GHSA-F4V5-65JJ-PCR2
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-07-22 22:56 – Updated: 2026-07-22 22:56Description
FINDING — MEDIUM (HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections with trailers) HttpConnection._trailers Cross-Request Leakage (Never Reset Between Requests)
Location: jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/ HttpConnection.java:107, 1157-1161, 1170
Detail: _trailers (line 107) is a connection-scoped HttpFields.Mutable field. parsedTrailer() (line 1157) populates it when request N carries HTTP trailers. messageComplete() (line 1170) checks "if (_trailers != null)" — evaluates true from request N's data — and stamps it onto request N+1.
Grep confirms: ZERO occurrences of "_trailers = null" in entire HttpConnection.java.
Scenario: Request N: POST /upload (trailers: X-Checksum: abc123) Request N+1: GET /data (no trailers) app: request.getTrailers() on N+1 → returns {X-Checksum: abc123} ← STALE
Application logic branching on getTrailers() != null produces incorrect behavior. Not cross-connection (same keep-alive connection only).
More dangerous scenario: TOCTOU — trailer passes check, target swapped before use.
Workarounds
Do not rely on HTTP request trailers for security-sensitive logic, or disable persistent connections by closing the connection after each HTTP/1.1 request.
{
"affected": [
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.0.35"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.0.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.0.36"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
},
{
"database_specific": {
"last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 12.1.9"
},
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Maven",
"name": "org.eclipse.jetty:jetty-server"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "12.1.0"
},
{
"fixed": "12.1.10"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-10051"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-200"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-07-22T22:56:05Z",
"nvd_published_at": "2026-07-14T09:16:39Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "### Description\n\n\u003e FINDING \u2014 MEDIUM (HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections with trailers)\n\u003e HttpConnection._trailers Cross-Request Leakage (Never Reset Between Requests)\n\u003e \n\u003e Location:\n\u003e jetty-core/jetty-server/src/main/java/org/eclipse/jetty/server/internal/\n\u003e HttpConnection.java:107, 1157-1161, 1170\n\u003e \n\u003e Detail:\n\u003e _trailers (line 107) is a connection-scoped HttpFields.Mutable field.\n\u003e parsedTrailer() (line 1157) populates it when request N carries HTTP trailers.\n\u003e messageComplete() (line 1170) checks \"if (_trailers != null)\" \u2014 evaluates true\n\u003e from request N\u0027s data \u2014 and stamps it onto request N+1.\n\u003e \n\u003e Grep confirms: ZERO occurrences of \"_trailers = null\" in entire HttpConnection.java.\n\u003e \n\u003e Scenario:\n\u003e Request N: POST /upload (trailers: X-Checksum: abc123)\n\u003e Request N+1: GET /data (no trailers)\n\u003e app: request.getTrailers() on N+1 \u2192 returns {X-Checksum: abc123} \u2190 STALE\n\u003e \n\u003e Application logic branching on getTrailers() != null produces incorrect behavior.\n\u003e Not cross-connection (same keep-alive connection only).\n\u003e \n\u003e More dangerous scenario: TOCTOU \u2014 trailer passes check, target swapped before use.\n\n### Workarounds\nDo not rely on HTTP request trailers for security-sensitive logic, or disable persistent connections by closing the connection after each HTTP/1.1 request.",
"id": "GHSA-f4v5-65jj-pcr2",
"modified": "2026-07-22T22:56:05Z",
"published": "2026-07-22T22:56:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/security/advisories/GHSA-f4v5-65jj-pcr2"
},
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-10051"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/15162"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/pull/15163"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/72206b3ea623cf7ed8729b47a83ee628ff10e8eb"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/commit/dc27e8d3ab743fe27935ea2d8c41756eb6c5bae9"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.0.36"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/jetty/jetty.project/releases/tag/jetty-12.1.10"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://gitlab.eclipse.org/security/cve-assignment/-/work_items/119"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N",
"type": "CVSS_V4"
}
],
"summary": "Eclipse Jetty: Cross-Request Leakage for trailers on HTTP/1.1 keep-alive connections"
}
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