GHSA-F39C-J3GP-39R5
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-17 18:32 – Updated: 2026-09-17 18:32In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Fix VINTF0 leak on the init-failure path
tegra241_cmdqv_init_structures() allocates VINTF0 with kzalloc_obj(), inits it, and preallocates its logical VCMDQs. Two of its error paths leak.
When tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() fails it returns before VINTF0 reaches the cmdqv->vintfs[] array, so the devres unwind on probe failure cannot reach it; free it directly there.
A later VCMDQ preallocation failure instead leaves VINTF0 published, and so this time the unwind does reach tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf(), which then frees it from vintf->hyp_own. But tegra241_vintf_hw_init() sets that flag only afterward, from a HW read-back, so the still-uninited VINTF0 reads as guest-owned and leaks, with mutex_destroy() and ida_destroy() run on fields it never set up.
Decide ownership from vintf->idx instead, the index assigned when its id is allocated: idx 0 is the kernel-owned VINTF0, while idx >= 1 marks a guest VINTF. So the in-kernel free decision in tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf() and tegra241_vintf_free_lvcmdq() now keys on idx too, and hyp_own stays a pure HW-readback state.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-90424"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-17T17:17:47Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\niommu/tegra241-cmdqv: Fix VINTF0 leak on the init-failure path\n\ntegra241_cmdqv_init_structures() allocates VINTF0 with kzalloc_obj(), inits\nit, and preallocates its logical VCMDQs. Two of its error paths leak.\n\nWhen tegra241_cmdqv_init_vintf() fails it returns before VINTF0 reaches the\ncmdqv-\u003evintfs[] array, so the devres unwind on probe failure cannot reach\nit; free it directly there.\n\nA later VCMDQ preallocation failure instead leaves VINTF0 published, and so\nthis time the unwind does reach tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf(), which then\nfrees it from vintf-\u003ehyp_own. But tegra241_vintf_hw_init() sets that flag\nonly afterward, from a HW read-back, so the still-uninited VINTF0 reads as\nguest-owned and leaks, with mutex_destroy() and ida_destroy() run on fields\nit never set up.\n\nDecide ownership from vintf-\u003eidx instead, the index assigned when its id is\nallocated: idx 0 is the kernel-owned VINTF0, while idx \u003e= 1 marks a guest\nVINTF. So the in-kernel free decision in tegra241_cmdqv_remove_vintf() and\ntegra241_vintf_free_lvcmdq() now keys on idx too, and hyp_own stays a pure\nHW-readback state.",
"id": "GHSA-f39c-j3gp-39r5",
"modified": "2026-09-17T18:32:05Z",
"published": "2026-09-17T18:32:05Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-90424"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1d2271d7df5230e4ce36bdafd17524bd004f3b3f"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/417190bde0fda4ee857999a722ca90163fbec587"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f40f3144477314b489e4bc209c06cb51679fe82b"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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