-\u003elock).\n\nThe change itself is trivial, but brings behavior change,\nFUSE_OVER_IO_URING has to be set in the FUSE_INIT_REPLY by fuse servers\nto accept any IORING_OP_URING_CMD. Libfuse does that and the only\nnon-libfuse implementation I found (fractal-fuse) also does it.\nQemu patches for fuse-io-uring are not merged yet, as far as I know.\n\nMoved up is the smp_load_acquire(\u0026fch-\u003einitialized) check, as a\nfuse-server implementation might try to setup io-uring before FUSE_INIT\nis processed and might have gotten -EOPNOTSUPP instead of -EAGAIN.\n\nAlso fixed is a stale comment that explains the handling of the\nFUSE_OVER_IO_URING flag in early RFC versions.\n\nIf there should be a report from any library or application we\nprobably need to revert this commit.",
"id": "GHSA-f6c3-623p-967p",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:31:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90095"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1f59015e958174e89be58cc8db16d70a60d17255"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/8f9a725d89711ad027f6b7183586ef91528f106d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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