GHSA-CWJ5-QQPC-PW3V
Vulnerability from github – Published: 2025-05-02 18:31 – Updated: 2025-11-10 18:30In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: tcp_make_synack() can be called from process context
tcp_rtx_synack() now could be called in process context as explained in 0a375c822497 ("tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process context").
tcp_rtx_synack() might call tcp_make_synack(), which will touch per-CPU variables with preemption enabled. This causes the following BUG:
BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: ThriftIO1/5464
caller is tcp_make_synack+0x841/0xac0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x10d/0x1a0
check_preemption_disabled+0x104/0x110
tcp_make_synack+0x841/0xac0
tcp_v6_send_synack+0x5c/0x450
tcp_rtx_synack+0xeb/0x1f0
inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x34/0x60
tcp_check_req+0x3af/0x9e0
tcp_rcv_state_process+0x59b/0x2030
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x5f5/0x700
release_sock+0x3a/0xf0
tcp_sendmsg+0x33/0x40
____sys_sendmsg+0x2f2/0x490
__sys_sendmsg+0x184/0x230
do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90
Avoid calling __TCP_INC_STATS() with will touch per-cpu variables. Use TCP_INC_STATS() which is safe to be called from context switch.
{
"affected": [],
"aliases": [
"CVE-2023-53121"
],
"database_specific": {
"cwe_ids": [],
"github_reviewed": false,
"github_reviewed_at": null,
"nvd_published_at": "2025-05-02T16:15:31Z",
"severity": "MODERATE"
},
"details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\ntcp: tcp_make_synack() can be called from process context\n\ntcp_rtx_synack() now could be called in process context as explained in\n0a375c822497 (\"tcp: tcp_rtx_synack() can be called from process\ncontext\").\n\ntcp_rtx_synack() might call tcp_make_synack(), which will touch per-CPU\nvariables with preemption enabled. This causes the following BUG:\n\n BUG: using __this_cpu_add() in preemptible [00000000] code: ThriftIO1/5464\n caller is tcp_make_synack+0x841/0xac0\n Call Trace:\n \u003cTASK\u003e\n dump_stack_lvl+0x10d/0x1a0\n check_preemption_disabled+0x104/0x110\n tcp_make_synack+0x841/0xac0\n tcp_v6_send_synack+0x5c/0x450\n tcp_rtx_synack+0xeb/0x1f0\n inet_rtx_syn_ack+0x34/0x60\n tcp_check_req+0x3af/0x9e0\n tcp_rcv_state_process+0x59b/0x2030\n tcp_v6_do_rcv+0x5f5/0x700\n release_sock+0x3a/0xf0\n tcp_sendmsg+0x33/0x40\n ____sys_sendmsg+0x2f2/0x490\n __sys_sendmsg+0x184/0x230\n do_syscall_64+0x3d/0x90\n\nAvoid calling __TCP_INC_STATS() with will touch per-cpu variables. Use\nTCP_INC_STATS() which is safe to be called from context switch.",
"id": "GHSA-cwj5-qqpc-pw3v",
"modified": "2025-11-10T18:30:29Z",
"published": "2025-05-02T18:31:37Z",
"references": [
{
"type": "ADVISORY",
"url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2023-53121"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/442aa78ed70188b21ccd8669738448702c0a3281"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7613cde8c0c1f02a7ec2e1d536c01b65b135fc1c"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/77ad58bca0119e8cc3e0e9d91a3f22caa66e4dfa"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9180aa4622a720b433e842b4d3aa34d73eec577a"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ad07290d63ff6689f50565b02f5b6f34ec15a5ca"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/bced3f7db95ff2e6ca29dc4d1c9751ab5e736a09"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d493d4fe88195a144d6a277a90062a7534ed2192"
},
{
"type": "WEB",
"url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/e23ca307745be3df7fe9762f3e2a7e311a57852e"
}
],
"schema_version": "1.4.0",
"severity": [
{
"score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H",
"type": "CVSS_V3"
}
]
}
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