GHSA-F5MR-VRH3-3RPP
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-03-14 00:30 – Updated: 2025-03-14 00:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
XArray: Fix xas_create_range() when multi-order entry present
If there is already an entry present that is of order >= XA_CHUNK_SHIFT when we call xas_create_range(), xas_create_range() will misinterpret that entry as a node and dereference xa_node->parent, generally leading to a crash that looks something like this:
general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f] CPU: 0 PID: 32 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-syzkaller-00003-g56e337f2cf13 #0 RIP: 0010:xa_parent_locked include/linux/xarray.h:1207 [inline] RIP: 0010:xas_create_range+0x2d9/0x6e0 lib/xarray.c:725
It's deterministically reproducable once you know what the problem is, but producing it in a live kernel requires khugepaged to hit a race. While the problem has been present since xas_create_range() was introduced, I'm not aware of a way to hit it before the page cache was converted to use multi-index entries.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2022-49152"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-476"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-02-26T07:00:52Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nXArray: Fix xas_create_range() when multi-order entry present\n\nIf there is already an entry present that is of order \u003e= XA_CHUNK_SHIFT\nwhen we call xas_create_range(), xas_create_range() will misinterpret\nthat entry as a node and dereference xa_node-\u003eparent, generally leading\nto a crash that looks something like this:\n\ngeneral protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc0000000001:\n0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN\nKASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000008-0x000000000000000f]\nCPU: 0 PID: 32 Comm: khugepaged Not tainted 5.17.0-rc8-syzkaller-00003-g56e337f2cf13 #0\nRIP: 0010:xa_parent_locked include/linux/xarray.h:1207 [inline]\nRIP: 0010:xas_create_range+0x2d9/0x6e0 lib/xarray.c:725\n\nIt\u0027s deterministically reproducable once you know what the problem is,\nbut producing it in a live kernel requires khugepaged to hit a race.\nWhile the problem has been present since xas_create_range() was\nintroduced, I\u0027m not aware of a way to hit it before the page cache was\nconverted to use multi-index entries.",
"id": "GHSA-f5mr-vrh3-3rpp",
"modified": "2025-03-14T00:30:51Z",
"published": "2025-03-14T00:30:50Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2022-49152"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/18f13edf3424b3b61814b69d5269b2e14584800c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1ac49c8fd49fdf53d3cd8b77eb8ffda08d7fbe22"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/29968329b926d238e3107ec071a250397555d264"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e2852eda19ee1a400cd809d7a9322680f34a262"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3e3c658055c002900982513e289398a1aad4a488"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7521a97b1929042604bef6859f62fa8b4bbc077b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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