{
  "affected": [
    {
      "database_specific": {
        "last_known_affected_version_range": "\u003c= 35.18.0"
      },
      "package": {
        "ecosystem": "npm",
        "name": "exiftool-vendored"
      },
      "ranges": [
        {
          "events": [
            {
              "introduced": "0"
            },
            {
              "fixed": "35.19.0"
            }
          ],
          "type": "ECOSYSTEM"
        }
      ]
    }
  ],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-43893"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [
      "CWE-88"
    ],
    "github_reviewed": true,
    "github_reviewed_at": "2026-05-05T19:53:47Z",
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-05-11T22:22:14Z",
    "severity": "HIGH"
  },
  "details": "### Impact\n\n`exiftool-vendored` starts ExifTool in `-stay_open True -@ -` mode, where arguments are read from stdin one per line. In affected versions, several caller-supplied strings were interpolated into ExifTool arguments without rejecting line delimiters. A newline or carriage return inside one of those strings could split a single intended argument into multiple ExifTool arguments, allowing argument injection. The fix also rejects NUL bytes as unsafe control characters.\n\nApplications that pass attacker-controlled strings to affected APIs may allow an attacker to make ExifTool read files accessible to the ExifTool process, or write output to attacker-chosen file system paths accessible to that process. No remote code execution has been demonstrated.\n\nThe reported write-path issue is caused by unsanitized tag **keys**. Tag **values** passed to `ExifTool#write` are not affected, because `WriteTask` already encodes whitespace characters in values (e.g. `\\n` -\u003e `\u0026#10;`) before transmission.\n\nConfirmed affected inputs:\n\n- **Tag-name arguments / tag keys** \u2014 keys of the `tags` object passed to `ExifTool#write`; entries of the `retain` option to `ExifTool#deleteAllTags`; entries of the `numericTags` option to `ExifTool#read`; the `tagname` argument to `ExifTool#extractBinaryTag` and `#extractBinaryTagToBuffer`.\n- **Filename / path arguments** to `ExifTool#write`, `#read`, `#readRaw`, `#deleteAllTags`, `#rewriteAllTags`, `#extractBinaryTag`, `#extractBinaryTagToBuffer`, and the binary-extraction convenience methods `#extractJpgFromRaw`, `#extractPreview`, and `#extractThumbnail`. `path.resolve()` does not strip newlines, so an application that accepts attacker-controlled filenames containing newline characters was vulnerable.\n- **The `imageHashType` option** to `ExifTool#read`. TypeScript types restrict this to a literal union, but JS callers or callers with weakened type checking could reach the sink.\n\nApplications that only pass hardcoded strings for tag names, options, and filenames are not affected.\n\n### Patches\n\nFixed in **v35.19.0**. Two layers of defense:\n\n1. **Per-site input validation.** A new `validateTagName` helper rejects any tag-name string containing characters outside the ExifTool tag grammar (letters, digits, `:`, `-`, `_`, and the ExifTool modifiers `*`, `?`, `+`, `#`). Applied at every tag-name interpolation site.\n2. **Defense-in-depth at the command renderer.** `ExifToolTask.renderCommand` now rejects _any_ argument containing `\\r`, `\\n`, or `\\0` before it is sent to the ExifTool process. This catches injection via filename arguments, option values, and any future interpolation site that forgets the per-site validator.\n\n### Workarounds\n\nUpgrade to v35.19.0 or later.\n\nIf upgrading immediately is not possible, reject untrusted strings containing control characters before passing them to the affected APIs. Conservative guard:\n\n```ts\nfunction assertSafeForExifTool(s: string): void {\n  if (typeof s !== \"string\" || /[\\x00-\\x20=\u003c\u003e]/.test(s)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Rejected unsafe string for ExifTool\");\n  }\n}\n```\n\nApply to tag names, `retain` / `numericTags` entries, binary-extraction tag names, filenames, and the `imageHashType` option. This is a denylist and is strictly weaker than the library\u0027s internal validator; it is sufficient to block the known PoCs but will accept strings that the library itself now rejects.\n\n### Resources\n\n- ExifTool `-stay_open` / argument-file documentation: https://exiftool.org/exiftool_pod.html#stay_open-FLAG\n- ExifTool tag-name reference: https://exiftool.org/TagNames/\n- CWE-88: Improper Neutralization of Argument Delimiters in a Command (\u0027Argument Injection\u0027) \u2014 https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/88.html\n\n### Credit\n\n- Reporter: Hank Tam\n- Affiliation: Independent",
  "id": "GHSA-cw26-7653-2rp5",
  "modified": "2026-05-13T14:19:52Z",
  "published": "2026-05-05T19:53:47Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://github.com/photostructure/exiftool-vendored.js/security/advisories/GHSA-cw26-7653-2rp5"
    },
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-43893"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exiftool.org/TagNames"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://exiftool.org/exiftool_pod.html#stay_open-FLAG"
    },
    {
      "type": "PACKAGE",
      "url": "https://github.com/photostructure/exiftool-vendored.js"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": [
    {
      "score": "CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:H/A:N",
      "type": "CVSS_V3"
    }
  ],
  "summary": "exiftool-vendored vulnerable to argument injection via newline characters in tag names"
}