GHSA-CXV6-CHW7-MHRH
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-04-27 18:32 – Updated: 2026-05-06 21:31In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
driver core: enforce device_lock for driver_match_device()
Currently, driver_match_device() is called from three sites. One site (__device_attach_driver) holds device_lock(dev), but the other two (bind_store and __driver_attach) do not. This inconsistency means that bus match() callbacks are not guaranteed to be called with the lock held.
Fix this by introducing driver_match_device_locked(), which guarantees holding the device lock using a scoped guard. Replace the unlocked calls in bind_store() and __driver_attach() with this new helper. Also add a lock assertion to driver_match_device() to enforce this guarantee.
This consistency also fixes a known race condition. The driver_override implementation relies on the device_lock, so the missing lock led to the use-after-free (UAF) reported in Bugzilla for buses using this field.
Stress testing the two newly locked paths for 24 hours with CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING and CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled showed no UAF recurrence and no lockdep warnings.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2026-31688"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [
"CWE-416"
],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2026-04-27T18:16:54Z",
"severity": "HIGH"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ndriver core: enforce device_lock for driver_match_device()\n\nCurrently, driver_match_device() is called from three sites. One site\n(__device_attach_driver) holds device_lock(dev), but the other two\n(bind_store and __driver_attach) do not. This inconsistency means that\nbus match() callbacks are not guaranteed to be called with the lock\nheld.\n\nFix this by introducing driver_match_device_locked(), which guarantees\nholding the device lock using a scoped guard. Replace the unlocked calls\nin bind_store() and __driver_attach() with this new helper. Also add a\nlock assertion to driver_match_device() to enforce this guarantee.\n\nThis consistency also fixes a known race condition. The driver_override\nimplementation relies on the device_lock, so the missing lock led to the\nuse-after-free (UAF) reported in Bugzilla for buses using this field.\n\nStress testing the two newly locked paths for 24 hours with\nCONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING and CONFIG_LOCKDEP enabled showed no UAF recurrence\nand no lockdep warnings.",
"id": "GHSA-cxv6-chw7-mhrh",
"modified": "2026-05-06T21:31:30Z",
"published": "2026-04-27T18:32:09Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-31688"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/dc23806a7c47ec5f1293aba407fb69519f976ee0"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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