Vulnerability-Lookup

GHSA-F4CQ-MFH7-4385

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-30 09:31 – Updated: 2026-09-30 12:35

Details

The defect manifests differently depending on the version: - In 0.9.0 through 0.11.0 a failed message-signature check is only logged and never enforced, and there is no mechanism to verify the server certificate: it is taken from the unauthenticated GetEndpoints discovery response and used to encrypt the user's password. - In 0.12.0 through 0.13.1 the signature check is inverted (valid signatures are rejected, invalid ones accepted), and server certificates are accepted without a trust anchor by default. - In all affected versions the default security policy is None. Starting with 0.12.0 the driver additionally continues silently at a weaker security policy than the one configured, and starting with 0.13.0 endpoint selection prefers the weakest matching endpoint.

Users checking only for one of these mechanisms may wrongly conclude they are unaffected.

This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.9.0 before 1.0.0.

Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 verifies message signatures correctly, refuses to connect unless the server certificate can be verified against a configured trust store or pinned certificate, defaults to Basic256Sha256 with SignAndEncrypt, and fails the connection if the negotiated security policy is weaker than the configured one.

Severity

9.2 (Critical)


                  
                    CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

Show details on source website

JSON

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{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-102508"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-295"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-09-30T08:16:31Z",
    "severity": "CRITICAL"
  },
  "details": "Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature and Improper Certificate Validation in the OPC UA driver of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allows an attacker in a network position between client and server to impersonate the OPC UA server and to read, forge or modify secure-channel traffic, including user credential ssent by the client.\n\nThe defect manifests differently depending on the version:\n- In 0.9.0 through 0.11.0 a failed message-signature check is only logged and never enforced, and there is no mechanism to verify the server certificate: it is taken from the unauthenticated GetEndpoints discovery response and used to encrypt the user\u0027s password.\n- In 0.12.0 through 0.13.1 the signature check is inverted (valid signatures are rejected, invalid ones accepted), and server certificates are accepted without a trust anchor by default.\n- In all affected versions the default security policy is None. Starting with 0.12.0 the driver additionally continues silently at a weaker security policy than the one configured, and starting with 0.13.0 endpoint selection prefers the weakest matching endpoint.\n\nUsers checking only for one of these mechanisms may wrongly conclude they are unaffected.\n\nThis issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.9.0 before 1.0.0.\n\nUsers are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 verifies message signatures correctly, refuses to connect unless the server certificate can be verified against a configured trust store or pinned certificate, defaults to Basic256Sha256 with SignAndEncrypt, and fails the\nconnection if the negotiated security policy is weaker than the configured one.",
  "id": "GHSA-f4cq-mfh7-4385",
  "modified": "2026-09-30T12:35:14Z",
  "published": "2026-09-30T09:31:09Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-102508"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/o076mcnsx6wnqpdy780m7s6hddbbnjfw"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/30/4"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:X/CR:X/IR:X/AR:X/MAV:X/MAC:X/MAT:X/MPR:X/MUI:X/MVC:X/MVI:X/MVA:X/MSC:X/MSI:X/MSA:X/S:X/AU:X/R:X/V:X/RE:X/U:X",
      "type": "CVSS_V4"
    }
  ]
}

CVE-2026-102508 (GCVE-0-2026-102508)

Vulnerability from cvelistv5 – Published: 2026-09-30 07:42 – Updated: 2026-09-30 14:39

Title

Apache PLC4X: OPC UA secure channel: integrity bypass, unverifiable server certificate, and silent downgrade

