GHSA-CVG6-Q922-Q66P

Vulnerability from github – Published: 2026-11-19 15:31 – Updated: 2026-11-19 15:31
VLAI
Details

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot

nfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session's cached reply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate ca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and nfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A COMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the SEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows. nfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running nfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves op->status at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having succeeded.

nfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that returned an error. That test reads the status the operation reported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and takes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the zero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so the client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:

BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24 __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60 read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390 nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810 nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240

Check that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following operation's error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing the buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply cache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of an error returned from SEQUENCE.

Show details on source website

{
  "affected": [],
  "aliases": [
    "CVE-2026-99362"
  ],
  "database_specific": {
    "cwe_ids": [],
    "github_reviewed": false,
    "github_reviewed_at": null,
    "nvd_published_at": "2026-11-19T15:17:47Z",
    "severity": null
  },
  "details": "In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:\n\nnfsd: preflight SEQUENCE replies before accepting a slot\n\nnfsd4_sequence() narrows the reply buffer to the session\u0027s cached\nreply limit before it accepts the slot seqid. A client may negotiate\nca_maxresponsesize_cached down to NFSD_MIN_HDR_SEQ_SZ, and\nnfsd4_alloc_slot() then gives every slot a zero-length sl_data[]. A\nCOMPOUND tag can fill that narrowed buffer until it holds the\nSEQUENCE opcode but not the status word that follows.\nnfsd4_encode_operation() returns without running\nnfsd4_encode_sequence(), so cstate.data_offset stays zero. It leaves\nop-\u003estatus at nfs_ok as well, so the COMPOUND is treated as having\nsucceeded.\n\nnfsd4_store_cache_entry() declines to cache a lone SEQUENCE that\nreturned an error. That test reads the status the operation\nreported, so it passes here. The copy starts at offset zero and\ntakes the whole reply, RPC and COMPOUND headers included, into the\nzero-length sl_data[]. The COMPOUND tag is copied along with it, so\nthe client picks most of the bytes written past the end of the slot:\n\n  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390\n  Write of size 80 at addr ffff888003a549cd by task kunit_try_catch/24\n   __asan_memcpy+0x38/0x60\n   read_bytes_from_xdr_buf+0x1bc/0x390\n   nfsd4_sequence_done+0x5b0/0x810\n   nfs4svc_encode_compoundres+0x1bf/0x240\n\nCheck that the fixed-size SEQUENCE result, plus room for a following\noperation\u0027s error status, fits the negotiated limit before narrowing\nthe buffer and consuming the slot seqid. The slot and its reply\ncache are left unchanged, as RFC 8881 Section 2.10.6.1.2 requires of\nan error returned from SEQUENCE.",
  "id": "GHSA-cvg6-q922-q66p",
  "modified": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "published": "2026-11-19T15:31:22Z",
  "references": [
    {
      "type": "ADVISORY",
      "url": "https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-99362"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/1a5a227bca6a8a9f9d31230697aeb84c62a21da6"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/35ff1a7a7e3835c3e974bc5c45d335897564ceae"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/37fc2ec211630360e9aefcaaec8730db964645f2"
    },
    {
      "type": "WEB",
      "url": "https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ed98b0c57e5e84290c5b35428144ab26778905f3"
    }
  ],
  "schema_version": "1.4.0",
  "severity": []
}



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