GHSA-F28V-RR9C-W68G
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-09-25 12:31 – Updated: 2026-10-30 15:33In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]
The FC BSG transport allocates job->request via memdup_user() using the exact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR, fc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and vendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.
qla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several sub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor command area without verifying request_len. A caller holding CAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the host, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to mis-select a command or panic).
Add a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector is always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in qla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add request_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further: qla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(), qla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(), qla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and qla28xx_validate_flash_image().
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-97529"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-09-25T11:17:03Z",
"severity": null
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nscsi: qla2xxx: Validate BSG request_len before reading vendor_cmd[]\n\nThe FC BSG transport allocates job-\u003erequest via memdup_user() using the\nexact user-supplied request_len. For FC_BSG_HST_VENDOR,\nfc_bsg_host_dispatch() only guarantees request_len covers msgcode and\nvendor_id; it does not account for the vendor_cmd[] flexible array.\n\nqla2xxx then reads the command selector vendor_cmd[0] and, in several\nsub-handlers, vendor_cmd[1]/[2] or structures overlaid on the vendor\ncommand area without verifying request_len. A caller holding\nCAP_SYS_RAWIO can submit a short request whose vendor_id matches the\nhost, triggering out-of-bounds heap reads (KASAN-detectable, and able to\nmis-select a command or panic).\n\nAdd a central guard in qla2x00_process_vendor_specific() so the selector\nis always in bounds, restrict the early vendor_cmd[0] read in\nqla24xx_bsg_request() to sufficiently long vendor messages, and add\nrequest_len checks to the sub-handlers that read further:\nqla24xx_proc_fcp_prio_cfg_cmd(), qla2x00_process_loopback(),\nqla84xx_reset(), qla84xx_updatefw(), qla2x00_read_optrom(),\nqla2x00_update_optrom(), qlafx00_mgmt_cmd() and\nqla28xx_validate_flash_image().",
"id": "GHSA-f28v-rr9c-w68g",
"modified": "2026-10-30T15:33:46Z",
"published": "2026-09-25T12:31:22Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-97529"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0540676f5fefdff748b8d57a927b143e31dc21fd"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cf38dd9465736141263ebb63375868311a0ec81"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5f33efe04658968b6b3f432f904d5f1f74c12286"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/740f3458a4798af54aaf8cf63e797d407e8b6d3b"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a0c6842ec825a91693626dbd9a4c54f2b9dc15ea"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d3762cc777544a4cbc4635a787e1cfc021e1a615"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ef63922d8bdea03de1804af39a6b12212acb1be2"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/f75bff451a2fac5aed82f9641df1e9a42c5a899d"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": []
}
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