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GHSA-F3FM-XFJV-XM82

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-07-04 15:31 – Updated: 2025-11-18 18:32
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

can: kvaser_pciefd: refine error prone echo_skb_max handling logic

echo_skb_max should define the supported upper limit of echo_skb[] allocated inside the netdevice's priv. The corresponding size value provided by this driver to alloc_candev() is KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT which is 17.

But later echo_skb_max is rounded up to the nearest power of two (for the max case, that would be 32) and the tx/ack indices calculated further during tx/rx may exceed the upper array boundary. Kasan reported this for the ack case inside kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet(), though the xmit function has actually caught the same thing earlier.

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet+0x2d7/0x92a drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 Read of size 8 at addr ffff888105e4f078 by task swapper/4/0

CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(voluntary) Call Trace: dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:122 print_report mm/kasan/report.c:521 kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:634 kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528 kvaser_pciefd_read_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1605 kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1656 kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1684 kvaser_pciefd_irq_handler drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1733 __handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:158 handle_irq_event kernel/irq/handle.c:210 handle_edge_irq kernel/irq/chip.c:833 __common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:296 common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:286

Tx max count definitely matters for kvaser_pciefd_tx_avail(), but for seq numbers' generation that's not the case - we're free to calculate them as would be more convenient, not taking tx max count into account. The only downside is that the size of echo_skb[] should correspond to the max seq number (not tx max count), so in some situations a bit more memory would be consumed than could be.

Thus make the size of the underlying echo_skb[] sufficient for the rounded max tx value.

Found by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2025-38224"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-125"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2025-07-04T14:15:31Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ncan: kvaser_pciefd: refine error prone echo_skb_max handling logic\n\necho_skb_max should define the supported upper limit of echo_skb[]\nallocated inside the netdevice\u0027s priv. The corresponding size value\nprovided by this driver to alloc_candev() is KVASER_PCIEFD_CAN_TX_MAX_COUNT\nwhich is 17.\n\nBut later echo_skb_max is rounded up to the nearest power of two (for the\nmax case, that would be 32) and the tx/ack indices calculated further\nduring tx/rx may exceed the upper array boundary. Kasan reported this for\nthe ack case inside kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet(), though the xmit\nfunction has actually caught the same thing earlier.\n\n BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet+0x2d7/0x92a drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528\n Read of size 8 at addr ffff888105e4f078 by task swapper/4/0\n\n CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 6.15.0 #12 PREEMPT(voluntary)\n Call Trace:\n  \u003cIRQ\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl lib/dump_stack.c:122\n print_report mm/kasan/report.c:521\n kasan_report mm/kasan/report.c:634\n kvaser_pciefd_handle_ack_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1528\n kvaser_pciefd_read_packet drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1605\n kvaser_pciefd_read_buffer drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1656\n kvaser_pciefd_receive_irq drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1684\n kvaser_pciefd_irq_handler drivers/net/can/kvaser_pciefd.c:1733\n __handle_irq_event_percpu kernel/irq/handle.c:158\n handle_irq_event kernel/irq/handle.c:210\n handle_edge_irq kernel/irq/chip.c:833\n __common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:296\n common_interrupt arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:286\n  \u003c/IRQ\u003e\n\nTx max count definitely matters for kvaser_pciefd_tx_avail(), but for seq\nnumbers\u0027 generation that\u0027s not the case - we\u0027re free to calculate them as\nwould be more convenient, not taking tx max count into account. The only\ndownside is that the size of echo_skb[] should correspond to the max seq\nnumber (not tx max count), so in some situations a bit more memory would\nbe consumed than could be.\n\nThus make the size of the underlying echo_skb[] sufficient for the rounded\nmax tx value.\n\nFound by Linux Verification Center (linuxtesting.org) with Syzkaller.",
  "id": "GHSA-f3fm-xfjv-xm82",
  "modified": "2025-11-18T18:32:47Z",
  "published": "2025-07-04T15:31:10Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-38224"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/54ec8b08216f3be2cc98b33633d3c8ea79749895"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a6550c9aa11e2f57f9cdaa6249cdd44d446be874"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d8a054b6e6824a8b52c3977ebd38c9583a63efac"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ]
}



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