Summary

Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature and Improper Certificate Validation in the OPC UA driver of Apache PLC4X (PLC4J) allows an attacker in a network position between client and server to impersonate the OPC UA server and to read, forge or modify secure-channel traffic, including user credential ssent by the client. The defect manifests differently depending on the version: - In 0.9.0 through 0.11.0 a failed message-signature check is only logged and never enforced, and there is no mechanism to verify the server certificate: it is taken from the unauthenticated GetEndpoints discovery response and used to encrypt the user's password. - In 0.12.0 through 0.13.1 the signature check is inverted (valid signatures are rejected, invalid ones accepted), and server certificates are accepted without a trust anchor by default. - In all affected versions the default security policy is None. Starting with 0.12.0 the driver additionally continues silently at a weaker security policy than the one configured, and starting with 0.13.0 endpoint selection prefers the weakest matching endpoint. Users checking only for one of these mechanisms may wrongly conclude they are unaffected. This issue affects Apache PLC4X: from 0.9.0 before 1.0.0. Users are recommended to upgrade to version 1.0.0, which fixes the issue. Version 1.0.0 verifies message signatures correctly, refuses to connect unless the server certificate can be verified against a configured trust store or pinned certificate, defaults to Basic256Sha256 with SignAndEncrypt, and fails the connection if the negotiated security policy is weaker than the configured one.

Severity

9.2 (Critical)


                        
                          CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N

SSVC

Exploitation: none Automatable: no Technical Impact: total

CISA Coordinator · CISA-ADP (v2.0.3)

Decision recorded 2026-09-30 14:39 UTC

CWE

CWE-347 - Improper verification of cryptographic signature
CWE-295 - Improper Certificate Validation
CWE-757 - Selection of Less-Secure Algorithm During Negotiation ('Algorithm Downgrade')

Assigner

apache CNA under the mitre root

CNA scorecard B 76/100 over 1257 records in the last 180 days details

References

2 references

URL	Tags
https://lists.apache.org/thread.html/o076mcnsx6wn…	vendor-advisory
http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2026/09/30/4

Impacted products

1 product

Vendor	Product	Version
Apache Software Foundation	Apache PLC4X	Affected: 0.9.0 , < 1.0.0 (semver) Unaffected: 1.0.0 (semver)

Credits

Abhinav Agarwal

Show details on NVD website

JSON

To clipboard

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Sightings

Author	Source	Type	Date	Other

Nomenclature

Seen: The vulnerability was mentioned, discussed, or observed by the user.
Confirmed: The vulnerability has been validated from an analyst's perspective.
Published Proof of Concept: A public proof of concept is available for this vulnerability.
Exploited: The vulnerability was observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Patched: The vulnerability was observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
Not exploited: The vulnerability was not observed as exploited by the user who reported the sighting.
Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.

Vulnerability timeline

Sightings and recorded dates, grouped by day · UTC

Order JSON

How durations are calculated

Following the VTEM framework (Black Hat USA 2015), time to patch starts when the vendor or a coordinator was informed, total time to patch at discovery, and disclosure to patch at public disclosure; vendor response time runs from the report to its acknowledgement. Time to exploit and time unpatched start at the earliest discovery or report, falling back to public disclosure. Unpatched time ends at the first recorded patch, or the calculation time when no patch is recorded. Exploitation to patch shows the interval between those two events; a published proof of concept is a public exploit, not exploitation.

Each result shows its source dates. A negative interval means the end event came first; when date-only inputs leave the order open, the result says so. Date-only inputs are approximate. The earliest evidence wins: KEV report dates and sightings are labelled as such. Records describing another vulnerability are listed but never calculated from, and a PoC alone does not establish exploitation. Missing patch evidence does not prove that no patch exists. Filters below change the event list only.

Publication & reservation Sightings KEV catalogs Other timestamps

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The MITRE ATT&CK techniques below are AI-generated suggestions, inferred from the description of the vulnerability by the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-classification-roberta-base model, served locally by ML-Gateway. They have not been verified by an analyst and are provided for guidance only.
The approach is described in our paper Mapping CVEs to MITRE ATT&CK Techniques: A Curated Gold-Set Classifier and the Limits of LLM-Assisted Label Expansion.
Browse all ATT&CK techniques and the vulnerabilities related to each.

Related by attack behaviour

Vulnerabilities whose description is nearest to this one in the vector space of the CIRCL/vulnerability-attack-technique-biencoder model. This is a similarity search over the bi-encoder space (plain cosine), not a classification, and it has no measured accuracy.

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